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AH 

INTRODUCTION 

TO THE STUDY OF 

MORAJL EVIDENCE 



OR, OF THAT 



v 5 



SPECIES OF REASONING 

WHICH RELATES TO 

MATTERS OF FACT AND PRACTICE. 

WITH AN 

APPENDIX, 

On debating for Victory, and not for Truth. 



BY JAMES EDWARD GAMBIER, M. A, 

RECTOR OF LANGLEY, KENT, 

And Chaplain to the Right Hon. Lord Barham. 



THE SECOND EDITION ENLARGED. 




ftonnotn 

Printed for the Author, by J. Bryan, Grccer^MaU CourJi 

AND SOLD BY 

MESSRS. RIVINGTONj ST. PAUL'S CHURCH- YARD. 
1808. 



ERRATA* 

Page 9. the Parenthesis should extend to the end of the 14th 

Line. 
Page 83, Line 11, for its, readout. 

.. 88 > 30, f r these divine laws, read the laws of God. 

In several places a Semicolon is put, instead of a Comma, whick 

the Reader is requested to correct. 



TABLE of CONTENTS. 

Page 

Preface i. 

CHAP. I. 

On the Nature of Moral Evidence, wherein it 

differs from Demonstration . . 1 

Moral Evidence denned — 

Differs from Demonstration ; 

(i) As to its Subjects 2 

(2) As to the Method in which it is conducted 3 

(3) Because the Arguments on both Sides of a 
Question should be considered — 

(4) Because Propositions in Moral Evidence, 
though false, are not absurd 4 

(5) As to the Kind of Assent which it produces - 
(6J Because it affords no Rule for judging 

with Certainty , , 5 

(7) Because it admits of Degrees - 

(8) Because it admits an Accumulation of 
Proofs , 5 

(9) Because you cannot reason safely farther 
than one Step — 

(10) Because it does not compel the Assent . 9 
(it) Because it does not admit of as great Pre- 
cision in Language 10 

Is inferior to Demonstration, yet not to be re- 
jected ? and why , , , , • • . . . -* 



CONTENTS. 

Page 
Two Extremes from not attending to the Dif- 
ference between Moral Evidence and De- 
monstration 13 

(i) Calling probable Proof Demonstration.. — 
(2) Disputing probable Proof, because not de- 
monstrative 14 

CIUP. II. 
On the different Kinds of Moral Evidence, 

with Observations on the Weight of each. . 15 

1. Personal Observation — 

f Of Things uniform • 17 

(2) Of Things various 24 

2. Testimony 27 

Remote Testimony , 35 

3 y Observation of others . . . . . 36 

4. General Notoriety 45 

5. Report 47 

6. Tradition — 

Internal Evidence. Analogy 48 

Inferences from Facts or Premises. Presump- 
tions * 49 

Consistency of the Parts of a Relation 53 

CHAP. III. 

General Directions relating to Moral Rea- 
soning '. 54 

It Previous Qualifications 5Q 

(1) Acquire fixed Principles of Evidence .... ~ 

.'2) A Habit of enquiring after a Standard ... — 

(3) A Habit of refering Things to their End 58 

(4) Acquire clear and precise Rules of Judgment — 



CONTE N T S. 

Page 

2. To determine whether we should engage in 

the Discussion 59 

(r) Is the Question worth investigatiug — 

(2j Will it admit of free Examination 60 

(3) Is it capable of a satisfactory Decision. . . 62 

(4) Are we competent to its Discussion ..... — 

3. When we have determined to investigate 

it, we should 63 

(1) Examine if it be fairly stated — 

(2) Form as clear Ideas of it as possible .... 64 

(3) Consider of what Kind of Evidence the 
Subject admits — 

(4} Our Judgment of future Events should be 

regulated by Probability, not Possibility. . 65 

Consider all Arguments on both Sides .... 67 



iV 



(6) Guard against the Fascinations of Expres- 
sion . 68 

(7) Guard against Mis-statement of Degrees. . — 

(8) Force of Proof depends on Weight of Ar- 
guments, not on their Number . . . 69 

(9) Determine the Weight of each Argument, 
sum up, and balance 

(10) If both Sides be equal, suspend the Judg- 
ment, not otherwise 

4. To determine the weight of an Argument, 

or the Probability of an Event 70 

The Degree of Probability. . , ; 75 

Cautions. 

(1) Make Observations on as large a Scale as 
possible 77 

(2) Take Care that the Circumstances are similar 78 



CONTENTS. 

Page 

Often the Degree of Probability cannot be 

exactly ascertained 83 

How to proceed in Cases of extraordinary im- 
portance 85 

Compound Probability 89 

How to judge by the general Appearance of a 

Question 91 

How to regulate our Choice 93 

(i) State all Advantages and Disadvantages . . — 

(2) Consider remote Consequences 94 

(3) See that all Advantages and Disadvantages 

are fairly stated 95 

(4) On contingent Advantages 96 

To determine on the Pursuit of an Object. . . 98 

How to regulate our Advice to others 101 

CHAP. IV. 

Special Directions relating to each Kind of 
Moral Evidence 102 

1. Personal Observation and the Observation 
of others 

(1) Are you qualified to observe Uiq Subject 

(2) Consider the Circumstances under which 
your Observations were made 103 

(3) Do not draw Conclusions from too few 
Subjects n 

(4) In Subjects which are various, how to as- 
certain what is probable, and the Degree . . 105 

(5) Subjects which are various, do not admit 
constant conclusions ......... 



CONTENTS. 

Page 
Farther Cautions on the Observations of others 106 
(0 Do their Facts and Processes warrant their 
Conclusions — " 

(2) Do their Observations coincide with your 
own - — 

(3) Are they likely to have related them fairly 107 
2. Testimony 108 

(1) Is the Thing credible 

(2) Are the parts of the Relation consistent 
with each other, and with known Circum- 
stances 114 

(3) Does it agree with subsequent Circum- 
stances — 

(4) Is the Witness competent to judge of the 
Fact 113 

(5) Could he recollect it . . . ♦ * • 

(6) Is he a man of general Veracity 116 

(7) Did he speak his real Judgment. 117 

(S) Is he a Man of general Integrity 118 

(9) Is he interested in the Decision of the 
Question 

(10) On a Testimony against the Interest of the 
Witness 119 

(11) On the Manner of giving his Evidence.. . 120 

(12) On the Occasion on which the Testimony 

is given 

(13) On the Testimony of a dying Man — 

Does the Evidence rest on the Testimony 

of only one Witness, or more 122 

(15) Would the Account be easily confuted, 
if false 123 



CONTENTS, 

Page 
(r6) A vague Account not as credible as a par- 
ticular one . 124 

(17) When the Witness speaks positively of 
some Things, and uncertainly of others. . . . -, — 

(18) Of ancient Facts; what Reception did 
they meet with at first 

(19) On the Omission of a Thing pretended to 
have been public 1 30 

(20) On contradictory Testimonies. 131 

(21) Whether a Negative can be proved .... 133 

(22) On Testimonies agreeing in Part, and 
contradictory in Part 135 

Remote Testimony , 137 

3. General Notoriety — — 

4. Report 139 

5. Tradition 14Q 

6. Analogy « . . , 

Inferences from Premises — Presumptions 141 

CHAP. V. 
On the Kinds of Evidence of which different 

Subjects admit 144 

Mathematical Subjects • . . 

Moral Maxims and Proverbs 145 

Properties and Effects of Subjects of Natural 

History 

Effects of Substances on Mankind 146 

Facts respecting the Constitution of Nature. . 149 

Present Facts 

Hand-Writing. 150 

Effects of Peace, War, &c 151 

Knowledge of jVIen's Motives and Intentions 152 



CONTENTS. 

Page 

Knowledge of Human Nature 165 

Transactions with Men 166 

Transieut Facts 169 

Recent Events, Subjects of Law-Suits ...... 170 

Recent Public Events 171 

History 172 

Memoirs 178 

Ancient History 180 

Parliamentary Reports 181 

Authenticity of Books. 183 

Miracles 187 

Review of Chapter 190 

Conclusion 191 

Appendix , 194 



PREFACE. 






JL O form a habit of reasoning justly^ 
is one of the most important objects of 
education. Much has been done to pro- 
mote this object by writers on logic, 
and on the human understanding. Their 
writings, however, relate principally to 
reasoning on subjects of pure science, 
and abstract truths, or the necessarv re- 
lations of ideas. Little, comparatively, 
has been written, to teach us how to 
reason on practical subjects; but that 
little is highly valuable. Mr. Locke, in 
his Essay on the Human Understanding, 
has treated briefly on probability; and 



H PREFACE 

the author of the Port Royal Art of 
Thinking, has, at the latter end of his 
work, introduced two or three chapters 
on the application of reason to the events 
of human life. Both of these writers 
furnish useful observations on these sub- 
jects. Dr. Watts, in the second part of 
his Treatise on logic, and his book on 
the Improvement of the Mind, has laid 
down many important rules to direct the 
judgment on practical questions. In the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, also, under the 
head of metaphysics, there are some just 
remarks on the theory of observation, 
and testimony. And, Dr. Campbell, in 
his Philosophy of Rhetoric, has explained 
at considerable length, the theory of mo- 
ral evidence. 

Were young men willing to take the 
pains of collecting from these, and other 
authors, all that they could meet with 



PREFACE. 1H. ■ 

on the subject of moral evidence, they 
might form, for themselves, a system 
sufficient to answer every desirable pur- 
pose. But this is scarcely to be ex- 
pected. For, in the course of education, 
the principal use of reason is in subjects 
purely scientific. It is not, therefore, 
surprising that students should bestow 
their chief attention upon that use of it, 
and neglect, to a great degree, all those 
principles and rules of argumentation, 
which they have then no occasion to 
apply. Hence, it may naturally be ex- 
pected, that, however well qualified they 
may be to argue on scientific subjects, 
they should be incapable of reasoning 
justly on human events. When their edu- 
cation is finished, it is scarcely to be sup- 
posed, that they would recur to those 
books, which they had formerly studied, 
to collect from them such information as 
they had hitherto neglected j but which 
A 2 



IV, PREFACE, 

thev would now find of the greatest use 
in the conduct of life. Probably, very 
few men take this trouble ; and this is 
one cause, why so few reason correctly 
on questions which admit of no higher 
evidence than probability. 

It is, however, obvious, that that use 
of reason, which teaches us how to re- 
gulate our judgments, expectations, and 
conduct, must be much more important 
than that, which relates only to science. 
Of course, it ought to be studied with 
greater attention. But, this it never will 
be, unless it be studied professedly, as a 
separate system. 

It may be thought, perhaps, that a 
man, who has formed a habit of reason- 
ing justly on scientific subjects, will be 
capable of applying that habit to matters 
of probability, without studying any sys- 






PREFACE. V* 



tern of moral evidence. That the study 
and practice of demonstrative reasoning 
will be found of great use towards ac- 
quiring skill in moral evidence, is true. 
It is not meant, therefore, to discourage 
an application either to logic or to ma- 
thematics. On the contrary, an appli- 
cation to both, is strongly recommended, 
as the best possible means of acquiring 
an ability of thinking closely and cor- 
rectly, and of reasoning conclusively. 
But, then it is true also, that this study 
will rarely be found sufficient to enable 
a man to reason justly on probable sub 
jects ; both because the principles in de- 
monstrative and moral reasoning differ 
much; and, because the mind that has 
been accustomed to yield its assent to 
demonstration only, generally finds great 
difficulty in being satisfied with a lower 
species of evidence. Hence arises that 
tendency to scepticism, which has been 

A 3 



VI. PREFACE. 

imputed to the study of mathematics. 
And, hence it is, that the transition, 
even from pure to mixed mathematics, 
is often attended with a want of that sa- 
tisfaction, which had hitherto been en- 
joyed. Both these are occasioned by not 
considering, that different subjects ad- 
mit of different kinds of evidence; and 
by the mind's, not being accustomed to 
yield its assent to that kind of evidence, 
of which the subject admits. 

He, who has not attained the know- 
led o-e, and accustomed himself to the use 
of correct and fixed principles of decision 
on the weight of evidence for matters of 
fact, must engage in the investigation of 
many important questions, such, for in- 
stance, as the truth of Christianity, with 
great disadvantage. The principles, on 
which he will be required to decide, be- 
ing new to him, will probably appear to 



PREFACE. Vlli 

have been framed merely for the occa- 
sion, and will therefore be suspicious. 
But had he pursued this study with due 
attention, these principles would be fa- 
miliar to him ; he would have been ac- 
customed to apply them to various sub- 
jects, and to see that they lead to correct 
conclusions. To him, therefore, they 
would afford both a safe and satisfac- 
tory ground of decision on the question 
proposed. 

This study will, also, be a means of 
preservation from many errors in cue or- 
dinary occurrences of life Few practi- 
cal questions call for our decision, on 
which we are not previously interested 
on the one side, or the other. The 
having to search for our principles of 
judgment, while under the influence of 
interest, must be an inlet to delusion^ 
in addition to the danger of m', ing 



Vlll. PREFACE. 

them. But, if we have been accustomed 
to the use of certain fixed principles 
of evidence, they will naturally present 
themselves to our minds, when occasions 
for their application arise ; nor shall we 
be able to decide inconsistently with 
them, without being conscious of doing 
wrong. It would, therefore, be useful 
to acquire a knowledge of the principles 
of moral evidence, as Avell as of those of 
demonstration ; and, perhaps, to pursue 
the study of these different kinds of evi- 
dence at the same time. 

The Author's motive for engaging in 
the discussion of this subject, w r as, his 
having observed persons of ability and 
educarion delude themselves as to the 
truth of facts, of importance to their mo- 
ral conduct, by appi) ing to them princi- 
ples of reasoning, unsuited to the nature 
of the case. With the principles of de- 



PREFACE. IX. 

monstrative reasoning, they were well ac- 
quainted ; but of those of moral evidence 
they had not a sufficiently clear and set- 
tled knowledge, to put them on their 
guard against the delusions of inclma- 
tion or interest in themselves, or the so- 
phistry of others. Hence, even their 
knowledge of morality, and the general 
rectitude of their intentions, became of 
little avail to direct their conduct ; for, 
an error in the fact, is often as fatal to 
virtue, as an error in the principles of 
morality. 

As there is no book written, profes- 
sedly, on this subject, (at least so far 
as the Author of this Tract can learn,) 
these hints are offered ; but not as new 
thoughts. For, in the present advanced 
state of science, little that is new, can 
be expected on a subject of this nature. 
Nor are they proposed, as comprising a 



x - PREFACE. 

complete system, but merely as an intro- 
duction to the study of moral evidence. 

To the learned Reader, if any such 
should honour this Tract with a perusal, 
an apology may be necessary for the dis- 
cussion of subjects, which may appear 
too obvious to need explanation or proof. 
But, it should be observed, that this 
work is intended for the use of those 
who are only beginners in the science of 
moral reasoning ; and that, for their in- 
formation, it was necessary to explain, 
and prove, even such points as would be 
perfectly obvious to the more expe- 
rienced reasoner. This appeared to be 
the more requisite, because, however 
obvious those points may be, many of 
them are too frequently neglected in 
practice, and that, by persons whose 
character gives great weight to their 
example. Hence it was desirable, that 



PREFACE. XI. 

the beginner should be furnished with 
a weight of proof, calculated to coun- 
terbalance such authority. 

To most readers, it will be necessary 
to apologize for the dryness of the book. 
Something of this must be attributed to 
the nature of its subject; for a treatise 
on the principles of reasoning, can 
scarcely be otherwise than dry. Yet, 
some of the blame may, perhaps, be due 
to the Author, for not having inter- 
spersed his work with a greater number 
of quotations, and interesting anecdotes, 
to relieve the fatigue of his reader. 
He would have done this, had it been in 
his power. But the nature of his situa- 
tion, and his constant engagement in an 
employ, which nearly engrosses his time, 
precluded his collecting, either from 
reading or conversation, such quotations 
or anecdotes, as would suit his purpose. 



CHAP. L 

On the Nature of Moral Evidence: and 
wherein it differs from Demonstration. 



.ORAL Evidence is that species of proof, 
which is employed on subjects, directly or in- 
directly, connected with moral conduct. It is 
not, however, confined to such subjects ; but is 
extended to all those facts, arid events, con- 
cerning which we do not obtain the evidence of 
sense, intuition, or demonstration, and to all the 
general truths which are deduced from obser- 
vation. In these, it still retains the name of 
moral evidence, a denomination which it seems 
to have derived from its being employed on 
subjects connected with moral conduct ; because 
they form the most important class of subjects 
to which it is applicable. The evidence of 
morality must be carefully distinguished from 
moral evidence. The former is that evidence 
by which any class of actions is proved to be 
virtuous or vicious; the latter is that by which 
facts or events are proved to be true or false. 
These two species of evidence are, however, 
very frequently connected. For, moral con- 
duct requires, in most cases, an application of 

B 



2 Nature of Moral Evidence, (Ch. L) 

moral evidence, as the laws of morality can 
rarely be applied for the direction of our actions 
without a knowledge of facts. Thus, in order 
to apply the moral rule, that a man should 
pay his just debts, it is necessary to know what 
is a just debt; and, to ascertain this will re- 
quire a knowledge of facts. That, in politics, 
a man should support that party which has, in 
the greatest degree, justice on its side, is a 
moral duty; but, to determine which party 
that is, requires a knowledge of facts, as well 
as of the principles of justice. 

Moral Evidence and Demonstration differ in 
several particulars. 

1. They differ as to their subjects. De- 
monstration is employed about abstract truths, 
and the necessary relations of ideas. Of this 
kind are the properties of numbers and of geo- 
metrical figures; and, indeed, all subjects 
which are capable of being accurately ex- 
pressed by numbers, as extension, duration, 
weight, velocity, and force. But, the subjects 
of moral evidence are matters of fact, and the 
connections, whether constant or variable, 
which subsist among things which actually 
exist. Thus, that Romulus founded Rome, 
that water freezes at the temperature of thirty- 
two degrees, that fire softens wax but hardens 
clay, are truths within the province of moral 
evidence. 



Wherein it differs from Demonstration. 3 

2. They differ as to the method in which 
they are conducted. In demonstration, we pro- 
ceed from known truths to those which are un- 
known by steps each of which is necessarily 
connected with that which precedes it. In a 
moral proof there is no such necessary connec- 
tion between its parts. It generally consists of 
arguments which are wholly unconnected with 
each other ; and where there exists a connexion 
between the arguments, that connexion is not a 
necessary, but only a probable one. Or, to ex- 
press this differently, a demonstrative proof 
consists of one series, each part of which is 
dependent on that which precedes it ; but a 
moral proof generally consists of a number of 
independent arguments. Thus, the proof of 
every proposition in Euclid's Elements consists 
of a series of arguments connected together in 
one chain, in which, if any one link fails, the 
proof fails. But the proof that the Romans 
were formerly in this island consists of various 
independent arguments; as, the testimony of 
each historian who mentions the fact, the 
Roman camps and roads, the remains of Roman 
buildings, the coins, and urns, the tessellated 
pavements, &c. These are so many arguments, 
each independent of the rest, but all conspiring 
to prove the fact. 

3. In demonstration, it is not necessary to 
consider more than one side of a question ; fo^ 
b2 



4 Nature of Moral Evidence, (Ck. I.) 

if, by a demonstration justly conducted, any 
proposition is proved to be true, it is of no 
consequence what may be urged against it ; for, 
whatever is offered as proof on the opposite 
side, must be a mere fallacy. But, in moral 
evidence, there are very frequently arguments 
of some weight on both sides ; and therefore, 
before we can decide, we must examine both 
sides of the question, and give our assent to 
that on which there appears to be the greatest 
weight of evidence. 

4. Propositions, contradictory to those w hieli 
are established by moral evidence, are merely 
false: but those which are contradictory to 
such as may be demonstrated, are not only 
false, but absurd also. Thus, the assertion that 
there is no such city as Pekin, though false, is 
yet not absurd ; for there was a time when it 
was true. But the proposition that ' the three 
angles of a triangle are not equal to two right 
angles/ is not only false, but also involves in it 
an Absurdity. 

5. ' There is a difference also in their force, 
or in the kind of assent which they produce. 
As, in demonstration, there is a necessary con- 
nexion between each successive step of the 
proof, the ideas compared are perceived to 
agree or disagree. But, in moral evidence, 
their agreement or disagreement is only pre- 
sumed; and that on proofs, which are, in their 



Wherein it differs from Demonstration. 5 

nature, fallible. The one, therefore, produces 
absolute certainty, the other only probable 
judgment, or at most, moral certainty. The 
probability may, indeed, rise so high as to 
exclude all reasonable doubt; still, however, 
it falls short of absolute certainty. 

G. As moral evidence does not produce 
certainty, no rules of moral evidence can be 
given, which will direct us how to form an in- 
fallible judgment in any particular case. The 
utmost that can be accomplished, is to give 
such rules as will in most, though not in all 
cases, in which they are fairly applied, lead to 
a right conclusion. This is another difference 
between moral evidence and demonstration. 
For, as demonstration admits of certainty, so 
rules are laid down, which in all cases capable 
of demonstration, will lead to truth. 

7. Demonstration does not admit of de- 
grees; for certainty is the only assent, which 
can be produced by it : but moral evidence may 
produce a variety of degrees of assent, from sus- 
picion to moral certainty. For, here, the degree 
of assent depends upon the degree in which the 
evidence on one side preponderates, or exceeds 
that on the other. And, as this preponderancy 
may vary almost infinitely, so likewise may the 
degrees of assent. For a few of these degrees, 
though but for a few, names have been invented. 
Thus, when the evidence on one side pre- 
b3 



15 Nature of Moral Evidence, (Ch. I.) 

ponderates a very little, there is ground for 
suspicion, or conjecture. Presumption, per- 
suasion, belief, conclusion, conviction, moral 
certainty ; doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief, 
are words which imply an increase or decrease 
of this preponderantly. Some of these words 
also admit of epithets, which denote a farther 
increase or diminution of the assent. 

8. Moral evidence admits of an accumu- 
lation of proofs, and each independent argu- 
ment increases the weight of evidence on the 
whole. Thus, the testimonies of concurrent 
witnesses serve to increase the credibility of each 
other; and the evidence of circumstances may 
confirm that of the witnesses. But demonstra- 
tion admits of no accumulation of evidence; 
for, one just demonstration as effectually proves 
the truth of a proposition as many. If recourse 
be had to another, it is not to supply its defects, 
but only to ascertain that the former includes 
no false step, but has been regularly and cor- 
rectly conducted ; for, if it be defective, it is no 
proof at all, but a mere fallacy. 

9. In demonstration, we may reason safely, 
from a conclusion already established, and 
upon that establish a second conclusion. This 
too, will furnish ground for further reasoning, 
and another conclusion : and thus we may pro- 
ceed to any extent that may be requisite. But, 
in moral evidence, we can seldom proceed with 



Wherein it differs from Demonstration. 7 

complete safety, more than one step : the second 
step will be more uncertain than the first ; and 
the third more uncertain still ; and so on. For, 
the first conclusion being not universally true, 
but true only in a certain proportion, out of a 
given number of cases, we are in danger of 
building our second process of reasoning on one 
of those cases in which it may fail. In our 
third process, we run two risks of assuming a 
false ground ; and in our fourth process we run 
three ; and so on : whence it is evident, that it 
cannot be completely safe to proceed more than 
one step. Or, to place this matter in a different 
light, the first conclusion is not certainly, but 
only probably true. The second will be pro- 
bable, only, on a supposition, that the first 
should, in the event, prove true: i\ e. it is only 
a probability of a probability. And the third 
conclusion will be probable, only on a suppo- 
sition, that both the former should prove true ; 
i. e. it is the probability of a probability of a 
probability. Thus, in the progress, the un- 
certainty of the conclusion is continually en- 
creasing. To illustrate this point by an ex- 
ample. It was thought, some years ago, that, 
if the treaty of Amiens had been fulfilled with 
regard to Malta, the French would have ob- 
tained possession of that island, and in con- 
sequence would have regained Egypt, and at- 
tacked our possessions in India. In order to 
b 4 



S Nature of Moral Evidence, (Ch. I.) 

their making this attack upon India, we may 
remark the necessity of the following events at 
least : first, that they should gain such an influ- 
ence in Malta, as to be able to possess them- 
selves of the island : secondly, that they should 
fit out, and send to sea, a sufficient force to 
conquer Egypt, without our being able to pre- 
vent them : thirdly, that they should elude the 
vigilance of our fleets, and arrive safely in 
Egypt: fourthly,' that they should gain a 
footing in Egypt: fifthly, that they should 
establish themselves there in sufficient security 
to undertake an expedition to India : and 
sixthly, that they should arrive in India with 
a force strong enough to attack us, notwith- 
standing the difficulty of procuring a fleet, the 
dangers of the Red Sea, the vigilance and 
superiority of our fleets, or the difficulty of 
passing the Desert. Now, let the probability 
of each of these events, taken separately, be as 
two to one. Then, previous to the cession of 
Malta, the probability of their attacking us in 
India would be only as 64 to 665, which is less 
than as one to ten. Or, had there been an 
equal chance of each of these events taken 
separate^, the probability of the ultimate event 
would then have been only as 1 to 63. Had 
there been only two events in the series, and an 
equal chance of each separate event, the pro- 
bability of the ultimate event would have been 



Wherein it differs from Demonstration. 9 

as I to 3; had there been three events, it 
would have been as 1 to 7 ; had there been four, 
it would have been as 1 to 15 ; had there been 
five, it would have been as 1 to 31. In this 
example, the probability of each separate eyant 
is expressed in numbers. But, in practice, it 
will seldom be found possible to ascertain the 
probability of an event with sufficient exactness 
so to express it ; and consequently the ulti- 
mate probability of any series of events can 
rarely be calculated with precision. But, not- 
withstanding this, as, in every series, (in which 
the following events will certainly not happen) 
unless the preceding events should happen, 
the probability of each successive event is 
constantly less than of that which precedes it, 
in the same manner as in the example, though 
we may be unable to ascertain the precise 
amount of its decrease, the example will 
properly illustrate the point in hand. 

10. Moral evidence does not compel our 
assent, % as demonstration does. If a man dis- 
pute a proposition which is demonstrated, it 
must be because he does not understand its 
proof. But on subjects which admit of moral 
evidence only, there will often be some ground 
to adopt either side of the question. Hence, 
it affords an unfair opponent a plausible reason 
for dissent, and that in various degrees, ac- 
cording to its different kinds. Thus, truths 
b 5 



10 Nature of Moral Evidence, (Ch. I) 

founded on exj>erience, or general notoriety, 
may always be disputed. It also affords an 
opportunity to eloquent men to represent truth 
in the colours of falsehood, or falsehood in 
the colours of truth, so as to deceive all, who 
are not extremely careful to detect their fal- 
lacies. 

11 A further difference consists in the 
language which is used in them. In demon- 
stration, all the terms are accurately defined, 
and are used always in the same sense. But, 
as moral evidence relates to more popular sub- 
jects, so those subjects are treated of in a 
popular, and not in a philosophical, language. 
The terms are seldom accurately defined, and 
they are not always used in the same sense. 
Figures of speech are introduced, and all those 
rhetorical licences admitted, which contribute 
more to ornament, than precision. Hence, in 
moral evidence, we can rarely obtain as distinct 
a view, either of the question > or of the ar- 
guments, by which it is to be proved, as in 
demonstration. 

From what has been said, it is manifest that 
moral evidence is vastly inferior to demonstra- 
tion. Hence, perhaps, some persons vnny con- 
clude, that the study of it will be of little use. 
But, however inferior it may be to demonstra- 
tion, it is not possible to avoid using it con- 
stantly. For, it is frequently the only light 



Wherein it differs from Demonstration. 11 

afforded us to form our opinions of facts and 
to regulate our conduct with respect to them. 
Without attending to it, we can neither act, 
nor cease to act. We cannot even subsist 
without acting upon it; since it cannot be 
demonstrated that our food will not poison, 
instead of nourishing us. Instead, therefore, 
of contemning it on account of its inferiority, 
it becomes us to improve to the utmost, the 
light which it affords, by qualifying ourselves 
to apply it as correctly as possible on every 
occasion. This must be incumbent, not only 
on the student in science, but also on every 
man, whatever be his business or employment. 
Besides, it may be observed, that the ne- 
cessity of acting on this inferior species of 
evidence, is suited to the state in which we are 
placed: a state, in which all the faculties 
received from our Creator, are put to the 
trial.* Now, the clear light of demonstra- 

* Were the proof of Revelation irresistible, u it would 
11 restrain the voluntary powers too much ; would not answer 
u the pu p )se o* trial and probation ; would call for no exercise 
" of ca (tour, s^iousre^s, humility, inquiry; no submission of 
4i p^ssi >ns, inr-rt-sts and prejudice-: to moral evidence and to pro- 
Si 3 ;hle rrum ; no habits o ( reflection ; none of that previous de- 
44 ire > tear- and to obey the will of God, which forms, 
if perhap . rhe test and the merit of the virtuous principle. 
(l Irr t ridence would confound all chararters, and all 

14 oispositi ns . would subveit, rather than promote, the true 
li p.rp se of the ivinc c unctts, which is not to produce 
44 ooeiicn e by a force 'He short of mechanical constraint 
il (which oheojc.e would be regularity, not virtue, and would 
11 naruh perhaps oirler from that which inanimate bodies pay to 
44 the h* imprcs.ed upon their nature) but to treat moral agents 
44 agreeably to what they are ; which is done when light and motive* 

b6 



12 Nature of Moral Evidence, (Ch. I ) 

tion, would be ill adapted to the trial of our 
understandings, on practical questions; be- 
cause, it could scarcely fail of compelling us 
to a right judgment, even in spite of the most 
perverse inclinations, or the greatest insin- 
cerity. But, being under the conduct of moral 
evidence, our sincerity is continually put to 
the test. Hence, if a man wish to make his 
views of duty consist with his inclination, or 
present interests, he can seldom want a pretext 
for so doing. And the greatest talents, natural 
or acquired, will not secure him against this 
delusion ; but, on the contrary, rather promote 
it ; for, they only furnish him with more able 
counsel to deceive himself and others. But, 
if he be sincerely desirous of knowing his duty, 
though he possess but ordinary abilities, he 
may generally attain the knowledge of it. 
For, notwithstanding the inferiority of moral 
evidence to demonstration, it is capable of 
affording sufficient proof to influence the 
judgment, and direct the conduct of any 
reasonable and honest man, who is disposed to 
make a fair use of his talents f For, experience 
shews that men err, not so "much from the 
want of light, as because they are influenced 
by their passions and interests.} 

" are of such kinds, and are imparted in such measures, that 

w the inrluence of them depends upon the recipients themselves."' 

Paley's Eudcnces of Christianity, 2, 368, and 371. 



Wherein It differs from Demonstration. 13 

Two extremes have been fallen into, from 
not duly attending to the difference between 
moral evidence and demonstration. On the 
one hand, probable proof has been called de- 
monstration. When a writer has produced, 
in favour of some important point, a variety 
of reasons, all of the probable kind, yet of 
great cogency, and has shewn, that all the 
objections against it are either fallacious, or 
but of little weight, he often asserts that he has 
demonstrated his position. He may, indeed, 
have so far proved it, as to have excluded 
all reasonable doubt ; yet he has, nevertheless, 
not demonstrated it. For, the highest degree 
of probability does not amount to a demonstra- 
tion; and nothing can be a demonstration, 
where there is not an intuitive, and necessary 
connexion between every successive step of 
the proof. This practice has, probably, arisen 
from an inclination to magnify every thing 
important ; and, from a disposition to the use 
of figures of speech. As demonstration is the 
highest species of proof, when we have so 
fully proved any point, as to have excluded 
all reasonable doubt, we say, by the figure 
hyperbole, that we have demonstrated it. This, 
however, is improper ; because things, which 
differ in their nature, ought to be distinguished 
by different names ; and when different names 
have been invented for them, it is wrong to 



14 Nature of Moral Evidence, (Ch. I.) 

confound the things by using the name of the 
one for the other. It has, besides, a tendency 
to defeat its own end ; for, with all, who have 
been accustomed to a more accurate use of 
words, it is calculated rather to weaken, than 
to strengthen, the force of the proof; inasmuch 
as it excites them to enquire, not whether the 
question has been proved by sufficient evidence, 
but whether there is an intuitive and necessary 
connexion between each successive step of that 
proof: and, as it is evident that there is no such 
connexion, doubts are raised in their minds. 
On the other hand, a position, for which 
sufficient probable evidence is brought, is 
oiten denied to be proved. This happens most 
frequently when an opponent demands our 
assent to some point, which seems unfavourable 
to our present interests. But, the word proof 
ought not to be confined to demonstration r 
any more than the name demonstration to be 
given to every species of proof. Lawyers 
have their proofs, as well as mathematicians. 
An\ should a mathematician censure a lawyer, 
who had asserted that to be proved, for which 
sufficient evidence* according to the established 
rules of law, had been adduced, because it 
had not been demonstrated, he would be con- 
sidered as absurd. Divines, too, have their 
proofs ; and though they do not amount to 
demonstration, yet> if they be sufficient to ex- 



Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. 15 

elude all reasonable doubt, ilicy ought to be 
admitted to be proofs. In truth, wherever 
there is produced, in favour of any proposition, 
the highest kind of evidence of which it ad* 
mits, and in a sufficient degree to outweigh 
all that can be urged against it, it may properly 
be said to be proved. 



CHAP. II. 

On the different Kinds of Moral Evidence, 
with Observations on the weight of each. 



N this chapter, it is proposed, to inquire 
into the different kinds of moral evidence ; the 
degree of credit which is usually given to each 
kind ; and the influence which each may rea- 
sonably have on our judgment. 

The first kind is, Observation or Experience. 
The observation of a specific fact, or what, 
perhaps may, in strict propriety, be called 
experience, does not belong to this subject, 
but to a higher species of evidence. For, if 
I can recollect that I observed a certain fact, 
I have the evidence of certainty for its having 
existed, and not that of probability. But, the 
observation or experience here intended, con- 
sists of the general conclusions which have 
been deduced from various subjects of the 



16 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence, (Ch. II.) 

same kind. It is also personal observation; 
i. e. it consists- of the conclusions which a man 
has deduced from his own observation. 

The specific- facts,- which are the subjects of 
our observation, are all of them individuals; 
and taken separately, furnish us with no other 
knowledge, than that of their own existence. 
But, when we compare together the observa- 
tions which we have made on different facts 
of the same kind, we are enabled to draw from 
them general conclusions, which are applicable 
to particular cases. The nature of those con- 
clusions, the way in which they are deduced, 
and the manner of applying them to particular 
cases, vary according to the nature of the 
subjects observed. 

On comparing together different facts of a 
similar kind, they appear to have been some- 
times uniform, at other times various. Thus, 
the common operations of nature, as the eb- 
bing and flowing of the tides are perceived to 
be uniform. The same uniformity is observed 
in the properties of substances ; as the ductility 
and malleability of gold, the melting of lead 
in fire, and its sinking in water. But the state 
of the weather, the direction of the wind, the 
effects of many articles of food and medicine, 
the success of most of the plans and operations, 
in which men engage, are all observed to be 
various. Again, facts of some kinds will ap- 



Personal Observation. 17 

pear to be either uniform or various, according 
as our observation of them is more or less ex- 
tensive. Thus, the moon, if observed during 
the space of only a few days, will exhibit 
great variety, both in the time of its rising, 
and in the form in which it appears ; and 
thence may be called, as it has been by poets, 
u the inconstant moon." But, if the observa- 
tion be extended to a longer period, these 
changes will appear to take place uniformly. 
Hence, facts of this kind may be properly 
considered as uniform. Thus, then, the sub- 
jects of our observation may be reduced to 
two classes, viz. those which are uniform, and 
those which are various. 

First. In things that are uniform, general 
conclusions are drawn, by collecting these 
points in which the uniformity is observed, 
neglecting those in which they have been 
perceived to differ, and making those uniform 
points the predicate of a proposition of which 
the tilings themselves are the subject.* Thus, 
on comparing our observations of the sun, we 
find that every day it rose and set, sometimes 
involved in clouds, at others shining with 

* For the information of those who are wholly unacquainted 
with logic, it may be necessary to observe, that a proposition is 
a sentence, in which any thing is affirmed, or denied of another 
: the subject of a proposition is that, concerning 
which any thing is affirmed or denied and that its predicate is 
that which is affirmed or denied of the subject. Thus, " Plato 
" was a philosopher," is a proposition, of which Plato is the sub- 
ject, and Philosopher is the predicate. 



18 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence, (Ch. II) 

splendour. Neglecting, then , the circumstances 
in which it differed, and attending to those 
only in which it was uniform, we deduce 
this general conclusion, that the sun rises and 
sets every day. Or, recollecting that all the 
masses of gold which we have ever seen, 
however various their forms, were yet yellow, 
and very heavy; neglecting the varieties of 
their forms, we infer, that a yellow colour, and 
great weight, are properties of gold. This 
species of reasoning is called by logicians, an 
induction of particular facts of the same nature. 

The conclusions, thus drawn from uniform 
subjects, are general truths. Thus, it is a 
general truth, that night succeeds day, and 
day night; that Spring, Summer, Autumn, 
and Winter, follow each other in regular suc- 
cession ; that iron sinks in water ; and that 
wax melts in fire. 

In applying these general conclusions, we 
learn what to expect in every particular case : 
and the expectations, founded upon them, are 
attended with a high degree of moral evidence. 

But, it should be remarked, that the more 
frequently we have repeated our observations 
of uniform subjects, and the more various the 
circumstances are, under which they have 
been made, the more correct will our con- 
clusions be, and the more safely may they be 
applied to particular cases. 



Personal Observation. 19 

It will, perhaps, be objected to this theory, 
that it is a rule amongst philosophers, that one 
correct experiment is sufficient to establish a 
general truth; Whether this rule be, or be 
not, just, it will, when duly considered, be 
found not at all inconsistent with what has 
been advanced. We are here speaking of the 
conclusions, which a man may be able to de- 
duce from his own personal observation, un- 
assisted by any information derived from others. 
Their rule supposes the experimentalist to be 
possessed of much previous information, de- 
rived, not only from his own experience, but 
from the general observation of mankind. 
When a philosopher draws from experiment 
a general conclusion respecting the properties 
of any substance, he presumes that that identical 
substance, on which he tried his experiment, 
possessed exactly the same qualities with all 
others which are considered as of the same 
nature. Thus, if he would determine the spe- 
cific gravity of pure gold, he must presume 
that the gold, which he uses for the purpose, 
possesses the same properties with all other 
pure gold. Now, on what is this presumption 
founded ? A man, just engaging in researches 
into nature, and unacquainted with the dis- 
coveries of others, could not safely presume 
this. He could not yet know, that such is the 
uniformity of nature in her operations, that 



ions, i 



20 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

the fame qualities would be found in pure gold, 
at all times, and in every part of the world. 
But since, by the experience of many ages, 
the fact of this uniformity of nature has been 
established, the philosopher assumes it as the 
basis of his reasonings, and draws his con- 
clusions from it, with perfect satisfaction. The 
conclusion, therefore, drawn from a single ex- 
periment, is not, strictly speaking, dependent 
on that experiment alone, to the exclusion of 
all other information on the subjects of nature. 
On the contrary, it pre-supposes an experience 
of vast extent, derived from the general obser- 
vation of mankind. 

As no man can be supposed to be at this time 
entirely unacquainted with the general expe- 
rience of mankind, it may be asked, of what 
use it c-m be to lay down directions applicable 
only to a state of ignorance ? I answer, that in 
order to understand rightly the subject of per- 
sonal observation, it is necessary to consider 
it simply, as it is in itself, unconnected with 
the information derived from other sources. 
When it is clearly understood in this simple 
state, it will be understood, with greater ease, 
and correctness, when combined with tUat in- 
formation. It will then be more easily per- 
ceived for what part of our knowledge we are 
indebted to our own unassisted efforts; and 
also, in what manner we must proceed in those 



Personal Observation. 21 

enquiries, which must be conducted by our 
own personal observation. 

That subjects which have been observed to 
be uniform, do, in fact, excite an expectation 
of the continuance of the same event under 
the same circumstances, is confirmed by expe- 
rience. It is evident, that they produce this 
effect in children, even in their earliest infancy, 
when, if they exercise reason at all, it must be 
only in the slightest degree. It is by this effect 
of experience, that they must learn the meaning 
of words. For, as there is no natural con- 
nexion between things, and the names by which 
they are called, it can be only by observing, 
that the persons, who surround them, constantly 
connect a certain sound with a certain object, 
that they can learn to regard that sound as its 
name. This information cannot, at first, be 
conveyed to them by words ; because they are, 
as yet, unacquainted with the words necessary 
for that purpose. Experience operates in the 
same way, also, upon brutes; and by this 
means dogs, for instance, are taught so far to 
understand the meaning of certain sounds, as 
to be able to execute the commands of their 
masters in various particulars. As to the ex- 
istence, then, of the fact, there can be no 
doubt ; but the principles upon which this fact 
depends, have never, (so far as the author of 
this tract can learn,) been satisfactorily assigned* 



j* 



22 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II) 

Some have attempted to account for it on the 
principle of association. But it does not ap- 
pear that the association of ideas naturally ex- 
cites an expectation of our finding their objects 
always connected together . Having met a friend 
at a certain inn, I have associated the idea of 
the inn, with that of my friend; but this as- 
sociation excites in me no expectation of my al- 
ways meeting him there ; or even of my meeting 
him there at any particular time, unless I have 
some other reason to expect it. 

This subject was thus stated in the first edition 
of this tract. But, on further consideration, 
a doubt has arisen, whether this fact may not 
be justly accounted for by association: and 
whether the want of the expectation of finding 
those objects always connected together in fact, 
whose ideas are associated in the mind, ought 
not to be attributed to the corrections of ex- 
perience. When an idea is by any means re- 
called by memory, it comes, not abstractedly, 
but attended by all those circumstances, with 
which it was accompanied, when it was first 
present to the mind. The principal idea is, 
perhnps, never presented on recollection to the 
mind of an infant without its accessories; 
and thus both principal and accessories appear 
to it to make up only one compound idea: 
and consequently one part of this compound 
idea would seem to imply the presence of the 



Personal Observation. 23 

rest. The infant would, perhaps, continue to 
regard them as one compound idea (or, in 
other words, would always expect to find those 
objects connected in fact, whose ideas had been 
thus associated in its mind) were it not, that 
it often meets with the one without the others ; 
and thus, it learns by experience, that the 
association of ideas will not always warrant 
the expectation of finding their objects con- 
nected together. Or, to speak more correctly, 
it finds that certain objects, whose ideas are 
associated, are always connected in fact; but 
that certain other objects, whose ideas are also 
associated, are not alwaj's connected in fact. 
In regard to the former objects, the expectation 
of finding them always connected continues to 
prevail ; but, in regard to the latter, its expecta- 
tion of finding them connected will be stronger 
or weaker in proportion as it has more or or less 
frequently observed them so connected. 

Whether this, or indeed any other mode of 
accounting for the fact, be, or be not, true, 
it seems impossible to determine by experiment. 
For, we can neither recollect the processes of 
our own minds in infancy, nor ascertain the 
processes of the minds of other infants, with 
sufficient correctness to decide the question. 
All, therefore, that can be advanced on this 
point must be hypothesis. But very for- 
tunately the rules of reasoning are not at all 



24 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

dependent on the modes of accounting for this 
fact, or indeed for any other of the more 
secret operations of the mind. They are to 
be regarded as matters of curious speculation, 
rather than as of practical importance. If the 
reasonableness of the expectation of the same 
event under similar circumstances be inquired 
into, it will be found to be grounded on the 
presumption, that what has been observed to 
be uniform, depends on some established law 
of nature : and the evidence, which we have 
for the existence of these laws of nature, is 
the general experience of mankind. 

Secondly. The other class of facts, are 
those which have been observed to happen 
variously. Conclusions are drawn from our 
observation of these, by collecting together, 
into one sum, all those instances in which 
we have perceived them to exist in a certain 
way; and, into another sum, all those in 
which we observed them to exist in a different 
way; and then, comparing these sums to- 
gether, to determine the ratio which they bear 
to each other. If the instances on each side 
be equal in number, we conclude, that the 
general nature of the fact is uncertain. When 
they are unequal, we conclude, that that is the 
more general nature of the fact, which is con- 
formable to the side on which the excess lies ; 
and our conclusion becomes so much the 



Personal Observation, 25 

stronger, in proportion as the instances on the 
one side, ave found to be more numerous than 
those on the other. 

In applying these conclusions to particular 
cases, where the instances on each side have 
been observed to be equal in number, we form 
no expectation at all in what way the event will 
happen in any proposed case, but regard it as 
a matter of equal chance, or perfect indifference. 
But, when the instances on one side have been 
observed to exceed those on the other, we natu- 
rally form some degree of expectation, that 
they will happen in each proposed case, as we 
have most frequently observed them. And the 
greater the ratio is, which those on the one 
side bear to those on the other, the stronger 
is this expectation. 

Thus, for example, if out of a great num- 
ber of instances, in which men had eaten of 
a certain fruit, those in which it had proved 
harmless, were exactly equal in number with 
those, in which it had proved injurious, it 
would be considered as a matter of absolute 
uncertainty, whether or not it would injure a 
person, who was going to eat of it. If rather 
more had been injured by it, than not, it would 
be considered as probable^ that it would injure 
him. But, if very few out of the number had 
escaped injury, it would then be regarded as 
highly probable that he would be injured by it. 
c 



t(J Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

As the ratio, which the instances on each 
side bcaT to each other, may vary almost in- 
finitely, so may the degrees of expectation or 
probability vary almost infinitely, from the 
confines of moral certainty to those of ab- 
solute uncertainty. 

In forming our expectations from facts, which 
we have observed to be various, we presume, 
that the event is directed by some cause, known, 
or unknown, which, though it be not suffi- 
ciently powerful always to controul the event, 
but may sometimes be overcome by some un- 
known circumstances, yet always tends to make 
it happen one way, rather than the other. 

Before we quit this part of the subject it 
may be remarked, that we often recollect the 
general conclusions which we have deduced, 
when we have forgotten the particular subjects 
from which we deduced them. This happens 
especially when the subject had in it nothing 
new, or surprising, and was amended by no 
circumstances, which by association had fixed 
themselves in our minds. Thus, a man who 
had rarely seen a certain phcenomenon in na- 
ture, or curious experiment in chemistry, 
would not only recollect it, but also the cir- 
cumstances of time, place, and persons, which 
accompanied it. Whereas, he, who had fre- 
quently seen such things, might recollect little 
of those circumstances ; though he clearly re- 



Testimony. 27 

membercd the general conclusions, which he 
had deduced from them. The one he would 
treasure up in his memory, as of importance 
to be recollected ; while he would neglect the 
other, as of no consequence. 



The second kind of moral evidence, to be 
considered, is Testimony. 

Testimony, is either divine, or human. Di- 
vine testimony, when evidently such, produces 
perfect certainty. For, whatever God says, 
must be true. It, therefore, belongs to a higher 
species of evidence, than that which is the 
subject of this tract. But then, it must be 
ascertained, that what is affirmed to be the 
word of God, is really God's word : and this 
inquiry must be conducted on the principles 
of moral evidence. On these principles, the 
authenticity of the bible has often been in- 
vestigated, and proved, with an accumulation 
of evidence, of which no other fact in the 
world ever admitted. 

Human testimony, is the evidence of a per- 
son, who declares that he himself observed a 
certain fact or event. 

It is the evidence of one witness, or of more. 
Each separate witness, if he be really an inde- 
pendent or original witness, strengthens the 
c2 



2B Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

evidence. But before it be admitted, that the 
evidence is thus confirmed, it should be ascer- 
tained that they are really independent wit- 
nesses. For, if the second witness did not ob- 
serve the fact himself, b-ut assented to it only 
on the testimony of the former, his evidence 
should be disregarded, and the subject rests on, 
the testimony of the first. But, on the con- 
trary, if they should both be found to be 
original witnesses of the fact, tlie evidence 
would then be strengthened in a much greater 
proportion than that of two to one; for the 
coincidence of their testimony is to be taken 
into the account, as well as the separate weight 
©f each. And indeed, in many cases, in which 
either of the two evidences, taken separately, 
would produce scarcely any conviction, their 
concurrence, if they be known to be inde- 
pendent witnesses, might produce nearly moral 
certainty. -The same observation applies, and 
with greater force, as the number of inde- 
pendent concurrent witnesses encreases. For it 
is more extraordinary, that many should coin- 
cide in their observation, and account of the 
same fact, than that two should: and that 
in a much greater degree, than in the pro- 
portion of their numbers. 

Testimony may, also, be either direct, or 
incidental. Direct testimony, is the evidence 
which is professedly delivered on a certain sub- 



Testimony. 29 

jeet. Incidental testimony, is that which is 
casually introduced on one subject, in the 
course of an evidence, or discourse, professedly 
delivered on another. It is of greater weight 
than direct testimony, because being casually 
introduced, it is less susceptible of a deliberate 
intention to deceive. And, it is of the greatest 
weight when the subject, casually introduced, 
is spoken of as known by the person, to whom 
Vac discourse is addressed, and an inference, 
or further information, is grounded upon it ; 
because it is improbable, that a man would 
speak of a fact, which he was conscious was 
false, as known by the person whom he ad- 
dressed; since he could not expect it to be 
believed, but must be sensible that he should 
thereby weaken the force of the rest of his 
discourse, if not provoke a public exposure. 

Further, testimony is either simple, or con- 
firmed by oath. The former is the only testi- 
mony which the ordinary events of human life 
afford. And, though many of these events 
may be of the highest importance, yet they 
admit of no other. On this we form our 
judgment of almost all facts, past or present, 
which do not admit of personal observation. 
Testimony, confirmed by oath, is nearly con- 
fined to judicial proceedings. Besides the 
ordinary weight of evidence, arising from the 
competency and presumed veracity of the wit- 

C o 



30 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

ness, it introduces a solemn appeal to God, as 
a witness of the truth of what is affirmed, and 
implies a sort of self-execration, if it be 
false. The effect of this solemnity upon the 
minds of all who are not in an unusual degree 
void of religion, the superior guilt of perjury 
to a common lie in the judgment of all man- 
kind, the punishment which it incurs if de- 
tected, and the infamy* with which it is fol- 
lowed, all combine to confirm an evidence de- 
livered upon oath. Thus an oath for confir- 
mation is to men an end of all strife. 

Lastly ) testimony is either spoken or written. 
In some cases, written testimony is of greater 
weight than unwritten. Thus, an account in 
writing of words spoken long ago, if written 
near the time when they were delivered, is 
more likely to be correct, than one given from 
memory. So also any intricate subject, con- 
sisting of a variety of circumstances, is likely 
to be stated with greater accuracy, if it were 
committed to writing soon after it took place, 

* This infamy has probably as much influence on men, as all 
the other causes together: for, excepting our immediate interest 
or gratification, and often not excepting even these, the chief 
principle of human conduct is, as Mr. Locke observes, the Law 
©f Reputation. Hence it is to be lamented, that such distinc- 
tions should have prevailed, respecting the nature of oaths, as 
tend, in some cases, to lessen the infamy of perjury. In regard 
to those oaths, on which the security of the property and lives of 
m n depend, that infamy continues unimpaired, and therefore 
produces hcne^cial effects. But, in respect to Custom House, 
Exci>e, and Election Oaths, it seems much diminished ; conse- 
quently, in those cases, the Law of Reputation checks the com- 
mission of perjury only in a slight degree. 



Testimony. 31 

than if trusted to recollection. The terms of 
a written contract, also, may be more safely 
relied upon, than those of a verbal one; bo- 
cause, if any of those terms happen to be 
forgotten, men are too apt to entertain opinions, 
favourable to their own interests, in their stead : 
besides, that an unforeseen change of circum- 
stances often makes a change in their interests, 
which they are too apt to favour in the account 
of their engagements. In some respects, how- 
ever, viva voce evidence is entitled to greater 
credit than written: because it does not admit 
of so much contrivance to deceive : because 
it is subject to cross-examination : and because 
the countenance, voice, and manner of speech 
of the witnesses, afford some indications of 
their veracity or falsehood. Added to all this, 
in written evidence it is requisite to ascertain, 
that it is really the writing of the person, to 
whom it is attributed. 

On the principle on which credit is given to 
testimony, various opinions have been enter- 
tained : which are mentioned in the Encyclo- 
paedia Britannica, vol. ii. p. 532. Hume's 
opinion is, that experience is the sole ground 
of faith in testimony. To confute this, Camp- 
bell contends, that experience is the foundation 
of diffidence, rather than confidence, in testi- 
mony; for infancy is credulous, and old age 
distrustful ; and maintains that testimony has a 
c4 



32 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

natural and original influence on belief. Reid 
says, that there are two principles implanted 
in our nature which correspond with each 
other: first, a propensity to speak the truth ; 
and secondly, a disposition to confide in the 
veracity of others. To speak truth, he con- 
siders as natural and instinctive, and as re- 
quiring no art, inducement or temptation, but 
only to yield to a natural impulse. Lying, 
on the contrary, lie regards as doing violence 
to nature, and as never practised, even by 
the worst of men, without some temptation. 
The author of this article in the Encyclopaedia, 
censures the representing of the speaking of 
truth as instinctive; because, as words are 
arbitrary signs, no instinctive connexion can 
ever have been formed between such signs 
and ideas. His opinion is, that, though there 
be no natural connexion between words and 
ideas, yet that words are so strongly associated 
to ideas, that, without a violent effort of the 
speaker to the contrary, they must always 
be in conformity with each other, that, hence, 
it is impossible, that a man should, without 
some effort, speak any thing but truth: for 
the ideas, of what he has seen or heard, are 
not of his own manufacture: but are gene- 
rated by external objects; and till they be 
effaced from the memory, they must always, 
by the law of association, make their ap- 



Testimony. 33 

pcarance there with all their mutual relations, 
and in their proper dress. It may, however, 
be remarked, that this author has not dis- 
tinguished between the intention to speak truth, 
and the means, or words, by which that in- 
tention is to be executed. Though the latter 
be arbitrary; yet, the former may be instinc- 
tive. Another solution is that given in the 
Eclectic Review for May, 1807, p. 426, " The 
" experience of children (for in the very worst 
" society, every child hears probably a him- 
11 dred truths for one falsehood) and the in- 
" comparably greater facility of relating from 
u memory than from invention, are quite suf- 
" ficient to account for the tendencies to cre- 
" dulity and veracity, without supposing dis- 
* 6 tinct principles in the constitution of the 
u mind: and if these causes are competent 
<i to the effects, it is unphilosophical to seek 
" for others." This solution, which agrees 
in part with Hume's, seems the most probable. 
Great part of our knowledge is, in childhood, 
obtained by testimony. We then believe al- 
most every thing that is told us by our parents, 
or our nurses. This, though liable to abuse, 
is nevertheless a wise provision, as it is a 
means of furnishing us with information, which 
we could not otherwise obtain, but which may 
be necessary for our security then, or as a 
preparation for future improvement. At an 
c 5 



34 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

early period, we find, that not all that is told 
us is true ; which tends to weaken our implicit 
reliance on testimony. This, at first, extends 
only to particular things, in which we have 
been deceived. Then, perhaps, it applies to 
particular persons, whose falsehoods we have 
had frequent opportunities of detecting. But, 
as in our progress, we find, that instances 
of deception are not confined to particular 
subjects, or particular persons, we gradually 
learn to suspect testimony more and more. 
Still, as we grow older, we become even more 
suspicious of it; and learn by experience, that 
it is necessary to restrict our belief in it by 
certain rules. Thus, as our ability of ob- 
taining knowledge, by other means, increases, 
our implicit reliance on testimony gives way 
to a more rational belief in it. But, though 
our disposition to credit it be in some measure 
controuled by experience, it is seldom regu- 
lated by it sufficiently. For notwithstanding 
the suspicions, which frequent deceptions oc- 
casion, that disposition to credit testimony is 
still so strong in most men, that they cannot 
help giving more credit than is due, even 
to those who are known to allow themselves 
to deviate from truth ; the inconveniences of 
which they often feel. On the other hand, 
there appears, in a few men, a strong dis- 
position to discredit testimony, at least on 



Testimony. 25 

certain subjects. But, an implicit belief of 
testimony, and a determined rejection of it, 
are both extremes; between which there is 
a just mean to be observed. There are rules, 
which, if carefully applied, will generally en- 
able us to determine, with tolerable accuracy, 
when it may safely be credited, and when not. 
These rides must be sought from experience. 
In our intercourse with mankind, we observe, 
that they generally speak the truth, except 
when they are influenced by prejudice, interest, 
or passion; but that, when they are under 
the influence of either of these, they frequently 
attempt to deceive. Hence, if we may rea- 
sonably presume, that in the testimony, which 
a witness gives, his mind is wholly unbiassed; 
he may generally be regarded as worthy of 
credit, but not otherwise. 

Thus, it appears, that (lie credibility of testi- 
mony if it be not originally derived from 
experience, is yet restricted by it to certain 
circumstances, and under these circumstances 
is confirmed by it. 



We are often informed of things, not by the 

person who observed them himself, but by one 

who was informed of them by the observer; 

and frequently the information passes through 

cS 



36 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

several hands before it reaches us. If all the 
persons, through whom the information has 
passed* be known, this, for the sake of dis- 
tinction, may be called Remote Testimony ; 
but, if they be unknown, it is mere Report. 
The weight of this kind of evidence is less 
than that of immediate testimony; and the 
greater the number of persons is, through 
whom the information has passed, the less 
credit does it deserve. Because, there is then 
so much the greater danger of their having 
misunderstood each other; and because the 
risk of misrepresentation, or of intentional de- 
ception, which are common to all testimony, 
is repeated as often as the information passes 
from one person to another. 



The third species of moral evidence, is of a 
mixt kind, possessing partly the nature of per- 
sonal observation, and partly that of testimony. 
It is that by which we learn from others, those 
general conclusions which they have deduced 
by the observation of a variety of facts of the 
same kind. It differs from the first kind; 
because that relates to the general conclusions 
which we deduce by our own personal observa- 
tion. And, it differs from testimony; because 
that relates to the specific facts which our 



Observation of others. 37 

informer has observed, and not to the general 
conclusions which lie has deduced. 

llere^ also, it should be noticed, that the 
subjects observed, may have been perceived to 
be either uniform or -carious ; and nearly the 
same remarks may be made upon each, which 
have been made already, under the head of 
Personal Observation. 

A very considerable part of the knowledge 
possessed by men, even of good education, is 
thus obtained. For, human life is too short, 
and the opportunities of most men too few, 
to furnish them with sufficient knowledge, by 
personal observation. 

The weight of evidence to be attributed to 
the information thus obtained, depends on 
several circumstances. 

The nature of the subjects is one of these. 
Many subjects are level to the capacity of every 
man. Here, no doubt can arise on account of 
the difficulty of making the observations. Of 
subjects, not so obvious as these, some are 
capable of more accurate observation than 
others. Thus, general truths in chemistry 
may be more easily ascertained, than in agri- 
culture ; because the circumstances of the ex- 
periments admit of being regulated at discre- 
tion in the one, but not in the other; and, 
because the experiments in the former are 



38 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (CL II.) 

terminated in a shorter space of time, than 
those in the hitter. 

Much also depends on the character of flie 
observers. Our knowledge of the ability of 
our informer, of his care and accuracy in 
forming his judgment, and his usual regard 
to veracity, will greatly influence our reliance 
upon his information. The members also, of 
some professions, are, from their education 
and habits, more capable of accurate observa- 
tion, than those of others. Thus, experi- 
mental philosophers are more able observers 
than farmers. The relations of the one are 
also more worthy of credit, than those of the 
others; both, because there is a connexion 
between accuracy of observation, and fidelity 
in relation; while they who judge at random, 
generally either speak at random, or supply 
the defects of their observation by invention ; 
and because a mis-statement in subjects, which 
admit of greater accuracy, is more easily de- 
tected, and attended with greater disgrace, 
than in those which are more vague. 

The number of our informers, is another cir- 
cumstance, by which the credibility of their 
information is regulated. This depends, not 
only on the principle which regulates belief 
in testimony, but also, on its being less pro- 
bable, that several persons should be mistaken 
in the general conclusions, which they have 



Observation of others. 39 

drawn from their observations, than one. 
This remark, however, supposes the subject 
to be such, that the observers are competent 
judges of itj otherwise, the information of one 
person, whose skill and general veracity are 
known, is more worthy of belief, than that 
of many, of very inferior capacity and credit. 
When the same information is delivered by 
all, so far as we can learn, who have had op- 
portunity of observing the subject, w r e have 
then the strongest proof, of which this species 
of evidence, taken alone, can admit. This, 
however, is capable of being increased by our 
own personal observation. For when, by this 
means, we have deduced the same conclusions, 
which we have learnt from others; we are 
more fully convinced of their truth, than if 
we had received them upon their information 
alone. For instance, he, who has tried ex- 
periments in chemistry, natural philosophy, 
or electricity, has a firmer conviction of their 
truth, than he who has only read of them. 
Thus, these two species of evidence, when 
they concur, very much confirm each other. 
And, when our own personal observation has 
been both constant and extensive, and also 
coincides with the experience of all, whose 
observations on the subject we have ever known, 
we have the highest degree of proof, of which 
the subjects of moral evidence are capable; 



4G Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

and our assent rises to moral certainty. For, 
whatever coincides with our own constant and 
extensive experience, and that of all other 
men, so far as we can learn, we may conclude, 
to happen according to some established law 
of nature; and therefore, not to be subject 
to those contingencies, to which other events 
are liable. It is thus, that we are satisfied of 
the truth of certain propositions respecting the 
common operations of nature, and the pro- 
perties of substances ; as, that the sea ebbs 
and flows, that the sun rises and sets, that 
lead sinks in water, and melts in fire. That 
these propositions are true, no doubt can be 
entertained. Yet, even this evidence, great 
as it is, falls short of demonstration; and that, 
whether the propositions affirm the properties 
of their subjects as general truths, or their 
events in particular cases. If they affirm the 
properties of their subjects as general truths, 
the evidence depends on my own observation, 
and that of others. Now, my own observa- 
tion, however constant, must necessarily be 
very limited. My inference must, therefore, 
be drawn from a very small number of cases, 
compared with those, which actually exist: 
consequently, it is possible, that the subject 
may not be constant; though I have never 
seen it otherwise. The same may be said of 
the other persons, whose observations coincide 



Observation of others. 41 

with mine, both severally and collectively. 
For the subjects, which have been observed 
by all the persons, whose judgment 1 have 
been able to collect, must be but a small part 
of those of the same kind which exist. 
Added to this, their observations have been 
communicated to me by testimony; and it is 
possible, that their testimony may be false. 
For such a proposition, therefore, I cannot 
attain certainty; consequently, the evidence 
falls short of demonstration. A remarkable 
instance of failure in a proof of this kind oc- 
curs in the well-known case of the king of 
Siam, who rejected the evidence of the Dutch 
Ambassador, for the existence of ice. His 
own constant experience, and that of all others, 
so far as he could learn, were in direct con- 
tradiction to the Ambassador's assertion. He 
had, therefore, as strong reason for disbelieving 
it, as the most constant experience could af- 
ford ; yet he was mistaken. 

This evidence is, also, inferior to demonstra- 
tion, if the propositions affirm the event of 
things in particular cases: for, as it was ob- 
served, the conclusion, which my own con- 
stant experience, and that of others, affords, 
respecting these events, is that they happen 
according to some established law of nature. 
Now, the laws of nature depend upon the will 
of God. But, we cannot be certain, that it 



42 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

is his wiH, that they should always continue 
the same. He may have been willing to 
suspend them on certain occasions, where it 
seemed fit to his infinite wisdom. He may 
even determine that they shall be totally 
changed or abolished.* Hence, we cannot be 
certain, that events, which depend on these 
laws, will always continue the same. Con- 
sequently, the evidence, which we have for 
these events, is inferior to demonstration. 

It should be remembered, that the will of 
God is both the foundation of the conclusions 
deduced from constant experience, and the 
limit to them. As it secures their truth against 
the effects of human caprice, and other con- 
tingencies; so it excludes their truth in all 
cases, in which it may be his will, that the 
events should be contradictory to experience. 

As personal observation, when it coincides 
with the accounts which we have received 
of the experience of others, confirms them; 
so, when it is contradictory to them, it lessens 
their weight ; because, it then induces a belief, 
that what has been delivered on the subject, 
is only a popular error. And, as such errors 
have prevailed, a reasonable suspicion of fal- 
lacy may be entertained on the point in question. 

* No proposition, founded on constant experience, can be bet- 
ter established than that the sun will nse tc-morrcw ; yet, he 
who believe* in Revelation, must admit that a day will come 
when even this proposition will be false. 



Observation of Others. 43 

Such a suspicion may arise, especially, where 
the subject requires extraordinary skill and 
dexterity, or peculiar accuracy of attention 
to all the circumstances, under which the event 
is to be observed. For, it may then be pre- 
sumed, that there has been some defect in 
these requisites in former observers. But it 
is necessary, that the person, who thus relies 
on his own experience, in opposition to gene- 
ral opinion, should be satisfied, that he pos- 
sesses these qualities in an extraordinary degree, 
and has properly exercised them; otherwise, 
he ought rather to suppose, that there has 
been some error in his experiments. 

In some cases, personal experience would 
lead to false conclusions, which could be cor- 
rected only by the experience of others. 
Thus were we to conclude, that what we had 
observed in the manners, opinions, and cha- 
racters of men, were general truths, depending 
on some permanent cause, our conclusion 
would be erroneous. For men have differed 
much in all these respects, in consequence of 
the various circumstances in which they have 
been placed. But, these differences we learn, 
not from our own experience, but from the 
experience of others : and thus, their experience 
shews, that what we might conclude to be 
uniform, was really various. On the other 
hand, there are facts, which would, on per- 



44 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ck. II.) 

sonal observation, appear to us to be various; 
but which the experience of others would shew 
us to be uniform. Of this nature are comets, 
which appear at too distant periods for any 
individual, unacquainted with the observa- 
tions of others, to determine to be uniform. 
Eclipses, also, would scarcely be discovered 
to be uniform by the insulated observations 
of an individual; and, indeed, history fur- 
nishes us with instances of even nations who 
were ignorant of their uniformity. Thus, we 
are told, that the Lydians and Medes were in- 
duced to put an end to a war, which had lasted 
five years, by an eclipse of the sun, which hap- 
pened while they were engaged in a doubtful 
battle; evidently from an ignorance of the 
uniformity of eclipses, and probably from a 
supposition that this eclipse manifested the 
anger of the Gods against their contests. And 
the inhabitants of Jamaica were, by a similar 
ignorance, prevailed upon to renew their sup- 
plies to Columbus, by his foretelling a total 
eclipse of the moon, with the time when it 
would happen, and which he pretended was a 
mark of the vengeance of the Great Spirit 
k against them, for refusing to support his 
servants. 



Gcnei^al Notoriety. 45 

General Notoriety, is a fourth kind of moral 
evidence. 

When we find that a thing is fully believed 
by all men, so far as we can learn, it is then 
said to be a matter of general notoriety. This 
kind of evidence relates both to specific facts, 
and to conclusions drawn from observation. 
It agrees with testimony, inasmuch as the in- 
formation is received from others ; but it dif- 
fers from it, because we have not here the 
evidence of any particular individual, who 
pretends, that he himself personally observed 
the fact. And, it differs from general observa- 
tion, because our informers do not pretend, 
that they deduced the conclusion from their- 
own observations. 

Most men have no other evidence than this, 
for a great, perhaps the greater, part of the 
- facts and general truths, which they believe. 
They have neither observed those facts them- 
selves, nor have they received them on the 
testimony of those who did observe them. 
But, they believe them, because tliey find 
them generally believed, and disputed by none. 
So, also, as to the general conclusions, which 
they hold. They have neither deduced them 
by their own observation, nor have they been 
informed of them by those, who did deduce 
them; but they find them universally main- 
tained, and never doubted; therefore, they 



46 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

also admit them. Even truths, capable of 
demonstration, are received by a great part of 
mankind, on no higher evidence than this. 
For they have neither demonstrated them them- 
selves, nor been informed of them by those who 
have; but they admit them because they are 
universally received. It is thus that many 
of the truths in natural philosophy are believed 
by men in general. And it is thus that many 
geometrical truths are believed by artificers and 
constantly applied to practice in setting out 
their work. 

The weight of this species of evidence, de- 
pends partly on a presumption, that if the 
assertions were not true, they would not be 
universally believed, but would be contra- 
dicted; and partly, perhaps principally, on 
experience ; for, though we are in the constant 
practice of believing them, and acting upon 
them as true, we have seldom found ourselves 
mistaken. Thus, the rules of arithmetic, as 
of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and 
division are found, when properly applied to 
lead to correct conclusions. We therefore 
place the utmost confidence in their truth. 
Yet, though they are all capable of demonstra- 
tion, very few persons comparatively have ever 
seen them demonstrated. 



Report. 47 

A fifth kind of moral evidence, is Report. 

The word has various significations, which 
it is not necessary to mention. It is here used 
to signify a rumour or account of certain facts 
or events, more or less believed. If the ac- 
count be fully credited, it then belongs to the 
article last mentioned. We are here not only 
without the testimony of any individual who 
professes to have observed the fact in question 
himself; but we do not even know the channel 
through which the information came ; for, if 
this be known, it is not a subject of mere 
report; but of remote testimony. The weight 
of this species of evidence is much less, than 
of either of the preceding. It depends, jpartly , 
on a presumption, that if there were not some 
ground for the report, it would not have arisen ; 
and partly on experience, which points out 
the circumstances, that render it more or less 
credible. These circumstances will be more 
conveniently mentioned in a subsequent chapter. 



Tradition, is a sixth kind of moral evidence. 

It is the relation of a fact or event, which 
happened some time ago, and which was not 
committed to writing by any person who ob- 
served it, but was communicated from one to 
another, for a certain period of time. To this 



48 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II.) 

is to be attributed almost all the information, 
which we have of the history of nations in 
their infancy ; and our knowledge of many 
circumstances belonging to particular persons, 
or particular places, which are not recorded in 
history. But, the tendency of mankind to 
exaggerate, and to supply the defects of 
memory by invention, renders accounts so 
handed .down, very uncertain. 



All the above kinds of moral evidence may 
be considered as external; because the evidence 
on which the proposed subject is believed, doe* 
not arise from the subject itself, but from some 
external source. Besides these, there are other 
kinds, which, as they arise from the subjects 
themselves, may be considered as internal evi- 
dence. 

The first of these is Analogy. This is, when 
from the resemblance, which the subject in « 
question bears to some other known subject, it 
is inferred, that they both had the same origin ; 
or both possess similar properties ; or, under 
similar circumstances, are likely to be affected 
in the same way ; or to produce the same effects. 
It is by this species of evidence, that we are 
able to apply to particular occasions, the 
greater part of the information which we hav« 



Internal Evidence. 49 

derived from personal observation, and the 
. general observation of mankind. Thus, it is 
from the resemblance which a disorder, in a 
certain patient, bears in its symptoms to other 
disorders which a physician has already ob- 
served, that he is able to ascertain its nature, 
and prescribe for its cure. 

The weight of the evidence by analogy ad- 
mits of great variety, according to the par- 
ticular nature of the subject to which it is 
applied: and, in every particular class of sub- 
jects, that weight must.be determined by ex- 
perience. For, experience will teach us with 
what degree of safety conclusions have been 
drawn in each class, and therefore, with what 
degree of probability they may be drawn in 
future. It should be, however, observed, that 
reasoning by analogy is not equally safe in 
drawing general conclusions, as in applying, 
to particular cases, the general truths already 
established. 



Probable inferences ^ drawn from facts^ or 
from premises ^ belong also to the head of 
internal evidence. 

Inferences from facts are termed by lawyers, 
Presumptions ; and are opposed by them to po si- 



50 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Ch. II) 

live proofs.* These inferences are of greater 
or less weight, according as it is more or less 
probable, that the facts or circumstances, al- 
ready established, would not have existed, un- 
less the fact, which is inferred from them, had 
existed also.t 

Thus, if on a remote island, a hovel should 
be discovered, it would naturally be inferred, 
that some human being had been there ; and 
this inference would amount to a moral cer- 
tainty.^: Or, if a man be found dead in a 
house, with a bleeding wound, apparently made 

* By positive proof is meant the evidence of testimony of men 
©n oath, or of writings, or records. A just rule of law icspecting 
presumptions is that they are to be relied upon only ui.til the 
contrary be proved. Blackstone, iii. 371. 

+ In Gilbert's Law of Evidence, it is said, that u when the 
« fact itself cannot be proved, that which comes nearest to the 
" proof of the fact, is the proof of the circumstances thatneces- 
il sarily, and usually attend such facts." But, it should seem, 
that what affords a safe ground to infer the fact, is, not that, if 
the fact did exist, it would have been attended by such or such 
circumstances ; but, that those circumstances would not have ex- 
isted, unless the particular fact alledgcd had existed also. For, as 
there may be several different facts, which would be attended by 
the same circumstances, the existence of the circumstances affords 
rto ground to conclude which of those facts did actually exist. 
Just as, when a certain effect might be produced by several dif- 
ferent causes, we have no ground to infer by which of those causes 
it was in reality produced. But, when there is only one cause 
which could have produced the effect, there we may safely infer 
the existance of the cause from that of the effect. 

t When the philosopher, Aristippus, who was cast away upon 
an unknown shore, beheld certain geometrical figures distinctly 
marked upon the sand, he was naturally led to conclude, with a 
degree of confidence not inferior to moral certainty, that the 
country was inhabited by men, some of whom were devoted to 
mathematical science. Now, had these figures been less accurate- 
ly formed, and more like the work of chance, the presumption, 
that the country was inhabited, would have been weaker; and 
had they been of such a nature, as to leave it doubtful, whether 
they were the work of accident or design, the evidence would 
iuve been too ambiguous to serve as a foundation for any opinion. 



Internal Evidence. 51 

with a sword, and another man be observed 
running out of the house with a bloody sword 
in his hand, there being no other person found 
on the spot, a violent presumption would arise, 
that the fugitive was the murderer. For, though 
it be possible, that the deceased may have 
killed himself, yet y the hasty flight of this man, 
with the bloody weapon in his hand, are cir- 
cumstances which give the inference consi- 
derable probability. 

So, also, a receipt for rent, due at a certain 
time, affords a probable presumption, that the 
rents, which were due previous to that time, 
had been paid. Thus, also, attempts to con- 
ceal, afford a presumption of guilt, and, on 
the contrary, openness affords a presumption of 
innocence. 

Inferences from facts are deduced by ana- 
logy. For, the presumption is founded on the 
resemblance which the fact in question bears, 
in its circumstances, to other known facts. 

The term, presumption, is given not only to 
inferences from facts, but, also, to all other 
conclusions not supported by positive proof. 
These presumptions respect both the past and 
the future. Thus, our judgments of men's 
motives and intentions, especially when they 
have not declared them in words, are only 
presumptions. The opinions which we form 
of the future conduct of men, under certain 
p3 



£2 Different Kinds of Moral Evidence. (Clu II.) 

circumstances, are also presumptions. All 
these presumptions are of greater or less weight 
according as they are more or less consistent, 
with experience ; and when they are incon- > 
sistent with it, they are of no real weight. 
Thus, the presumption that a man, under cer- 
tain circumstances, will not abuse the power 
intrusted to him, is probable, or not, according 
as it appears from experience that men in 
general similarly circumstanced, have, or have - 
not, abused their power. 

Tables, shewing the probabilities of the dura- 
tion of human life, are deductions from facts; 
and the application of these tables to the assu- 
rance of lives, or the purchase of annuities, are 
probable inferences, drawn from the general 
truths laid down in them. 

So^ also, the doctrine of chances consists : of 
inferences from facts. That a die, for instance, 
has a certain number of sides, is a fact; and 
that each side is as likely to come upwards, on 
being thrown, as any other, may be safely as- 
sumed. But the calculations of the chances of 
throwing an ace, or any other number, in one 
or more throws, are only probable inferences, 
drawn from these premises. 

But, as these subjects belong to the science 
of mathematics, rather than to that of general 
reasoning on matters of fact, it will be suf- 
ficient just to have mentioned them here. 



Internal Evidence. 53 

Of inferences from premises, it should be ob- 
served, that when they are intuitive and neces- 
sary, they belong to demonstration; but, if 
they be only probable, they belong to moral 
evidence. 

Our conclusions from premises are safe, only 
when, and so far as, we have a clear and 
certain knowledge of the connexion or re- 
-pugnance of their subjects and predicates. 
I say, only so far as we have this knowledge, 
because we may sometimes know that the sub- 
ject and predicate are connected, but be ig- 
norant of the nature and extent of that con- 
nexion ; and consequently we cannot safely 
-draw a conclusion respecting its nature or ex- 
tent. But, as this subject properly belongs to 
logic, and has been fully discussed by logicians, 
it will not be necessary to enlarge u'pToii it here. 

Under the head of internal evidence, may, 
also, be mentioned the consistency of the parts 
of any relation of facts with each other; the 
appearances of simplicity, or of art and contri- 
vance, with which the relation is delivered ; the 
candour or partiality, which appears in the 
relation; the affording a fair opportunity of 
detection of what might be false or erroneous ; 
or the studiously avoiding detection, by an 
attempt to render the standard of truth, upon 
the question, uncertain. 

The weight of evidence arising from these 
»3 



$4 General Dircctionf relating to (Ch. III.) 

circumstances, depends on experience. For, 
it is by experience that we discover how far a 
person may have observed, correctly, some part 
of a fact, and incorrectly another part ; or what 
illusions of imagination he may have been sub- 
ject to, during the progress of the event which 
he relates. It is, also, by experience, that we 
discover how far true relations usually differ 
from those that are false, in the other circum- 
stances just mentioned. 

Upon the whole, it appears, that the two prin- 
cipal kinds of moral evidence, are Experience 
and Testimony ; that the rest (except inferences 
from premises) are only combinations, or modi- 
fications of these ; and that the sphere of expe- 
rience is greatly enlarged by testimony ; while, 
on the other hand, testimony is restricted and 
confirmed by experience. 



CHAP. III. 

General Directions relating to Moral Reasoning. 



>OST of the directions, here proposed, 
will be found perfectly obvious ; and therefore 
may be thought superfluous. But, obvious as 
they may be, to all who duly consider the 
subject, they are rarely attended to in practice. 



Moral Reasoning* li> 

And this is one reason why errors in judgment 
are so frequent. As they are, probably, no 
where collected into one point of view, for the 
assistance of the student, they are here brought 
together for his use. It is to be wished, that in 
deciding on questions, he would form a habit of 
reducing them to practice. Some of them will 
appear not to relate immediately to moral evi- 
dence, as defined above. But, as the general 
questions to which they refer are most frequently 
of a mixt nature, involving in themmatters of 
fact, or general truths deduced from observa- 
tion, as well as subjects of law, morality, or of 
some other art or science, and therefore require 
a knowledge of moral evidence to their decision, 
it was thought useful to introduce them. 

The directions here proposed may be more 
easily remembered if they be collected under 
separate heads, and methodically arranged. 
They shall be mentioned, therefore, in the 
following order, viz. First, those which may 
be considered as a sort of previous qualifications 
for the examination of questions in moral evi- 
dence. Second!?/, those which should deter- 
mine whether or not we ought to engage in the 
discussion of the question proposed. Thirdly, 
such as must be observed in the discussion of 
questions. And lastly, the principles on which 
the weight of any probable argument, or the 
probability of any event, ought to be determined. 

D 4: 



56 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

First. To qualify ourselves for the exami- 
nation of questions in moral evidence. 

1. We must acquire fixt principles of evi- 
dence, and learn to apply tlieiii as steadily, and 
impartially, as possible. To this end we must 
acquaint ourselves with the sort of evidence, of 
which different subjects admit ; and form settled 
and steady notions of the weight of the different 
kinds of evidence, and of the circumstances 
which contribute to weaken or confirm them. 
Thus, we shall engage in the discussion of 
subjects, with less danger of being biassed by 
interest, and, therefore, with greater probability 
<ji deciding justly. Nothing, perhaps, has 
contributed niore to the impartiality with which 
justice is administered in our courts, than their 
having an established law of evidence, in which 
is laid down what evidence shall be admitted, 
; and what rejected. In private discussion, little 
: progress seems to have been made towards this 
important object. Hence, we see men attri- 
buting great weight to evidence in their favour, 
but very little weight to the same kind and 
degree of evidence, in opposition to them. 
Thus, disputants are like fraudulent tradesmen, 
who have two sets of weights, one to be em- 
ployed in their purchases, and the other in 
their sales. 

2. We should acquire a habit of examin- 
ing, at the commencement of every discussion, 



Moral Reasoning* 57 

"whether there be not some general principle, or 
some standard, by which the question must 
be determined. If there be, the discovery of 
it trill" both direct our investigation, and con- 
duct us most speedily, and most securely to 
our decision. But, if we neglect to discover 
it, we shall wander in our inquiry without 
an object, and, after all, seldom arrive at a 
just conclusion. For instance, to determine 
whether a *War were or were not successful, 
it should be ascertained at the outset, what con- 
stitutes a successful war. So also in deciding 
on the characters of men in any station of life, 
we should previously ascertain what are the 
duties of their station, and what are the quali- 
ties in w 7 hich excellency or defect in that line 
consists. A clear view of these duties and 
qualities is also requisite to enable us to decide, 
whether a man be or be not fit for a certain em- 
ployment. We must, however, be careful that 
the general principle which we assume, be both 
true in itself, and also, applicable to the point 
in hand; and, to ascertain this, we should 
accustom ourselves to bring it forth to view, and 
to submit it to examination. This direction is 
the more necessary, because it is probable, that 
our decisions are often made upon latent prin- 
ciples, which, if we were to examine them, 
we should not suffer to influence our determi- 
nation, 

b5 



58 General Directions relating to (Clu III.) 

3. We should acquire a habit of referring 
every thing, which will admit of it, to its end ; 
and of determining its value by its subserviency 
thereto. This will aiford a just standard on a 
subject, which would, otherwise, admit of none. 
Thus, in ascertaining what is the best style of 
writing, it should be considered, that the end of 
writing is to communicate ideas to the reader ; 
and, therefore, that that must be the best style, 
which conveys them to him with the greatest 
clearness and force : compared with these qua- 
lities, ornament and dignity are but of little 
value. Bat, what that style is, which is most 
clear and forcible, must be decided by ex- 
perience. If this rule be neglected, decisions 
of questions of this kind, will be left at the 
mercy of fashion and caprice, and therefore, be 
generally erroneous. 

4. We must acquire clear and precise rules 
of judgment ; such as are capable of an easy 
application, and lead as nearly as possible to 
certainty ; for they are valuable only as they 
possess these qualities. Rules, apparently pre- 
cise, are often rendered vague, by some circum- 
stance annexed to them, or by the introduction 
of indefinite limitations or extensions. Thust, 
the rule, that the dealings of men with each 
other should be regulated by principles of equity, 
is both clear and precise in itself, and admits 
©f an easy and tolerably certain application ; 



Moral Reasoning. 59 



'o 



because the value of property, or of ser- 
vices, may generally be estimated. But, if 
a provision be annexed to it, that one of the 
parties is to have rather the advantage, or 
according to the common phrase, to have the 
turn of the scale in his favour, it becomes 
indefinite, and very uncertain in its application. 
For, there is then nothing to direct the judg- 
ment, as to the degree in which the advantage 
is to be allowed, or how great a weight is to 
turn the scale. 

Such rules are generally worse than none ; 
because they induce men to attempt to decide 
by principles which cannot lead to a just 
decision. If they had no rule, they would 
either not attempt to decide at all, or would 
seek after some just principle, on which to 
ground their decision: but having, what ap- 
pears to be a rule, they proceed to decide, 
and are deceived. 

Secondly. To determine whether we ought 
to engage in the discussion of a question. 

1 . We should consider whether the question 
be worth investigating ; and, to decide this, 
we should inquire of what importance the sub- 
ject may be to us. Some subjects are im- 
portant in themselves, or of importance to other 
men, while to us they may be of little con- 
sequence. Thus, many subjects in law or 
physic, may be of great moment to lawyer* 
p6 



60 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

or physicians, but of little use to a divine, 
a soldier, or a mechanic. And, should they 
employ in the investigation of these subjects, 
the time which is requisite to form a just judg- 
ment of them ? they must neglect what belongs 
to their own station. But such subjects as 
belong to our peculiar line of life, or to our 
moral and religious conduct, or health and 
happiness, are important to us ; and therefore, 
are worthy of our careful examination. 

2. Consider how r far the question will admit 
of being fully examined. Some subjects can 
.scarcely be openly and fully discussed. The 
questions are already decided in the opinion of 
mankind, and their interest and prejudice pre- 
vent their examination of them. Arguments 
on one side, however weak, will be received 
with applause; while those on the other, how- 
ever strong, will be heard with disgust. Thus, 
in a republic, arguments in favour of a mo- 
narchy, or in a monarchy, arguments in favour 
of a republic, will scarcely be duly examined. 
So also, 'when the current of popular opinion is 
in /favour of- war, arguments for peace will 
excite resentment; or, when public animosi. 
ties prevail, arguments in favour of the objects 
of general hatred will expose him who urges 
them to great odiam. 

On such questions w r e should be extremely 
careful to divest ourselves of prejudice on ekhw 



Moral Reasoning. 61 

side. For, truth does neither necessarily lie on 
the same side with the general opinion, nor on 
the contrary side. "Wc must, therefore, ex- 
amine such questions, as fairly as possible, 
on the ground of their own merits. But,, in 
most cases, we should do this privately; for 
a prudent man will be well assured, that the 
duty of his station calls him to controvert, the 
public opinion, before he exposes himself to 
the hatred of mankind bv so doing". 

Sometimes the arguments which are necessary 
to the decision of a question, cannot be urged, 
without a violation of the respect due to persons 
in authority; or without offending the person 
with whom we are discoursing, on account of 
the reflections which they must cast upon his 
conduct. Prudence must direct, whether the 
importance of the occasion will justify our in- 
curring these evils or inconveniences ; or, whe- 
ther it be not better to avoid the discussion 
altogether. For, it is evident, that if these 
arguments be either not urged at all, or not 
with due force, we cannot arrive at a just 
decision. In our private examinations of such 
questions, we may, indeed, give every con- 
sideration its just weight, regardless of the 
discredit which it would throw on any person. 
This consideration, therefore, can be no reason 
why we should not endeavour to form our pri- 
vate judgment of such questions, as correctly as 



62 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

possible. But, it is an important reason, why 
we should not debate them with others ; and 
that, not only on account of the evils above- 
mentioned, but also, lest, from want of a due 
consideration of the argun*ents necessary to 
a just decision, we become accessaries to their 
errors in judgment, and practice, 

3. Consider whether the question be ca- 
pable of a satisfactory decision. Some questions 
cannot be determined, because the subject ad- 
mits of no standard, but is altogether of an ar- 
bitrary nature. Thus, matters of mere taste 
have, in general, no proper standard; and, 
therefore, according to the old adage, " de 
gustibus nil disputandum." Others admit of 
no decision, because the subject, or predicate 
of the proposition, cannot be accurately defined. 
And others again do not afford sufficient evi- 
dence for a determination. From all such 
questions, it would be better to abstain. For, 
besides the loss of the time devoted to them, 
which might be more profitably employed, their 
discussion has a tendency to confuse the judg- 
ment. 

4. We should consider whether we are 
competent to the discussion of the question* 
Incompetency may arise from a defect of abili- 
ties, or information; or from our being too 
much interested in the decision. The last is, 
probably, the most frequent; as well as the most 



Moral Reasoning. 63 

powerful source of incompetency ; for nothing 
blinds the eves, and perverts the judgment, 
so much as interest. If the question, however, 
be such that, though interested in it, we are 
under a necessity of deciding it, we shall act 
prudently in taking the advice of some judicious 
friend, who is perfectly disinterested. At any 
rate, our decision should be made with dif- 
fidence ; and we should be ready to listen to 
any objections which may be urged against it. 

Thirdly. When we have determined to enter 
upon the investigation, w r e should examine, in 
the first place, whether the question be fairly 
and clearly stated, so as to bring the real point 
in dispute to an issue. Sometimes, through ig- 
norance, and often by design, the statement of 
a question includes something taken for granted, 
which necessarily leads to a decision in favour 
of the proposer. This amounts to begging the 
question ; and therefore should not be admitted. 
Sometimes, the true point at issue is not ex- 
pressed in the question: and then the discussion, 
however ably conducted, leads to no satisfac- 
tory conclusion. In this case, it would be pro- 
per to adopt the practice of special pleaders, 
and to ascertain all the points, in which w r e 
agree with our opponent, and those in which we 
differ from him. A new statement of the ques- 
tion may then be made, in which the errors 
•f the former may be corrected. 



64 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

2. We should form as clear and precise 
ideas as possible of the proposition on which 
•we would decide; and carefully distinguish 
it from all others with which it is in danger of 
being confounded. If it assert a fact, we 
should endeavour to understand clearly its 
nature and circumstances. This will enable 
us to judge more easily and correctly of the 
weight of the evidence, which is brought to 
prove it. If it affirm or deny the nature or 
quality of any thing, we should gain as clear 
ideas as possible, both of its subject and pre- 
dicate, so far as we undertake to judge of it. 
For instance, if a certain measure of adminis- 
tration were asserted to be constitutional or 
unconstitutional, we should gain clear and pre- 
cise ideas, both of the measure, and of the 
constitution, so far as can affect the question. 
For, without such clear and precise ideas, 
it must be impossible to form a just judgment 
on the subject. 

3. We should consider of what kind of 
evidence the proposed subject, under all its cir- 
cumstances, is likely to admit; and, if such 
evidence be produced in a sufficient degree to 
counterbalance all that can be fairly urged 
against it, we should accustom ourselves to 
yield our assent. This direction is important, 
because we are often apt to expect stronger 
evidence, than the nature of the thing admits; 



Moral Reasoning. M 

and (hence, to feel dissatisfied, though the 
point be fairly proved. Thus, if in studying 
the evidence on any question of fact, we 
" employ ourselves in examining whether there 
be not a possibility that it may be false, instead 
• of considering whether there be not a sufficient 
probability that it is true, we shall certainly 
raise strong doubts in our minds. But, then, 
we should not study the subject rationally. 
Demonstration is the only species of reasoning, 
which, if even conducted correctly, can ex- 
clude the possibility of error. But facts do 
not admit of demonstration. They admit of 
moral evidence alone. The examining, there- 
fore, into flit possibility of error is inconsistent 
with the nature of the subject, and an absurd 
-practice. 

4. The foregoing rule relates to past facts, 
but a similar rule may be given respecting 
future events. It should be remembered, that 
the probability, and not the possibility, of an 
event is the proper ground for our conclusions. 
The propriety of this rule is too obvious to 
need proof. It has been, however, and is too 
often disregarded; as, when the prospect of a 
large prize in a lottery induces men to ad- 
venture, without a regard to ihe probability 
of success; or, the fear of an injury induces 
them to painful precautions, without con- 
sidering the probability of its happening 4 * 



66 General Directions relating to (Ch. HI.) 

An instance of this kind is mentioned in the 
Port Royal Art of Thinking, of a princess, 
w -ho, having heard that some persons had been 
killed by the fall of a roof, would never after- 
wards enter a house, without having it ex- 
amined; and was so persuaded of the pro- 
priety of her conduct, that she deemed all those 
imprudent, who did not take the same pre- 
caution. This rule is also disregarded by 
those who offer to us possibilities, as sufficient 
answers to arguments of probability. 

It is of great importance, both to the advance- 
ment of our knowledge, and to the happiness of 
our lives, to acquire a habit of disregarding, to 
a considerable degree, possibilities^ and of form- 
ing our judgment, and regulating our hopes 
and fears, by the true probability of the case. 
In some men, hope seems naturally to prevail, 
in others fear. The former are apt to magnify 
a slight prospect of success into a strong proba- 
bility; and the latter to increase too much the 
probability of dangers* Some dignify their 
rashness, by calling it a trust in providence r 
others justify their timidity by naming it pru- 
dence. But, these dispositions need correction, 
and are capable of being regulated by a due 
attention to the principles of moral evidence. 
Notwithstanding this rule, when the event, 
if it should take place, is of vast importance ; 
and the line of conduct necessary to ensure our 



Moral Reasoning. 67 

safety, if it should happen, will be attended 
with no disadvantage, if it should not; there 
iis possibility may properly determine our con- 
duct. Thus, for instance, if a house be on 
lire, its inhabitants should endeavour to effect 
their escape, even though there should be the 
greatest probability of their failing. Because, 
if they succeed, they save their lives; but, if 
they fail, they suffer only what they would 
have suffered, had they made no attempt to 
escape; and the smallesrt chance of success 
imaginable, is surely worth the pains and 
labour of the attempt. So also, the eternal 
judgment is an event of infinite importance. 
He, whose conformity to the directions of 
scripture, will ensure his safety, if it should 
take place, will be no loser by that conformity, 
if it should not. Consequently, the very pos- 
sibility of an eternal judgment, is a sufficient 
reason to engage in a preparation for it. This, 
however, is no exception to the rule, because, 
here the person is not supposed to draw any 
conclusion about the truth of the event. Deci- 
sions of questions of this kind, should pro- 
ceed on a consideration of the importance 
of the event and its probability combined, 
according to a principle explained at the end 
of tliis chapter. 

5. Since in most questions in moral evi- 
dence there are, as has been already observed^ 



68 General Directions relating io (Ch. III.) 

arguments on both sides, a view must be taken 
of all the material arguments on each side, 
before we proceed to a decision ; and this must 
be done with as much impartiality as possible. 
For^ it is evident, that if we examine one side 
with a prejudice in its favour, and the other 
with a prejudice against it, our decision is not 
likely to be correct. 

6+ When the question to be decided is 
contained in any composition or treatise, or if 
we debate it with another person, we should be 
upon our guard against the fascinations of ex- 
pression. We are apt to be too much in- 
fluenced by elegance of language, or bril- 
liancy of imagination. But, error is as often 
adorned with the flowers of rhetoric as truth. 
To judge correctly, we must divest every argu- 
ment of all its ornaments of style, and place it 
before us in a plain, simple dress; for, then 
Ave shall be better able to estimate its real 
"weight. 

7. Whenever the weight of an argument, 
or the decision of a question depends on degrees, 
we should examine whether those degrees be 
fairly stated; and, we should examine this 
« carefully ; because their statement is too fre- 
quently fallacious. Thus, in questions respect- 
ing the comparative merit, or demerit of parties, 
whether public or private, the degree of virtue 
or vice is generally over-rated on onesidey and 



Moral Reasoning. ' 6$ 



"S 



under-rated on the other, according to the 
party espoused by the speaker. 

8. It mast be observed, that the force of 
proof does not depend upon the number of 
arguments on -either side, but upon their weight. 
For, as in an account, there may bfc a number 
of articles, which amount only to a small sum 
altogether; while there may be a single article, 
which greatly exceeds them in value; so, a 
number of arguments may altogether weigh but 
little, while one single argument may be of 
great weight. 

9. When all the arguments on both sides 
have been fairly stated and examined, a judg- 
ment should be formed of the weight of each. 
Each side should then be summed up, and a 
balance struck; and our decision should be 
en that side, on which the evidence prepon- 
derates. The necessity of attending to this 
rule is obvious. It is^ however, often neglected. 
The more usual practice is to consider the 
arguments on one side only. Often, men 
decide on the consideration of only one single 
argument on one side. Whence the frequency 
of error is not surprising. 

10. If, upon examination, the evidence 
on both sides should appear equal, our judg- 
ment should be suspended ; but, if the evi- 
dence preponderates at all on either side, the 
assent must follow that preponderancy, and 



70 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

must also be regulated by the degree of it. As 
the degrees of preponderancy may vary almost 
infinitely, so the degrees of assent may vary 
almost infinitely too, as has been already men- 
tioned. If due care be taken to proportion, 
the degree of assent to the degree of prepon- 
derancy, it will prevent the errors, which 
would otherwise arise from precipitancy of 
judgment. Because then, whenever any opi- 
nion is held on slight evidence, it will be held 
subject to further examination, and will be 
corrected, if further evidence on the subject 
can be obtained. Besides, the person who so 
holds it, will probably be careful to express 
himself to others in such terms, as will convey 
to them a just idea of the degree of evidence, 
on which he has formed it. 

Fourthly. To determine the weight of any 
single argument, or the probability of any event. 

The chief difficulty consists in affixing a 
just value to each single argument; but, if 
this be not done, it will be impossible to sum 
up each side fairly, and of course impossible to 
strike a just balance. It may be thought im- 
practicable to lay down any rules for the per- 
formance of this. And, indeed, no rules can 
be given, which will enable us to do it with 
certainty in any particular case; otherwise, 
moral evidence would admit of certainty, as 
■well as demonstration. But, if certainty caH* 



Moral Reasoning. 71 

cot be obtained, it should be approximated 
as nearly as possible; and, for this purpose, 
ire should avail ourselves of such directions, 
as will render us some assistance ; though they 
be not capable of affording us all the help 
which we could wish. Now, the directions 
for determining the probability of any event, 
or of any simple question, on which there is 
only one argument on each side, will be found 
applicable to the determination of the proba- 
bility of single arguments in more complex 
questions. Such directions shall, therefore, be 
proposed* 

To determine the probability of an event, it 
should be considered, not nakedly, or by itself, 
but in all its circumstances. Jf all these cir- 
cumstances be such as either never, or very 
seldom, have accompanied a falsehood, the 
event is to be regarded as probable; but, if 
they be such as have usually accompanied 
a falsehood, it is then to be considered as 
improbable. Or, that eyentj which, under 
similar circumstances, has more frequently 
happened than not, is probable : and that, 
which under similar circumstances has more 
frequently failed than taken place, is im- 
probable. Or, again, that rule of judgment, on 
subjects of the same nature with that which is 
proposed, which, in most cases, where it is 
fairly applied, leads to a right conclusion, is a 



72 General Directions relating to (Ch. HI) 

just rule of probability; while that, -which 
most frequently leads to a wrong conclusion, is 
a wrong rule. All these rules amount nearly to 
the same thing; but they are given in these 
different forms, because some subjects will 
admit of a more easy application of one, and. 
others of another. They all require a reference 
to experience, to determine what is probable; 
for, experience is the true criterion of proba- 
bility. We are too strongly disposed to reason 
a priori , or to form our opinions on what we 
suppose to be the nature of things, rather than 
to consider how the subjects in question have 
most frequently turned out; and thus we are 
led into errors, which a due regard to experience 
would have enabled us to avoid. We may rest 
assured, that the more attentive we are to 
experience in forming our judgments of the 
subjects of moral evidence, the more correct 
will our judgments be: and, that the larger our 
collection of experience is, whether founded on 
our own observation, or on that of others, the 
more capable shall we be of determining what 
is probable, and what is not. The necessity 
of founding our judgments on experience, 
instead of founding them on hypotheses, or 
arguments a priori, can scarcely be too strongly 
enforced ; both because of the propensity which 
we have to reason on these latter grounds to the 
neglect of expediences and because of the errors 



Moral Reasoning. 73 



"5 



into which this propensity constantly leads us. 
To give an instance of these different modes of 
reasoning. Suppose the following question to 
be proposed for discussion : whether it would 
contribute to the good of the community, that 
a nation should provide for the education of 
its poor? They, who espoused the negative 
of this question, would, perhaps, tell you, that, 
if the poor were instructed, they would not be 
content to discharge those laborious offices 
in society, which are essential to the support 
of the community. Will a man, whose mind 
has been enlightened by education, be content 
to forego, by the farther pursuit of know- 
ledge, the gratification of that curiosity which 
you have awakened in him, and submit to 
drudge on in the same constant round of 
operations, which can furnish not one new 
idea ? Will he willingly continue to be your 
servant, to plough your lands, to thrash your 
corn, without a prospect of ever acquiring 
more than a bare subsistence; while he sees 
others, not superior to himself in information, 
rise to opulence and dignity ? Will he pati- 
ently submit to be governed? They would 
tell you, that ignorance is the parent of sub- 
mission; and therefore, that you must keep 
men ignorant, if you would have them good 
subjects. They, on the contrary, who main- 
tained the affirmative of the question^ would, 



74 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

probably, tell you to compare Scotland, where 
the poor are remarkably well educated, with 
Ireland, where the education of the poor 
is as remarkably neglected; that the result 
of this comparison will prove, that the edu- 
cation of the poor is favourable to the in- 
terests of the community. Now r , these latter 
would reason from experience; but the former 
would reason n priori. For they would be 
inferring from what they Mould think they 
knew of human nature, or from certain 
principles w hich they would assume respect- 
ing mankind, what would be the effects of 
educating the poor. It would be just as 
though I should infer what would be the 
effect of the mixture of certain substances, 
from what I supposed I knew of their pro- 
perties separately, instead of trying what 
the effect would be, or learning it from those 
who had made the experiment. From the 
discoveries which have been made in chemistry, 
it is obvious that, in many cases, such in- 
ferences would lead to very dangerous con- 
sequences. From all that could be known 
of the properties of sulphur, charcoal, and 
saltpetre, separately, no one could infer that 
their mixture would produce such a substance 
as gunpowder. He, who was most accurately 
acquainted with the nature of oil of turpentine, 
and nitrous acid, would never have been able 



Moral Reasoning* 75 

to infer, that the instant they came in contact, 
they would produce a violent flame. In na- 
tural things, we know well enough the danger 
of admitting hypotheses, and arguing a priori, 
and that the only safe way is the way of 
experiment. It is, indeed, by rejecting the 
former mode of reasoning, and adhering to 
the latter, that all the great improvements in 
science in modern times have been made. 
And, certainly, wherever it is practicable to 
pursue the method of experiment in most 
other departments of knowledge not capable 
of demonstration, it will be found vastly more 
safe and successful, than reasonings a priori^ 
or on hypotheses. 

In many cases, we are not satisfied with 
knowing, in general, what is probable; but 
we wish further to know, in what degree it 
js probable. This knowledge is important, 
when a question is to be decided by a compa- 
rison of opposite probabilities, or when there 
are arguments on both sides. Now, to deter- 
mine this, is a much more difficult thing than 
to determine the former. It has, however, been 
done, and with sufficient accuracy, in some 
questions of as uncertain a nature, as any that 
can be proposed. Nothing, for instance, is 
more uncertain than the duration of the life 
of individuals. Yet, tables have been formed 
to regulate the expectation of life at different 
e2 



76 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

ages, and with sufficient accuracy, to enable 
men to venture large sums of money in the 
purchase or sale of annuities, and assurance 
of lives with success. And, probably, if 
similar methods were adopted, and applied 
with as much care to ether subjects, the 
comparative probability of many of them 
might be as correctly ascertained. These 
tables were formed by an application to ex- 
perience. For, it was by observing how many 
persons, out of a given number, died at each 
particular age, that their rules were laid down. 
In all cases, which admit of it, experience 
should be the foundation of our rules; and 
happily, a great part of the cases, which we 
have to decide, will admit of that foundation. 
In consulting experience, we are to consider, 
not merely how the thing in question has most 
frequently happened; for, this will enable us 
to determine only in general, that it is more 
probable that it will happen so, than the 
contrary; but, we are to consider, how much 
oftner it has happened so, than otherwise; 
for, this will teach us in zvhat degree the event 
is probable. For instance, if I had observed 
only, that out of a number of persons, who 
had eaten of a certain fruit, more had been 
injured by it than not, I could then pronounce 
only, in general terms, that it would probably 
be injurious to any person who should eat of it. 



Moral Reasoning. 77 

' Bat, if I had observed, that only one third of 
the number had escaped injury, I might then 
conclude, that the probability of its being 
injurious to any one who should eat of if, 
would be as two to one ; or, if I had observed, 
that only one in a hundred had escaped injury, 
I might conclude, that it would be as ninety- 
nine to one» 

Two points, however, must be attended to 
in forming our rules of probability from ex- 
perience, in ascertaining both what is probable, 
and in what degree it is so. 

The first is, to make our observations on as 
large a scale as possible. For, the more exten- 
sive the scale is, the nearer will the rules 
founded upon it approach to truth. Thus, if 
we had known of only two, or three persons, 
who had eaten of the fruit, we could not 
depend with equal confidence on a conclusion 
drawn from this experience, as if we had 
known of ten ; nor, if ten had been the num- 
ber, could it be as safely trusted as if we had 
known of a hundred ; nor, if it had been a hun- 
dred, as if it had been a thousand, and so on. 
Because, when our observation is confined to a 
small number, there is a greater danger of 
the operation of the cause being affected by 
unknown circumstances, than where it is larger. 
And, the larger the number is, it is less pro- 
bable that the interfering circumstances should 
e3 



78 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

exist, and yet be undiscovered ; and the more 
probable that the cause is connected with the 
observed effect, and regulated in its operation, 
by some established law of nature. _ Besides, 
where our observation is extensive, we are 
enabled to determine better respecting the 
energy of the cause; and, whether there exist 
more or fewer circumstances which can pre- 
vent, or interfere with its operations; and, 
perhaps, what those circumstances arc Thus, 
v, hen the vaccine inoculation had been tried on 
only a few patients, though its success excited 
the attention of inquiring men, jet they would 
not presume to decide whether the disease which* 
it occasioned were mild and safe, and whether 
it would secure the patient from the infection 
of the small-pox. But, as the instances of its 
success multiplied, their doubts have been 
gradually overcome. And, now that these 
instances are very numerous, their judgment. 
of the propriety of the practice is established. 
The other point to be attended to is,, that 
flie facts on which our rules are founded, have 
been similarly circumstanced with those to 
which they are to be applied. For, if this 
be neglected, we shall be exposed to continual 
errors. Thus, if an epidemical disease, which 
proved more fatal to persons of one age, than 
to those of another, raged in the city, from 
which tables of the expectation of life were 



Moral Reasoning. 7&' 

formed; and the observations were made at 
the time when that disease prevailed, they 
would lead to false conclusions; and they, 
who acted on those tables, would fall into 
great, and perhaps ruinous mistakes. For, 
they would judge of the probability of the 
duration of human life in ordinary circum- 
stances, by observations made in extraordinary 
cases. So, also, tables of the rate of mor- 
tality founded on observations made in one 
place, are found not to be safely applicable 
to others differently circumstanced. Thus, 
the rate of mortality in large cities is found to 
be greater than that in the country, arid in 
some towns than in others. From Dr. Price's 
Book on annuities it appears, that, out of a 
thousand persons alive at one year old,, there 
are living at the age of 40, at Breslaw 445, at 
Norwich 289, at London (from 1759 to 1768> 
212, at London (from 1771 to 1780) 239, and 
at Northampton 420. It is obvious, therefore, 
that the tables formed for one place could not 
be correctly applied to another, unless it had 
been previously ascertained that the rate of 
mortality in both was nearly the same.* It 
often Ivap pens that the point in question can- 
not be determined by any direct experience, 

* Northampton, being a heajthy town, of a moderate popu- 
lation, containing about 7000 Inhabitants, has been selected as 
affording a mean between the mortality of towns and the coun- 
and the tables, founded on the observation* made there,, are 
ii general use. 

E 4 



,80 General Directions relating to (Ch. Ill) 

because the exact experiment has never, jvithin 
our knowledge, been tried. In all such cases, 
we should have recourse to that experience 
which comes nearest to the point in hand, 
and which, at the same time, is free from 
all such circumstances as might be supposed 
to occasion a different result. Thus in the 
investigation of the question proposed above 
respecting the effects of a nation's providing for 
the education of its poor, if we were unable to 
compare nations in which that education had 
been attended to and neglected, we should 
consider whether the experiment has never been 
tried on districts which may admit of being 
compared. For instance, in the Northern 
parts of this kingdom, education is more 
general than in the Southern. Are the poor, 
then, in the North less sober, less industrious, 
less orderly than in the South ? The com- 
parison of individuals, or of families, would 
not afford so safe a ground of decision as could 
be wished ; because where it is unusual for a 
poor man to receive a good education, it is 
not at all wonderful, that he, who has been 
well educated, finding himself possessed of 
superior information to the generality of those 
by whom he is surrounded, should not be 
content to continue in the lowest station, but 
attempt to raise himself to that rank, to which 
his superior talents appeared to entitle liinu 



Moral Reasoning. 81 

If, however, no experiment nearer than this to 
the point in hand could be discovered, it would 
be necessary to take this as the ground of 
onr judgment ; at the same time, endeavouring 
to make due allowance for the difference of 
the circumstances in the two cases. 

The judgments founded on experience of 
a competent extent, and which exactly meets 
the question to be decided, are highly probable. 
And in proportion as the question from which 
the experience is deduced, is dissimilar to 
the question for present decision, the pro- 
bability continually lessens, till the judgment 
founded on it becomes little more than con- 
jjecture. 

To judge of the similarity of circumstances, 
it is necessary to distinguish those which may 
affect the event in question, from those which 
cannot; for the latter must be neglected, but 
the former carefully attended to. To make 
this distinction is often very difficult, For, 
many circumstances, which have been thought 
immaterial, have, upon a closer examination, 
and further discoveries, been found of great 
moment. Thus, in chemistry, the influence 
of light, which was formerly disregarded, 
has lately been discovered to be of great im- 
portance in many processes, As, for instance, 
muriat of silver will continue white if care- 
fully preserved from light; but, if exposed 
*5 



Ht. General Directions relating to (Ch. III.} 

to it, will turn black. So, tincture of litmus 
will lose its colour, if kept in the dark, but 
will regain it on being exposed to the light. 
The influence of light on vegetation is, also,, 
very considerable. Plants will vegetate in the 
dark, but they are then white, without either 
smell or taste, and several of them grow along* 
on the ground instead of growing upwards. 
If they are brought into the light, the plants 
die down to their roots, but afterwards shoot 
upwards from the stock in their usual colours, 
and with their proper smells and tastes.* 
No rule^ however, but attention to experience, 
or engaging in a course of experiments upon 
the circumstances, can be given to distinguish 
such circumstances as can affect the event 
from such as cannot. 

What has been said of ascertaining in what 
degree an event is probable, is not to be under- 
stood as though it were possible to determine in 
all cases the degree of probability with pre- 
cision. The utmost that can be attained in 
most subjects is- to form a general notion of 
that degree, so as t& express it in general 
terms: in some cases,, however, it may be 
ascertained with sufficient precision to express 
ft in numbers, and to apply it safely rn calcu- 
lations. In drder to determine whether any 
particular kibjeet will admit 'of this prccitfiori,' 

* Thomson's Chemistry, vol. i. p. 290. 



Moral Reasoning. 83 

\re should consider whether Hie events happen 
according to any general law, and whether 
that law can be ascertained. Now, in regard 
to the chances of throwing a certain number 
with a die, or of drawing a certain card out of 
a pack, as any one number is as likely to be 
thrown as any other on the die, and any one 
card in the pack to be drawn as any other, 
and, moreover, as the number of sides of the 
die, and the number of cards in the pack, 
are known, it is evident both that this general 
law does exist, and that it may be directly 
inferred what that law is. But, when the 
existence and nature- of this law cannot b@ 
directly inferred from the nature and circum- 
stances of the subject, they cannot be safely 
presumed without accurate^ extensive, and 
repeated observation. Thus, it could not be 
sttfely presumed, that the duration of human 
life was sufficiently regular to afford ground 
for the formation of tables expressive of the 
rate of mortality, until by extensive, accurate, 
and repeated observation, that regularity had 
hten ascertained. If, for instance, I had ob- 
served, that, out of a hundred persons, certain 
numbers had died at each particular age, T 
could not safely infer, that the same numbers 
would die at each age r out of every other 
hundred. But, if I had observed, that out 
of a very large number, as several thousands^ 
*6 



84 General Directions relating to (Ch. Ill} 

certain numbers had died at each particular 
age, and that, on repeating my observations 
at different periods, the numbers of deaths 
at each particular age continued the same, or 
very nearly the same, I might then safely 
infer both the existence of the law, and also that 
the tables, founded on these observations, cor- 
responded with the regular course of mortality 
in the place where they were made. But in 
many cases, to attempt to express the proba- 
bility in numbers, and to apply it in calcu- 
lations would be to act without sufficient war- 
rant. For instance, if from having observed 
a sportsman kill 19 birds out of 20 shots, ; 
I should conclude, that the probability of his 
killing the next bird at which he should shoot, 
would be as 19 to 1, my conclusion would 
not be safe. I might, even, frequently see 
him kill the same number of birds out of the 
same number of shots,, and yet not be war- 
ranted in concluding, that the probability of 
his killing his bird was as 19 to 1. Before 
I could safely draw this conclusion, I must 
ascertain, that this was the rate of his success 
throughout the whole course of his present 
shooting. Or, if, on collating a certain num- 
ber of ancient manuscripts of a book, (as 10 
for instance,) I had observed a certain reading 
in all of them except one, I should thence 
conclude, that the probability of my findings 



Moral Reasoning. S5 

it in the eleventh manuscript of the book would 
be as 9 to 1 ; my conclusion would be un- 
founded. Because, I should be inferring the 
existence of a law regulating the probability 
of the event without sufficient ground. If, 
indeed, all the existing manuscripts of the 
book had been examined, and it had been 
discovered that the number of them which 
contained the reading bore a certain proportion 
to those which did not contain it, I might 
then assume that proportion, as the rate of 
the probability of my meeting with it in any 
particular manuscript, which I had not already 
consulted. But it does not follow, even with 
probability, that because, out of 10 manu- 
scripts, the reading is omitted in only one, 
it is therefore omitted in exactly the tenth 
part of the whole number of the existing 
manuscripts of the book. In cases like this, 
all that could be justly inferred would be, that it 
was more probable, or much more probable, 
than not, that the event would take place, 
as I had most frequently observed it : or, in 
other words, the utmost accuracy attainable 
would be to express the degree of probability 
in general terms. 

Some subjects, from their nature, are more 
«apable of being reduced to the test of expe- 
rience than others. Of many, we have not suf- 
ficient opportunities of observation, to warrant 



86 General Directions relating to (Ch. IIT.) 

a general conclusion; or those opportunities 
happen at too distant periods to enable us to 
make a fair comparison of the events; or the 
facts are involved in too intricate, or perhaps, 
dissimilar circumstances, to afford any deduc- 
tions. We ourselves, also, are too inattentive 
to them while passing, and recollect them too 
imperfectly afterwards, to form a correct judg- 
ment of them. But, if there be any particular 
subjects 4 , on the probability of which it may be 
peculiarly important to us to decide, we must 
apply ourselves to them with more than ordi- 
nary care. We must avail ourselves of every 
opportunity of observing them ourselves, or 
learning the observations upon them of others. 
We must not trust to memory, but carefully 
irrite down the facts, and all the material cir- 
cumstances with which they were attended. 
We must do this from time to time y as we make 
our observations. Thus we shall be continually 
collecting materials, from which a comparison 
may be madey and a correct judgment formed. 
For example, if I were desirous of ascertaining 
whether men were more influenced by a preju- 
dice in favor of old customs, or by a love of 
novelty, I would write down, under separate 
heads, every instance of the influence of either, 
with which I met, either by observation, or iri 
conversation, or in reading; and, .'at the same 
time, set down all the circumstances attending: 



Moral Reasoning. 87 

£ach particular case, as far as I could collect 
fHem. Or, if I wished to ascertain, whether 
mankind are more disposed to resist a lawful 
government, than submissively to endure a 
tyrannical one, I would collect, under sepa- 
rate heads, all the pertinent instances, together 
v ill their circumstances,, with which I could 
f . The greater part of these must necessa- 
rily be furnished from history; and therefore, 
in the conr&e of my historical studies, I should 
continually keep in mind, that I had such a 
collection in hand, that I might avail myself of 
every instance which occurred. Many such 
questions might be mentioned, on which evi- 
dence should be continually collected in the 
same way. To so laborious a practice, few, 
perhaps, would be willing to submit. But, it 
is obvious, that it would enable us to decide 
questions much more accurately than men usu-, 
ally do. For, a great many of the instances, 
which are necessary to be considered, in order 
to a right decision, have passed by them unob- 
served; many which were observed, are for- 
gotten; and many are not in their recollection^ 
when their determination is made : and thus 
their decision is founded on a few instances, 
which, from interest or passion, or some pecu- 
liar circumstances, had fixed themselves in 
their mind. Decisions, upon so partial a vie\V 
ef a question, must generally be erroneous >. If 



8& General Directions relating to (Ch. Ill,) 

questions occur, on which we have made no 
collections, or if we cannot bring ourselves to 
the practice of so laborious a method as that 
which has been just mentioned, we ought to 
recollect, as fairly and clearly as possible, all 
the instances of similar cases, which have come 
to our knowledge; that our decisions may, as 
much as possible, be founded upon experience. 
For, thus our judgment, having something to 
direct it, w ill be left less at the mercy of our 
interests and affections, and, consequently, its 
decisions will be more likely to be correct. 

This method of judging by experience, it 
should be carefully observed, is applicable only 
to the determination of the probability or im- 
probability of facts or events, and not to that 
of the morality of actions. This observation is 
the more important, because, of late years, 
there seems to have arisen a notion, that general 
principles should be dscarded as impracticable 
theories, and that the good or evil of actions 
should be decided by a consideration of the 
actual state of mankind, or in other words, by 
an appeal to experience, it seems, however, 
forgotten that, by whatever rules we may choose 
to regulate our actions, the only rule by which 
they will, hereafter, be judged, is the law of 
God. He, therefore, who would not be de- 
luded, but would decide justly on the morality 
of actions, must lay down these divine laws, aa 



Moral Reasoning. 89 

the principles from which all his conclusions 
must be drawn, and must fairly follow out his 
reasonings to whatever conclusions they may 
lead. It is remarkable, that, where experience 
should be made the foundation of our judgment, 
we abandon it, and have recourse to reasonings 
on assumed principles; while, on the 1 other 
hand, where experience is of no authority, but 
our conclusions ought to be deduced from ge- 
neral principles, there we make it the ground 
of our decisions. 

Although the reasonings upon conclusions al- 
ready established by moral evidence, must be- 
come more and more uncertain, the farther we 
proceed; yet, as in some cases, it may be ne- 
cessarj^, it will be proper to give some direc- 
tions relative to that procedure. In doing this, 
we have only to relate the principles which are 
laid down by mathematical writers upon the 
doctrine of chances. They represent certainty 
by unity ; and every probability by a fraction, 
whose numerator is the number of chances of 
the events happening, and whose denominator 
is the number, both of its happening and failing. 
Thus, if an event have three chances for its hap- 
pening, and two of its failing, the sum of which 
being 5, the fraction a will be the probability 
of its happening, and _* of its failing. Or, to 
express the same in other words, the denomi- 
nator of the fraction expresses the whole num* 



90 General Directions relating to (Ck. IB.) 

ber of the events observed, and the numerator 
the number observed to happen in a particular 
way. 

To render this more easy to persons who 
have never studied mathematics, or the higher 
parts of arithmetic ; suppose that out of every 
100 persons, who had been known to eat of a 
certain fruit, 75 had been injured by it; then 
the probability of its being- injurious to any 
person who was going to eat of it, would be 
expressed by the fraction _TJ_, which, being 
reduced to its lowest terms, is f ; consequently,, 
the probability of safety in eating of it is |i 
This is the method of proceeding in a question, 
consisting of only one step. But, if a second 
step be necessary, then the same process must 
be repeated to ascertain its probability, con- 
sidered independently; and, after that, both 
steps are to be combined by multiplying to- 
gether the fractions so found, for the second 
conclusion. Tims suppose as before, 75 out 
of the 100 had been injured by eating of the 
fruit; and that out of every 10, who had been, 
injured by it, 4 had died; then, to discover 
what probability of death there was in eatings 
of it, I must multiply -c~-> or rather | into 
.>_, which will give Jt| 5 which is equal to T 3 _. 
Ileiice the probability of surviving the eating 
of it, will be expressed by ^_. In the same 
way we proceed for every other conclusion % . 



Moral Reasoning. SI 

always ascertaining the fraction, expressive of 
the probability of the given step independently, 
and then multiplying that fraction into the 
conclusion last established, for the next con- 
clusion. — Tins example is proposed merely as 
a specimen of the mode of proceeding in such 
eases, and not to intimate that all- subjects are 
capable of being thus calculated. Attention 
must be paid to what has been said' above, in 
order to determine whether the probability 
will admit of being expressed in numbers. 
It was necessary to propose an example, ii* 
which numerical calculations are used, to cle* 
scribe clearly the mode of proceeding* Vor r 
such is the vagueness of language on subjects 
of this nature, that terms can scarcely be found 
to describe that mode with sufficient accuracy 
and perspicuity, to afford any direction capable 
of being clearly understood. 

Sometimes, without entering into a -particular* 
examination of a question, a tolerable judgment 
may be formed of it from a general view of the-. 
fairness or unfairness with which it is treated. 
This general view, however, will not warrant 
a high degree of assent; both because we may 
be mistaken in the appearances ; and because 
a point which is really true, maybe treated 
unfairly, through want of skill in those who 
maintain it, , or from the influence of a bad 
habit : but it may, notwithstanding^ afford a 



S2 General Directions relating to (Ch. HI.} 

considerable degree of probability. The prin- 
ciples on which this probability depends, arc 
as follows : first, that truth is always consistent 
with itself; i. e. tliat one truth harmonizes with 
others ; and that, in order to its establishment, 
it can never be necessary, that any judt prin- 
ciple of evidence, knowledge,, or morality, 
should be set aside, or perverted; and conse- 
quently, that no unfair practices can be requi- 
site to maintain it* And, secondly, our ex- 
perience, that when men maintain a cause, 
which they are conscious is just, they are de- 
sirous that it should evidently appear so to be; 
and, that this desire is so strong, that it always* 
influences their conduct, except when it is pre- 
vented by some powerful motive to the con- 
trary ; and, on the other hand, that when they 
are conscious that their cause is unjust, they 
naturally shrink from fair examination. So 
constant is this experience, that it has become 
proverbial that openness is an evidence of in- 
nocence; and secrecy, or a desire of conceal- 
ment, an evidence of guilt. There are, indeed, 
some affairs of a nature so entirely private, in- 
volving only the interests of the agent himself, 
or his particular connexions, that nobody else 
has any right to be acquainted with them. In 
these, every man is at liberty to be as secret as 
he pleases; and his secrecy affords no evidence 
of guilt. But,, in all. other cases, the argument 



Moral Reasoning. 95 

from experience is well founded. For, expe- 
rience shews, that an honest man is impatient of 
suspicion, and in order to free himself from it, 
will do all in his power to bring the cause which 
he maintains, into as clear a light as possible. 



One part of moral evidence relates to the 
truth or falsehood of propositions : another re* 
spects things, as whether they are good or bad, 
eligible or ineligible ; or, when two things are 
proposed to our choice, which of them should 
be preferred. But, as when we speak of them, 
we make propositions respecting them, this 
latter part resolves itself into the former. Its 
importance, however, renders it worthy of a 
separate discussion ; and, indeed, some points 
in it require particular directions. 

To determine whether a thing proposed be 
good or bad, eligible or ineligible, we must state 
all its advantages on t the one side, and all its 
disadvantages on the other; and decide accord- 
ing to the preponderancy of the former, or the 
latter. The necessity of this arises from the 
mixt nature of things ; there being scarcely any 
thing entirely good, or entirely bad; entirely 
beneficial,, or entirely prejudicial. Hence, if 
we consider only one side of the thing proposed, 



9* General Directions relating to (Ck. III.) 

we cannot possibly form a correct judgment, or 
a judicious choice. 

In estimating advantages and disadvantages, 
we must not confine our views to those which 
are immediate, but extend them to more remote 
and general consequences; and take care not to 
over-rate those which are near, and under-rate 
those which are distant. For, immediate bene- 
fits are often productive of remote and general 
evils, and immediate disadvantages of remote 
and general benefits. Our choice, therefore, 
lies frequently, perhaps generally, between ous 
present interest, which is comparatively small, 
and of short duration, and our future, but ex- 
tensive good. Thus, youth cannot be well 
educated without a degree of study, which is, 
at the time, extremely painful, and to which, 
if left to their own choice, they would scarcely 
ever submit. Wealth can rarely be acquired 
without application to business, and the sacri- 
fice of ease and pleasure. Health cannot be 
preserved without restraint of the passions and 
inclinations. Character cannot be established, 
without resisting the solicitations of interest. 
And virtue cannot be attained without opposing 
temptations, the compliance with which would 
produce immediate gratification or advantage. 
Hence, virtue has been well described, as the 
sacrifice of the present to the future, and vice 
at the sacrifice of the future to the present. It 



Moral Reasoning. i)o 

is, therefore, of great importance both to hap. 
piness and virtue, to acquire a habit of con- 
sidering remote and general consequences, and 
to allow them due influence on our judgment. 

We should, also, be particularly careful that 
the statement of advantages and disadvantages, 
be correct. For, in this we are exposed to great 
danger of delusion ; and, that the danger of that 
delusion is real, and not imaginary, is too evi- 
dent from experience. We seldom find that 
things turn out in possession, what we had re- 
presented them to ourselves in prospect. The 
great cause of this disappointment is, that if we 
happen to like the thing proposed, we give too 
much liberty to our imaginations to exaggerate 
its advantages, while we suppress many of its 
disadvantages, and lessen others. On the other 
hand, if we dislike the thing, we over-rate its 
evils, and under-rate its benefits. Thus, our 
determinations are made by passion, rather than 
by judgment ; they cannot, therefore, be ex- 
pected to be prudent. So also, when other men 
would persuade us to the choice of any parti- 
cular thing, or to engage in any undertaking, 
they generally over-rate its advantages, and 
under-rate its disadvantages, or the trouble and 
expence necessary to ensure success. We 
should, therefore, suspect the fallacies to which 
their statements are liable in these particulars, 
and examine them with the most rigid accuracy. 



96 General Directions relating to (th. III.) 

Thus, people are often induced to engage in 
building upon a low estimate being given them 
of the expence, when they would not have en- 
gaged in it, had they known the real cost. 

What has been said, relates to those advan- 
tages and disadvantages which constantly attend 
the subject proposed, and which, therefore^ 
may be considered as morally certain. With 
respect to such as are contingent, the rule is, 
that we should form our expectation of them, 
by a fair consideration of experience, and not 
suppose that our case will prove an exception 
to the general observation of mankind. The 
degree in which this rule is disregarded, and 
the mischievous consequences arising from that 
disregard, shew that it cannot be too strongly 
impressed upon our minds. We see men con- 
tinually plunging themselves, and those who 
are under their direction, into vice and misery ; 
not because they are ignorant of the general ex- 
perience of mankind on the point in question, 
but because they presume, that their case will 
be an exception to the general rule. Thus, men 
place their sons in lines of life proverbially dis- 
solute, or dishonest, and yet trust that they w ill 
resist the temptations which have overcome, by 
far, the greater number of those who have been 
exposed to them.* These are sad delusions. 

* Experience is disregarded in a similar way when men put a 
•onfidence in persons of certain lines of life, the members of which 
are known to have been almost universally unworthy of conS^ 



Moral Reasoning. 97 

In all cases, it is most probable, that we, and 
those under our directions, shall experience 
what most others, similarly circumstanced, have 
experienced. This is the only principle on 

dence. In these case?, also, they err, not because they are igno- 
rant of the result of experience, but because they suppose rheir 
case to be an exception to the general rule. In defence of this 
disregard of experience, it is sometimes urged, that it doej noiJbU 
Jmv, that because men in that station have been in general unwor- 
thy of confidence, the man in whom we confide is so too. But 
1 ask, what is meant by this expression, ft does not fulL-w } If it 
mean that it is not a prooab/e consequence, the assertion is not true; 
both because it is probable that men in similar situations, exposed 
to similar temptations and under similar circumstances, will be 
affected in the same way; and because in almost every line of 
life there are certain modes of action established by custom, and 
custom is by almost all men regarded as a law. But-, if the ex- 
pression mean that it is not a certain consequence, I answer, this 
is nothing to the point. For human conduct is to be reguiated, 
not by demonstrative, but by moral evidence, which does not 
admit of certainty. A further defence of t li i 3 disregard of expe- 
rience is often grounded on the superior principles which, it is al- 
Jedged, the person in whom we confide possesses beyond other 
men in similar situations. In deciding, however, on the exist- 
ence of these superior principles, no allowance is made for the 
danger of delusion, arising from friendship, interest, or parry : a 
danger which facts shew to be extreme. Other men have known 
the general rule derived from experience as well as we. They, 
too, have determined their case to be an exception to it; and in 
making that determination they have been generally deceived. 
This shews that it is most probable, that we too shall be deceived 
in following rheir example. It is in tins way that experience 
becomes of so little use to men in directing their conduct. I do 
not say, that there may not be exceptions to general rules. Bur 
I say, that we cannot be too careful in examining whether or not 
our case be really an exception ; and that we ought to have strong, 
positive, direct evidence that it is so ; otherwise, we are not jus- 
tifiable in disregarding general rules. It is, however, observable^ 
that when men are not influenced by inrerest, friendship or party, 
they are rarely deluded by these pretendeu exceptions. Thus, few 
people disregard the general character of horse dealers in theic 
transactions with them. They generally make use of all the skill 
which they possess, in examining the horse which they are go!n£ 
to purchase; and yet, after all, they are frequently deceived. 
But, this is not because of the confidence which they repose i« 
them, but because the skill of the dealer In concealing the defect 
exceeds their skill in detecting them. 
The importance of this note will, it is hoped, excuse its length: 



98 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

which we can judge with safety, and, when we 
disregard it, we delude ourselves, and do not 
make a fair use of our talents. 

To determine whether it be prudent to en- 
gage in the pursuit of any proposed object, we 
should first consider, whether success in its pur- 
suit be uncertain, or subject to no reasonable 
doubt. If that success be a moral certainty, 
then our decision must be made by a compari- 
son of the importance of the object, with the 
trouble and expence of the pursuit. But, if it 
be uncertain, then the consideration of the pro- 
bability of success must be combined with that 
of the importance of the object, and these two 
together must be compared with the trouble 
and expence of pursuit. In general, too, ano- 
ther consideration is necessary. Since one ob- 
ject can seldom be pursued without relinquish- 
ing another, a judgment of the value of the 
object to be relinquished must be formed in the 
same way, and the comparison of the two must 
direct our determination. In like manner, the 
value of two or more objects proposed to us, 
out of which one is to be chosen, may be ascer- 
tained and compared, that we may decide 
which is to be preferred. For instance, should 
a man be in doubt whether he should bring up 
his son to the bar or to agriculture, he should 
consider, on one side, the rank and fortune 
which successful counsellors usually obtain; 



Moral Reasoning. 99 

on J combine this consideration with the proba- 
bility of success. As this probability is very 
small, it reduces very much the value of the 
expectation to be reasonably entertained. From 
this value he should make a suitable deduction 
for the expensive education for the bar. Oa 
the other side, he should consider the fortune 
usually acquired in farming, and should com- 
bine this fortune with the probability of suc- 
cess ; and then make a suitable allowance for 
the very little expence incurred in the education 
of a farmer. The superior rank of the one 
may be considered as an equivalent for the more 
agreeable occupation of the other, and there- 
fore, both may be neglected. The result of the 
consideration would, perhaps, be, that the supe- 
rior fortune and dignity of the one, was more 
than compensated by the superior probability 
of success, and the small expence in the other. 

In subjects which both admit and require 
greater accuracy, the following method may 
be pursued. To determine the value of a pro- 
posal : If the attainment of the object admit of 
no reasonable doubt, then from the value of the 
object in itself considered, we are to deduct the 
expence and trouble of pursuit, and the re* 
mainder is the value of the proposal. Thus, 
if the proposed object be worth *£] ,000, and i he 
expence incurred in the pursuit, together with 
a reasonable compensation for trouble and loss 
f2 



100 General Directions relating to (Ch. III.) 

of time be *£150 the value of the proposal is then 
.£850. But, if the attainment of the object be 
uncertain, then the probability of success must 
be ascertained, by a consideration of how many, 
out of as large a number of persons as possible, 
engaged in the same pursuit, and similarly cir- 
cumstanced with ourselves, have succeeded. 
The probability thus found, must be expressed 
by a fraction, as before directed. That fraction 
must be multiplied into the value of the object. 
From this product the compensation for ex- 
pence, trouble, and time, must be deducted. 
The remainder is the value of the proposal. 
Thus, suppose, as before, the value of the ob- 
ject to be rfl,000, and that three out of every 
four persons engaged in the pursuit, under 
similar circumstances with ourselves, have suc- 
ceeded : then multiplying 1000 by f , it pro- 
duces ^750; from which deduct, as before, 
^£150. and the remainder .£600 is the value of 
the proposal. In like manner may be ascer- 
tained, the yaiue of an object to be relinquished ; 
or the values of several objects proposed to us, 
out of which wie are to choose one. 

It is obvious, thai all subjects do not require 
equal care in regulating our choice; but, that 
our care should be proportioned to the impor- 
tance of the subject. And., if our determina- 
tion will admit of no correction; but we must 
abide by our choice, whether wise or foolish, 



Moral Reasoning. 101 

we can scarcely be too attentive to tlte exami- 
nation of the grounds on- which it is made, ac- 
cording to the old adage, " deliberandum est 
diu quod semel statuendum est." 



To regulate our judgment in the advice which 
we give to others, we must consider what is 
likely to suit their constitutions, abilities, finan- 
ces, habits, feelings, taste, and other circum- 
stances ; for, as people differ much in these re- 
spects, the same advice cannot be suitable to 
all. The chief difficulty arises from the ideas 
of good and evil, which our own dispositions, 
habits, and circumstances, have impressed on 
our minds, and which are so strongly associated 
with their respective objects, that they can 
scarcely be separated. Hence, we can scarcely 
avoid making ourselves a standard for others ; 
and thus overlooking the difference of their 
circumstances, which should make a corres- 
pondent difference in the advice which we 
should give them. But, when the subject of 
advice has any relation to morality, no circum- 
stances, but those which make a part of the 
definition of the duty, and thus constitute an 
essential part of the moral nature of the subject, 
should make any alteration in our advice. For 
such immaterial circumstances as feelings, ha- 
bits, &c. make no difference as to moral duty. 
f3 



102 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IV.) 

CHAP. IV. 

Special Directions relating to each Kind of 
Moral Evidence. 



ERSONAL Observation , and the observa- 
tion of others, coincide in so many particulars, 
that repetition will be avoided by treating of 
them together. 

1 . Consider whether you are properly qua- 
lified to ascertain, by observation, the proper- 
ties of the subject proposed. 

This rule is of especial importance in all 
such subjects as require previous information or 
great skill, or a nice discernment in making the 
experiments. Thus, should any one, unac- 
quainted with the elements of chemistry, the 
accuracy requisite in chemical experiments, or 
the various ways in which fallacies may arise 
in. them, engage in a course of experiments, he 
could not safely trust to their result. Incapa- 
city for making observations correctly, may 
arise from other sources, besides the want of 
talents, or of previous information. Religious 
or political prejudices may also disqualify a 
man for a fair deduction of general conclusions 
from an observation of mankind. And, in ge- 
neral, prejudice and interest, render our obser- 
vations suspicious. 
This rule applies equally to the observation 



Observation. 103 

of others. It teaches us not to trust to their 
observations, unless we may presume them to 
have been fair and capable observers. 

2. Be careful to ascertain the circumstances 
under which your observations were made. 
For, as has been already said, the events of 
things depend on circumstances, and often on 
circumstances which might be thought inca- 
pable of influencing them. Their events, there- 
fore, under one set of circumstances, can afford 
no ride for judging of them under another. 
Thus, in the case of the King of Siam, men- 
tioned above, it was not considered that his ob- 
servations on water were made on degrees of 
heat, very different from those under which the 
Ambassador asserted that it would be converted 
into ice; nor was it considered, that though, in 
certain latitudes, the cold might never exceed 
a certain degree, it could not thence be inferred, 
that it might not exceed it in other latitudes. 

As it was remarked before, a distinction must 
be made between such circumstances, as can af- 
fect the events and such as cannot ; and expe- 
rience alone can teach us how to make this 
distinction. This rule, also, is equally appli- 
cable to the observations of others.. 

3. Take caye that your conclusions be not 
drawn from the observation of too small a num- 
ber of subjects ; or rather, that the degree pf 
your assent to them be proportioned to the ex- 

f4 



J 04 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IV.) 

tent of (he materials from which they are drawn. 
For, though a very few observations may war- 
rant a conjecture, we cannot safely consider a 
general truth as established, without the obser- 
vation of many subjects of the same kind. In 
this respect, however, a difference must be made 
in the different kinds of subjects, according as 
they are of a more uniform or a more various 
nature. For, fewer observations will warrant a 
general conclusion, on such subjects as minerals, 
earths or vegetables, than on the effects of things 
on mankind. AVe are in too much haste to 
draw general conclusions, and are unwilling to 
wait, till we are possessed of materials, from 
which they may be safely drawn. 

In the application of this rule to the observa- 
tions of others, there is some difficulty. For 
we are often incapable of knowing the extent 
of the subjects on which their observations were 
made ; and men are apt to speak of them as 
more extensive than they were. We can over- 
come this difficulty only by considering their 
general habits of accuracy in observation, and 
correctness in statement. Our knowledge of 
these habits must be attained, either by an ac- 
quaintance with the character of the particular 
individual, with whose observations we are fur- 
nished ; or, by a consideration of the general 
character of the profession to which he belongs. 
For, as was remarked before, the observations 



Observation* 105 

of the members of some professions, are more 
worthy of credit than those of others. 

4. In subjects which are observed to be va- 
rious, we can know what event is probable, in 
any particular case, only by considering how it 
has most frequently happened. And we can as- 
certain the degree of that probability only, by 
collecting the number of cases, in which it has 
been observed to happen in each way ; and, 
taking those numbers as the ratio, which the 
probability of its happening in one way, bears 
to its happening in the other. But, this point 
has been sufficiently discussed before. 

5. It is, also, to be remembered, that the 
utmost that can be accomplished in such sub- 
jects, is to ascertain, not what actually will 
happen in each particular case, but only what 
is most likely to happen ; or what may be ex- 
pected, in a certain proportion, out of a given 
number of cases. Hence, he who assures a 
single life on the most correct principles of 
assurance, may be a loser; while, had he as- 
sured a thousand lives on the same principles, 
he might have been a gainer. So also the 
effects of any proposed regulations or mea- 
sures upon numerous bodies of men,, admit of 
being ascertained with greater probability, than 
upon a few individuals. For the principles 
upon which the judgment is formed, have been 
deduced from a general observation of man- 

t5 



1 06 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IF. ) 

kind; and therefore, if they have been deduced 
correctly, they must be found to be just when 
applied to numerous bodies of men. Whereas, 
however correct these principles may be, as 
general truths, they may fail when applied 
to a few individuals, who may differ in dis- 
position from the generality of mankind, or be 
actuated by caprice, or influenced by some 
unforeseen, accidental circumstances. Thus the 
effects of political regulations may often be 
more exactly known, than of those in private 
life,* 

A few further cautions may be given, to re- 
gulate the credit which should be given to the 
observations of others. 

1 . If they state the facts, from which they 
deduced their observations, we should consider 
whether they had sufficient ground for their 
conclusions; or, if they relate the processes of 
their experiments, we should examine how far 
they were likely to afford an accurate result. 

2. We should consider how far the obser- 
vations of others concur with our own. If they 
coincide, our deductions are evidently con- 
firmed ; but,* if they differ, we should re-exa- 
mine the ground on which we made our obser- 
vations, and our ability to make them fairly ; 
and carefully inquire, whether'we or they were 
more likely to be mistaken. 

** See Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind, chap, iv, sec, 8, 



Observation. 107 

It is a rule of evidence, that credit should be 
given to every man in his own profession. 
And, on the whole, this is a safe rule. For 
though erroneous opinions may be entertained 
by persons in most lines of life, and may be 
persisted in through prejudice, yet a certain 
degree of success does attend their judging 
and acting on the opinions which they hold ; 
"whereas, were the plans of inexperienced per- 
sons, or those of speculative projectors followed, 
very few of them would be found to succeed at 
all. Thus, were farmers, instead of being dis- 
posed to follow the practice of their forefathers, 
ready to adopt every new plan proposed to them 
as an improvement, they would involve them- 
selves in losses, and the public might be injured 
by a scarcity of grain. There is, however, a 
mean. A man should be so far ready to adopt 
plans of improvement, as to be willing to try 
them on a small scale; but he should, in the 
general management of his business, pursue, 
steadily, his old plans, till experience has 
sanctioned the new ones.- If skilful men in 
any line have relinquished an old practice, it 
may be reasonably presumed, that they have 
done so on the authority of experience. 

3. We should consider how far they, who 

furnished us with their observations, were likely 

to relate them faithfully. Here, the nature of 

the subject must direct us j for, if it be con- 

*6 



108 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IV.) 

nee ted with any party-prejudices, political, re- 
ligious, or literary ; or be likely to promote any 
private interest, or gratify the vanity of the ob- 
server; his fidelity in the relation is less de- 
serving of credit^ than it would otherwise be. 



To regulate the credit to be given to Tes- 
timony.* 

It should be recollected, that Testimony re- 
lates to specific facts or events, and not to ge- 
neral conclusions, deduced from the observa- 
tion of a variety of facts of the same kind ; and, 
that it is the evidence of a person, who declares 
that he himself saw or heard what he relates, 
and not that he was informed of it by others. 
To determine whether his evidence be worthy 
of credit at all, or how far it is so, the follow- 
ing particulars must be attended to : 

1. It should be considered, how far the 
thing in itself, and under its proposed circum- 
stances, is credible or incredible. For, if it be 
absolutely impossible, no previous opinion of 
the competency and veracity of the witness,, 
can procure belief. If what is related be pos- 
sible, but extremely improbable, the testimo- 
nies of a greater number of persons of unim- 
peachable character, together with the evidence 

* Several of the leading ideas on this subject, arc taken from 
Dr. Watts's Logic, part ii. crup. v. sec. 5. 



Testimony. 109 

of concurrent circumstances, are requisite to 
render it credible. But, if it be not improba- 
ble, the testimony of an ordinary and unsus- 
pected witness, is sufficient to make it worthy 
of credit. 

These are the general principles on which 
the credibility or incredibility of the things at- 
tested should regulate our belief in testimony. 
But, as this subject is of great importance, it 
must be treated with greater particularity. 

It should be observed, that the presumptions 
arising from experience, cannot be compared 
on equal terms with the probabilities arising 
from testimony, became they are not homo- 
geneal,* and no rule can be formed, similar to 
that of reduction in arithmetic, to bring them 
to the same denomination. In that class of 
subjects which has above been denominated 
various, the strongest presumptions may be 
overcome by the testimony of witnesses of or- 
dinary credibility* For, as it is observed hy 
Bishop Butler, (Analogy, part ii. chap. ii. 
sec. 3.) u There is a very strong presumption 
u against common speculative truths, and 
u against the most ordinary facts, before the 
" proof of them ; which yet is overcome by al- 
" most any proof. There is a presumption of 
" millions to one against the story of Caesar, or 
" of any other man. For suppose a number 

* See Dr. Campbell's Dissertations on Miracles, page 2& 



110 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IF.) 

tc of common facts, so and so circumstanced, 
" of which one had no kind of proof, should 
M happen to come into one's thoughts, every 
" one would, without any possible doubt, con- 
" elude them to be false. And the like may 
u be said of a single common fact." 

The general conclusions, deduced, however, 
from the observation of subjects which are ttni- 
forrn, cannot as easily be overcome by tes- 
timony. Thus, no man would believe that a 
cannon-ball, thrown from a ship into the sea, 
floated, upon such testimony as was only suf- 
ficient to give credibility to the events of the 
life of a Cromwell or a Buonaparte, however 
surprising those events may be. Yet, even 
these general conclusions may be surmounted 
by testimony, provided the witnesses be nu- 
merous, their characters unimpeachable, the 
facts level to their judgment, and the circum- 
stances under which they give their evidence, 
calculated to confirm it. For, facts which con- 
tradict these general conclusions, ought not to 
be regarded as impossible. Strictly speaking, 
that only is impossible which involves in it an 
absurdity. It is only in a lower and incorrect 
sense, that those things are called impossibi- 
lities, which are contradictory to uniform and 
general experience. Thus, that a man should 
be able to foretel, clearly and distinctly, remote 
events, to walk upon the sea, to heal diseases 



Testimony. Ill 

by a command, to raise the dead, though they 
be contrary to the ordinary course of nature ; 
yet, as they involve in them no absurdity, they 
are not in themselves, and in the strict sense of 
the word, impossibilities. For the course of 
nature might, in these and in other respects, 
have been different from what it is, had it 
pleased the Creator that it should be so ; or, 
as has been already observed, it may have been 
suspended or altered, on particular occasions, 
and for important purposes. Facts of this na- 
ture, therefore, ought not to be regarded as 
incapable of being rendered credible by testi- 
mony; though they certainly require extraor- 
dinary testimony, together with the evidence of 
concurrent circumstances, to procure belief. 

Besides these, there are facts of another kind, 
on which we are in danger of exercising an un- 
reasonable incredulity. They are such as are 
more properly beyond our experience, than con* 
tradictory to it ; * being such as neither we, nor 
any other persons, as far as we can learn, have 
ever observed. Thus, if soon after the disco- 

* When we distinguish facts as beyond, or contradictory to ex- 
perience, we must mean by the term experience, the general con- 
clusions deduced from observation. For, if we mean by it the 
experience of a specific fact, nothing can be contradictory to it, 
but what is asserted to have happened, and which we experienced 
not to have happened. But, understanding the word in the sense 
above-mentioned, that wax should note melt in fire, or lead sink 
in water, is contradictory to our experience ; but that water 
should become solid, was properly beyond the experience of the 
King of Siam, and not contradictory to it ; because he had never 
seen it under those circumstances in which its freezing tak«s 
place. 



HZSpecial Direct, relative ioMor. Ev. (Ch. IF.) 

very of electricity, a person had travelled to a 
part of the world, unacquainted with that disco- 
very, and had related the extraordinary electri- 
cal phcenomena which he had seen, his vera- 
city would probably have been disputed ; until 
he had either shewn some electrical experi- 
ments, or produced the testimony of several 
other respectable witnesses in confirmation of 
his assertions. However extensive our know- 
ledge of nature may be, we cannot safely pre- 
sume, that we are yet acquainted with the whole 
of it. As discoveries have already been made, 
which were altogether unlooked for by our pre- 
decessors, so farther discoveries may still be 
made, of which we can at present form no con- 
ception. The discovery of Galvanism is very 
recent. And, as it is obvious into what errors we 
should have run, had we on first hearing of its 
phcenomena pronounced them false, we should 
learn to be cautious in deciding, that other ex- 
traordinary facts, which are related by compe- 
tent witnesses, are undeserving of credit. The 
fall of heavy bodies, of the appearance of stones, 
from the higher regions of the atmosphere, ac- 
companied by a luminous meteor, a hissing 
sound, like that of large shot, and a loud ex- 
plosion has been generally discredited. But,, 
he who reads the evidence of these facts, which 
has lately been collected, will scarcely with- 
hold his assent to their truth ; however dissatis- 



Testimony. 113 

fled he may be with the method of accounting 
for them.* An acquaintance with philosophy 
will sometimes not only render credible certain 
phocnomena, the existence of which we might 
have disbelieved, but also enable us to account 
for them on natural principles, when, by super- 
stitious people, they are regarded as miracles or 
portentous signs. Thus the various appear- 
ances of terrestial bodies in the atmosphere, as 
of buildings, cattle, or even armies, which by 
some have been regarded as prodigies, an- 
nouncing the approach of awful events, and 
would, by most, be thought the mere illusions 
of the imagination, or pronounced falsehoods, 
have been accounted for by philosophers, by 
the known laws of refraction, t Many extraor- 
dinary facts are mentioned by Bishop Douglas, 
in his Criterion of Miracles, of the influence of 
the mind in the occasion and cure of diseases. 
These facts are of such a nature, that while some 
would be disposed to regard them as miraculous, 
most men would, probably, determine them to 
be incredible ; yet they are supported by testi- 
mony, in itself unexceptionable, and confirmed 
by various other similar cases ; and therefore, 
as the Bishop observes, are worthy of credit. 

On the other hand, it would be equally un- 
safe to admit the truth of extraordinary facts on 

* See Edinburgh Review, vol. iii. page 386. 
+ See Christian Observer, vol. iii. page 66<^ 



114 Special Direct, relative to Mot, Ev. (Ck. IV.} 

slight and suspicious evidence. In these cases, 
as in most} the mean is safer than either extreme. 
We shall be most likely to avoid error by re- 
quiring that the number and credit of the wit- 
nesses, together with the evidence of concur- 
rent circumstances, should be, in some degree, 
proportioned to the improbability arising from 
the extraordinary nature of the facts attested. 
How we are to judge of the credit of witnesses, 
and of the circumstances which tend to confirm 
their evidence, will be inquired presently. 

. 2. The consistency of the parts -of a rela- 
tion with each other, and with known circum- 
stances, is another point to be attended to. If 
the relation be long, it is very difficult, if not 
impracticable to fabricate it so completely in 
all its parts as to preserve consistency.. Hence 
consistency confirms the relation; and if the 
subject be examined in this view, the decep- 
tion, if any exist, will generally be detected. 

3. The light which is thrown upon the sub- 
ject by subsequent circumstances, should also 
be regarded. For, when these circumstances 
are such, as from experience they might be ex- 
pected to be, on a supposition that the fact as- 
serted were true, they confirm the assertion; 
otherwise they lessen its credibility. The in- 
fluence of these circumstances, both in support 
of the evidence of testimony, and in opposition 
to it} is various, according as such circum* 



Testimony. 115 

stances do more or less constantly follow such 
a fact, as is asserted. Thus, were it asserted, 
that a certain man had taken arsenic, his death, 
together with such appearances of his body, as 
are usual in cases of this nature, would be a 
strong confirmation of the assertion; but his 
continuing to live, and to enjoy health, would 
be a contradiction of it. Or, were it asserted, 
that an apprentice had robbed his master, his 
appearing on a sudden possessed of considera- 
bly more money than usual, would render the 
assertion probable. 

4. The competency of the witness to judge 
of the fact which he relates, is -another point 
to be considered. That competency depends 
partly on his abilities, and partly on the op- 
portunities which he may be presumed to have 
had of seeing, or hearing what he states. Our 
determination of both these must be regulated 
by the nature of the subject, and the character 
and situation of the witness. 

5. If the fact be stated to have happened, 
a considerable time ago, it should be examined, 
whether it is probable that the witness should 
recollect it clearly; or whether he has used any 
means to assist his memory, as writing it down, 
or frequently mentioning it, or connecting it 
with other circumstances more easily remem- 
bered. This consideration is more especially 
deserving of attention, when the subject of the 



116 Special Direct . rcTative to Mot. Ev. (Ch. IF.) 

evidence is such, as is likely to escape the re- 
collection; for instance, words spoken, espe~ 
cially a long: discourse^ could scarcely be re- 
membered correctly, 

6. We sliouid inquire, whether the witness 
be a man of general veracity. Though all mei* 
profess to regard truth, yet they respect it 
in very different degrees. Some men could 
scarcely be prevailed upon to violate it on any 
consideration ; while others are induced to sa- 
crifice it to interest, to party, to a false deli* 
cacy, to vanity, or even to a compliment. 
Others again, though they would scruple to 
affirm what they knew to be wholly false, yet 
delight in telling extraordinary stories, and in- 
dulge themselves in exaggerating and embel- 
lishing the real facts which they relate. Whea 
they engage in relating an anecdote, and have 
forgotten any of its circumstances r unwilling to 
injure their narrative by omissions, they supply 
the defects of their memory by invention. 
Thus, though they, perhaps, entertain no di- 
rect deliberate design to deceive, yet the im- 
pression which they make on the minds of their 
hearers, is inconsistent with a correct view of 
the fact. It is evident, that the credit which 
can safely be given to any man's testimony, 
must be regulated by the regard which he may 
be presumed to have for truth; and the degree- 



Testimony. 117 

of that regard can be known only by an ac- 
quaintance with his general character. 

7. It should also be considered, whether 
there be reason to presume that the witness 
spoke his real judgment of the fact in question. 
For, there are subjects and occasions, on which 
even men of general veracity, assume the liberty 
of deviating from truth, and that liberty is, 
though tacitly, yet so generally allowed by the 
world, that scarcely any loss of character is sus- 
tained thereby. The world is a great theatre, 
men are players, each acting a part. On this 
stage they speak rather according to their as- 
sumed character, than according to their real 
judgment. And though this licence is used 
more frequently, as to opinions, than as to the 
statement of facts, yet it is not strictly confined 
to opinions. And should we charge any man 
with a disregard to truth on this account, w® 
should probably be despised for illiberality, ox 
ignorance of the world. For the same man, 
when he had laid aside the mask, and retired 
within the circle of his private connexions, 
would shew that, under his real character, he 
felt the obligations of veracity ; and would give 
a very different view of the fact from what he 
had given on the stage. Whether men be at 
liberty, on any occasion, thus to suspend, by 
common consent, the operation of the laws of 



118 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IV. ) 

truth, is a question of morality, and not of 
moral evidence; and therefore, falls not within 
the province of this tract. But, as the liberty 
is assumed, it is necessary to guard against the 
errors which Mould arise from ignorance of the 
practice. For, it is evident, that unless wo 
distinguish between the occasions, on which 
men regard themselves as bound to speak the 
truth, and those on which they do not, we must 
be continually exposed to error in believing 
their testimony. This distinction can be made 
only by attentive observation, or acquaintance 
with the world, 

8. Whether the witness be a man of inte- 
grity, or of an unprincipled character, should 
also be considered. For, if the general tenor 
of a man's conduct shew, that he has no regard 
to the obligations of morality, it may be pre- 
sumed, that he will not hesitate, on suitable oc- 
casions, to violate the truth. 

9. It should be inquired, whether the in- 
terest of the witness is likely to be affected by 
the decision of the point in question, For, ex- 
perience shews, that, under the bias of interest, 
men scarcely ever judge correctly, or give a 
fair and impartial evidence. They are then in- 
duced to suppress some circumstances, to soften 
others, and to give to the whole matter such a 
turn, as is most favourable to themselves. This, 
therefore^ is the principal circumstance which 



Testimony. 119 

renders testimony suspicious. Hence, it is n 
wise rule in our law, to reject the evidence of 
all those who are interested in the decision of a 
cause. 

10. As the testimony of an interested per- 
son, in his own favour, is suspicious, that tes- 
timony, which makes against his interest, is 
worthy of great credit; for, there then appears 
no other reason for his giving such evidence, 
than the force of truth. Here, however, it 
should be carefully ascertained, that his evi- 
dence is really opposite to his interests ; and, in 
some cases, this is attended with difficulty. 
For that, which is opposite to a man's general 
interest, may tend to promote some particular 
purpose, which he has at that time in view\ 
Nor, should the rule he extended without cau- 
tion to what opposes the interests of the wit- 
ness's party, For, in parties, secret enmities 
and separate interests arise, which make an in- 
dividual sometimes willing, for private pur- 
poses, to cast a reproach upon his partizans. 
Hence, what is regarded as the concession of 
#n opponent, and therefore indubitable, may, 
sometimes, be fabricated, for the purpose of 
promoting that interest of the witness, which, 
at that particular time, influences his mind. 
Most frequently, however, the influence of party 
prejudice operates in the same way with that of 
private interest. And, hence arises the diffi- 



120 Special Direct, relative to Mor.Ev. (Ch.lK) 

culty of obtaining a fair representation of facts, 
in times of great political animosity. 

11. The manner in which the evidence is 
given, may afford some assistance in judging 
of the veracity of the witness. There is a sim- 
plicity and firmness, equally remote from hesi- 
tation, and an assumed confidence, with which 
men generally speak the truth. This, though 
difficult to be described, may be learnt by ob* 
serration, 

12. The occasion on which a testimony is 
given, maj^, sometimes, render it suspicious. 
Thus, should a man inform me, unasked, and 
without any assignable reason, that a person 
just dead, and from whom I had no expecta- 
tion, had not left me any thing in his will, I 
should be apt to suspect his assertion. But, if 
there were any apparent reason why he should 
give me this information, provided it were true, 
no such suspicion would be excited by it. 

13. The testimony of a dying man has been 
considered as entitled to peculiar credit ; for, 
as he knows he is about to leave the world, and 
all its concerns, and to appear immediately in 
the presence of his Judge, it is presumed that 
he would not willingly contract the guilt of a 
deliberate falsehood ; a falsehood in which he 
can have but very little interest. Yet, it is 
not unusual for persons, who are executed, to 
die asserting their innocence, though there bt 



Testimony. 121 

strong reasons to conclude them guilty, n?nl 
nothing occurs afterwards to make that guilt 
suspected. To determine the degree of credit 
due to such evidence, the general state of the 
man's mind should be considered. If his con- 
duct shew that his mind is duly impressed with 
the awfulness of the eternal judgment, his testi- 
mony is entitled to great credit; but, if it ma- 
nifest no such impression, his evidence should 
be regarded as of little weight. The persons 
above-mentioned, who testify their innocence 
at their execution, are most frequently void of 
moral principle, and no suitable change ap- 
pears to take place in their minds even to the 
last. Their apprehensions of the judgment to 
come, are so slight as to be capable of being 
surmounted by any temporaMnterests, however 
small ; as a regard to their character after death, 
or the interest of their families or friends, or 
even tire casting a suspicion on the prosecutor, 
the witnesses, or the judge- The testimony of 
such persons is evidently very suspicious. If, 
however, the subject of their testimony be such 
as can no way affect their own character, or 
promote any interest for which they can be 
supposed to have any concern, or gratify any 
passion, however momentary 1 -, their evidence is 
then worthy of credit. The general nature of 
the subjects, also, should be considered. For, 
there are subjects, which men have brought 



122 Special Direct, relative to Mor.Ev. (Ch.IF.) 

themselves to regard as of such vast importance 
as to justify the use of almost any means ne- 
cessary to their success ; and it cannot be pre- 
sumed that such prejudices wholly lose their 
influence, even in the moments of death. 
Hence the testimony of a dying man cannot 
be as safely trusted on such subjects, as on 
others, where no such prejudices prevail. It 
should, also, be observed, that where the evi- 
dence of a dying man to a specific fact, would 
be fully entitled to credit, his evidence as to the 
general rectitude of a certain cause, may deserve 
no regard. All that it can possibly prove, is, 
that he sincerely believes the cause to be just. 
But, as we have no reason to suppose, that the 
minds of men become enlightened in articulo 
mortis j we cannot safely trust the judgment of 
a dying man, any more than of one in sound 
health. 

14. It should be considered, whether the 
evidence for the fact rests on the testimony of 
only one witness, or of more. For, as has been 
already observed, the concurrence of indepen- 
dent witnesses, increases the weight of their 
evidence, and that in a much greater degree 
than in the proportion of their numbers. Here, 
also, the nature of the subject should be at- 
tended to. For, if it be such, as would pro- 
bably be mentioned by several persons, on a 
supposition that it were true, then its being as- 



Testimony. 123 

sertcd by only one, detracts from its credibility. 
But, on the other hand, if the fact be of so 
very private a nature, that if it had happened, 
it would, probably, have been known only by 
one person; then, though the evidence of a 
single witness be of less weight than that of 
more, his testimony is not rendered suspicious 
by his being alone. For, as strong evidence as 
the nature of the case admits, is here produced. 
The degree of our assent, however, should be 
carefully proportioned to the weight of the evi- 
dence. In judging whether the nature of the 
case admit of the testimony of only one witness, 
we should consider, whether the representation 
of it bear the marks of simplicity, or those of 
art and contrivance, so to construct it, as to 
exclude the evidence of all other persons, and 
to make it rest on the testimony of the witness 
alone. For such marks of art and contrivance, 
would evidently render it suspicious. 

15. Is the subject of such a nature, and so 
circumstanced as to admit of an easy confuta- 
tion, if it be false ? Scarcely any consideration 
is of greater importance than this ; for, other- 
wise, the law of reputation, the great principle 
of human conduct, opposes no barrier against 
falsehood ; but the witness is at liberty to make 
what misrepresentations he pleases, and thereby 
to gratify any secret passion, or to promote any 
private interest, without danger of disgrace. 
g2 



I'll Special Direct, relative to Mar. Ev. (Ch. IV.) 

For the same reason it should be considered, 
whether the situation of the witness be such, as 
to secure him from shame, if his falsehood be 
detected, for this would weaken the credibility 
of his testimony. 

16. A vague account of a fact, is not so 
worthy of credit, as a relation which contains 
all the particulars of time, place, persons, and 
the like. Because, as all these particulars af- 
ford means of detection, if the relation be false, 
it may be presumed that the relater is satisfied 
that his account will bear examination. For 
the same reason, quotations are entitled to cre- 
dit, in proportion as the means of examining 
them are afforded by a statement, not only of 
the book, but of the volume, and the page, 
whence they are taken, and, even of the library 
where the book, if scarce, may be found. 

17. If, while the witness speaks positively 
as to some particulars, he acknowledges him- 
self to be ignorant of others, or to be only im- 
perfectly acquainted with them; this acknow- 
ledgment tends to confirm his evidence, as to 
those which he positively affirms. Because, it 
carries with it the appearance of caution, not 
to exceed his knowledge, and shews that he is 
not prepared to affirm any thing that may be 
asked him, to make out the story. 

18. Of the statement of ancient facts, it 
should be inquired, what reception they met 



Testimony* Wfi 

with when they were first made. If they were 
generally believed, by those who might have 
confuted them, had they been false, and if they 
were disputed by none, they may, for the most 
part, be considered, as well established. If 
they weie disputed at first, but, on examina- 
tion, were admitted, they are confirmed by their 
trial. But, if they continued to be discredited, 
they are to be suspected ; and, unless the unbe- 
lievers may fairly be presumed to have been 
influenced by ignorance, interest, pi ' 3 of 

passion, they should be rejected. A coy 
rison, therefore, should be made between the 
believers and unbelievers, in respect to ability 
and impartiality, and its result should deter- 
mine our judgment. These are the general 
principles upon which our assent to ancient 
facts, may be regulated. But, to estimate more 
correctly, the influence which the reception of 
any account by those to whom it was originally 
presented, ought to have on our belief, we should 
further inquire, whether that reception pro- 
ceeded on due examination, and on just princi- 
ples ; or may be fairly attributed to ignorance, 
credulity, negligence, or prejudice. Thus, 
where the parties, who originally received the 
account, gave it only a careless assent, or from 
mere indolence or indifference, took no pains to 
correct it; their assent ought not to influence 
our judgment, as it should, where it may bs 
G 3 



VZ6 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IV.) 

presumed, that they felt the importance of as- 
certaining its credibility ; and, therefore, exa- 
mined it with due care, before they admitted 
it. Hence, the admission of stories of prodi- 
gies, unconnected with the faith or practice of 
those who received them, is entitled to little 
weight ; while the reception of accounts of mi- 
racles, wrought for the establishment of Chris- 
tianity, ought to produce a conviction of their 
truth. Because, it is highly probable, that the 
belief of the former was not regulated by due 
examination : whereas, the greatest interests 
being immediately connected with the latter, 
it is altogether improbable that they should 
have been admitted, without the strictest scru- 
tiny. For, it cannot be reasonably imagined, 
that vast multitudes should be induced to 
sacrifice their prejudices, and immediate in- 
terests, in relinquishing the religion, in which 
they had been educated ; the religion of a long 
line of ancestors; a religion which was the ob- 
ject of veneration, the glory of their country, 
and hitherto of themselves ; to embrace a new 
religion, the object of universal contempt and 
abhorrence; when, by so doing, they gave up 
all prospects of worldly prosperity and ease, 
exposed themselves to general scorn and malice, 
and frequently to severe persecution ; without 
having carefully examined the credibility of 



Testimony. 127 

the miracles, on which ils claims to (heir re- 
ception, were founded. 

Tims, also, the reception of accounts of mi- 
racles, wrought in confirmation** of opinions 
already established, is not entitled to the same 
influence on our judgment, as it is when the 
miracles were performed, to establish new opi- 
nions, opposite to such as have been previously 
entertained ; and, especially, when those mi- 
racles were wrought in the presence of enemies. 
For, in the latter case, no reason can be as- 
signed for their reception, but a full convic- 
tion of their truth. But, in the former, there 
being nothing to excite those who received the 
accounts to scrutinize them, it is probable they 
were received without due examination: be- 
sides, it is difficult to ascertain, whether or not 
they were really believed by those who contri- 
buted to propagate them, and were not merely 
pious frauds. Thus, stories of Popish mira- 
cles, may easily be circulated in Popish coun- 
tries, and may be received without examination 
by the ignorant multitude ; while they would 
meet with no credit among Protestants. So, 
ao-ain, the reception of many historical facts, 
honourable to the nation among whom they 
were published, or dishonourable to their ene- 
mies ; or, creditable to that party in a state, 

* Paley's Evidence of Christianity, vol. ii. page 21, 
G 4 



128 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IV.) 

which possessed, almost exclusively, the op- 
portunity of transmitting the records of events 
to posterity, or discreditable to their opponents, 
ought not to induce us, implicitly, to decide 
upon their truth ; but, in forming our judg- 
ments of them, we should make due allowance 
for the effects of prejudice. Thus, for ex- 
ample, it may be reasonably presumed, that in 
relating the transactions between the Romans 
and Carthaginians, the Roman historian would 
be influenced by attachment to his own country, 
and ha red of its enemies; and, that the same 
prejudice would induce his countrymen in 
general, to admit his accounts, though par- 
tial, since they were in their own favour. Of 
course, that admission is not of sufficient au- 
thority to warrant our implicit credit. Had 
the works of any Carthaginian historian reached 
us, we might have seen some of the same facts 
stated less to the honour of Rome, and more to 
that of Carthage; and yet, have found reason 
to presume, that his accounts also were fully 
admitted by the Carthaginians. On the other 
hand, when the facts related are dishonourable 
to the nation, or party, who yet received the 
accounts of them, that reception confirms their 
truth. Thus, as the History of the Bible, 
though it records the peculiar privileges con- 
ferred on the Jews by the Almighty, relates 
also the base and ungrateful returns which thej 



Testimony. 12i 

continually made for them, their universal re- 
ception of it renders its truth indubitable. 

It should also be considered, whether the ac- 
counts of these ancient facts,* were published 
near the time and place, when and where they 
are stated to have happened. For, if they were 
not published till long aftcr^ they are sus- 
picious ; because it does not appear that they 
were ever heard of before; because it generally 
seems improbable, if not impracticable, for the 
person who asserts them to have at any 

just grounds for his assertion : and, because 
they want that confirmation Which should be 
derived from their reception, by persons who 
might have confuted them, had they been Fal 
Thus, the miracles ascribed to Mahomet, by 
those w ho wrote several centuries after his death, 
which miracles were never heard of before, are 
unworthy of credit. But, those secret facts of 
history, which have been published from papers 
in the cabinets of princes, or in the possession 
of private families are credible, though they 
did not become publicly known, till a consi- 
derable time after the event. For, as from 
their nature, they were incapable of being pub- 
licly known, except from these secret papers; 
and, it is highly improbable, that access should 
be had to those papers, till a considerable time 
had elapsed, the facts have the best evidence, 

* Prey's Evidence of ChrUthrvty, vol. ii, pages 6 and 9* 
G 5 



1 30 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IV.) 

of which the nature of the case admits. Be- 
sides, their credibility depends, not merely on 
the historian, but on the authenticity of the 
papers themselves, the opportunities which the 
original writers of them possessed of being ac- 
quainted with the facts which they relate, and 
the degree of probability of their being dis- 
posed to relate them fairly. 

If the accounts were published at a distance 
from the place where the facts were stated to 
have happened, especially if that be a place 
seldom visited by foreigners, they are sus- 
picious; because the restraints of the law of 
reputation can then be felt but little by their 
relater ; and, their public reception cannot have 
been regulated by due examination, but must 
have arisen from the confidence reposed in the 
assertor; which confidence may often be ac- 
counted for from the influence of prejudice, 
interest, or party. Thus, the miracles for- 
merly published in Europe, as having been 
performed by Popish missionaries in India, are 
unworthy of credit. 

19. The entire omission of a thing, pre- 
tended to have been public, by all other au- 
thors who might naturally have been expected 
to mention it, renders it suspicious. And it is 
the more suspicious, in proportion as the au- 
thors, by whom it was omitted, may be pre- 
sumed to have been engaged by interest, by 



Testimony. 131 

principle, or by the nature of their work to re- 
cord it, if they had been acquainted with it. 
But, if a satisfactory reason can be assigned 
why these authors should omit the mention of 
the fact, it then ceases to be suspicious on that 
account. 

20. Hitherto we have supposed, that we 
have testimony on only one side of a question ; 
but, it often happens., that witnesses are pro- 
duced on both sides. In this case, we should 
examine whether their assertions cannot be 
so interpreted, as to agree with each other. 
If they can, such interpretation should be 
adopted ; because, it is to be presumed, until 
the contrary appear, that the witnesses on both 
sides speak truth. But, if their assertions can- 
not be reconciled, it is then to be observed, 
that one affirmative witness may countervail 
many negatives ; provided the fact which he 
affirms be of such a nature, that it might pro- 
bably have taken place, and yet not have been 
noticed by those who deny it. An affirmative 
witness is one who asserts, that a certain fact 
did take place; a negative is one who asserts 
that it did not. But, as many propositions are 
capable of being expressed in both a positive 
and a negative form, this definition is too 
vague. When the assertion will admit of 
either form of expression, and the subject of it 
is of such a nature, that with that degree of at- 
gQ 



132 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IV.} 

tendon which the witness may be reasonably 
presumed to have paid, he was fully capable 
of judging whether the fact did take place or 
not, his assertion should be regarded as in the 
positive form, and he should be considered as 
an affirmative witness. But if the fact asserted 
be such, that it might have happened, and he 
probably not have observed it, his assertion 
should be put in the negative form, and he 
should be regarded as a negative witness. For 
instance, should one person affirm that it rained 
at the Horse Guards, during the whole of the 
morning of Christmas Day last, and another 
deny that it rained there the whole of that 
morning, the assertion of the former would, ac- 
cording to this form of expression, be positive, 
and that of the latter negative. Yet the asser- 
tion of each would admit of being expressed in 
the opposite form. For to affirm, that it rained 
the w hole of the morning, is equivalent to as- 
serting that it was not fair at any part of it ; 
and to deny, that it rained the whole of the 
morning, is equivalent to asserting, that it was 
fair at some part of it. Now, as its being fair 
at some part of the morning is a subject fully 
capable of observation, the assertion of that 
witness, who affirms what is equivalent to it, 
should be considered in its affirmative form, and 
he should be regarded as an affirmative witness. 
But he who asserts that it rained the whole 



Tcatimoni). 133 

morning, ought to be considered as asserting*, 
that it was not fair at any part of it, and should 
therefore be regarded as a negative witness; 
because it is not improbable, that his attention 
might be so occupied by some other subject at 
some part of the morning, that, though it were 
then fair, it escaped his notice. If, however, 
the fact be of such a nature, that it is xery 
improbable it should have happened without 
being observed, and the witnesses oppose each 
other in contradictory propositions, so that 
those on one side must be true, and those on 
the other false, we must then judge according 
to the number of the witnesses on each side, 
their credit, and the comparative probability of 
their respective testimonies. If the two latter 
circumstances be equal, the superior number 
are deserving of belief. If the first and last be 
equal, the side on which the witnesses are of 
the greater credit, is entitled to the preference. 
To judge of their credit, we must apply the 
principles already laid down. But, if the two 
former circumstances be equal, that testimony, 
which is more probable in itself, is to be be- 
lieved. 

21. It has been said, that it is impossible 
to prove a negative. But, this assertion re- 
quires son>e limitation: for those negatives, 
•which are capable of being expressed in an af- 
firmative form, may be proved. That a ball 



134 Special Direct, relative to Mor.Ev. (Ch.IV.) 

ffred at a target, did not hit it, is a negative 
proposition; but it may be expressed posi- 
tively. The ball missed the target. Now this 
fact is fully capable of observation, and there- 
fore the testimony respecting it, if admissible on 
other accounts, is worthy of credit. Other ne- 
gative propositions, also, which are incapable of 
being converted into a positive form, will admit 
of proof. Should it be asserted, that a pistol 
had been fired in a church, in the time of divine 
service, nobody would reject the testimony of 
several respectable persons of the congregation, 
that such an event did not take place. For, 
as it would be in the highest degree impro- 
bable, that the pistol should have been fired 
there, without their knowing it, they would be 
fully competent to prove the negative. And, 
in general, whenever the fact asserted is such, 
that it is very improbable it could have taken 
place, without being observed, the negative 
may be proved. In many cases, however, a 
negative can scarcely admit of proof. Thus, 
if a man were charged with having picked the 
pocket of a person who had sat near him the 
whole evening, he could scarcely produce any 
evidence to disprove the charge satisfactorily. 
For it is exceedingly improbable, that any per- 
son in the company should have kept his eyes 
so steadily fixed upon him during the whole 
evening, as to be able to say with perfect cer- 



Testimony. 135 

tainty, that at no part of it he had picked the 
pocket. But, as the nature of the case can 
scarcely admit of such evidence, the want of it 
ought to be no injury to the person accused. 
Sometimes, though a negative proposition can- 
not be directly proved, an affirmative proposi- 
tion may be proved, which necessarily inferring 
the negative, proves it indirectly. For instance, 
if a man were charged with having committed 
a robbery in St. Paul's Church-Yard, at ten 
o'clock last Saturday night, and could bring sa- 
tisfactory proof, that he was at that time sup- 
ping with a large party at the rooms of a friend 
at Cambridge, he would completely refute the 
charge. This is called proving an alibi. But 
as the being able to produce such proof is a cir- 
cumstance merely accidental ; the want of such 
proof should excite no suspicion. For the man 
might have been in London, and walking in the 
streets alone at the time, and therefore, though 
innocent, be incapable of disproving the charge. 
Hence the law, with perfect justice, does not 
require any man to produce such proof, though 
it be ready to accept it, when offered. 

22. In some cases, the witnesses may agree 
as to certain circumstances, and disagree as to 
others. Here, the nature of these circumstan- 
ces should be considered. If they be such as 
were not likely to excite the attention of the 
witnesses, and fix; themselves in their memory^ 



13G Special Direct, relative toMor. Ev. (Ch. IV.) 

their disagreement does not weaken their evi- 
dence as to the principal facts, in which they 
agree; but, on the contrary, rather confirms it. 
For, experience shews, that men very rarely 
agree in all the immaterial circumstances in re* 
lating the same fact. And, hence, a perfect 
coincidence, in every point, carries with it the 
appearance of a preconcerted plan of deception. 
But, if the circumstances were such, that they 
may be presumed to have made a strong im- 
pression on their minds, and to be recollected, 
then their disagreement renders their evidence 
suspicious. In making this distinction, we 
must be governed by experience ; for, it is that 
which teaches us what circumstances do usu- 
ally excite the attention, and fix themselves in 
the memory, and what do not. The suspicion 
thus excited, may rise so high, as to justify the 
rejection of the testimony of both the witnesses, 
especially if, on other accounts, it appears sus- 
picious. But, it would scarcely be safe, on all 
such occasions, to. disbelieve both. For, one 
of them may be a man of strict veracity, and 
state the fact correctly; while the other is a 
triffer with truth, and gives, in part, a false 
testimony. Besides, were such a rule esta- 
blished, it would render it easy for dishonest 
men to discredit any evidence which they 
might wish to be disbelieved. It would, there- 
fore^ be proper to consider whether one of these 



General Notoriety* 137 

witnesses be, in all other respects, unobjection- 
: and, in that case, to believe him, and re- 
ject the other. 

In subjects of Remote Testimony, the same 
observations are applicable to every witness 
through whom the testimony passes, till it 
reaches us. 



On the credit due to the evidence of General 
Notoriety. 

The great consideration here, is, how far the 
subject is likely to be known; and what proba- 
bility there is, that the assertions respecting it, 
should be contradicted, if they were false. 

Mathematical subjects admit of being cer- 
tainly known, and mistakes in them may be 
easily detected. In them, therefore, those con- 
clusions, which are universally believed, may 
be relied upon with safety. Events, also, in 
general, admit of being known : and when they 
are subject to the observation of many persons, 
mis-statements in them easily admit of correc- 
tion ; but when they can have been observed by 
only a few, their mis-statements are not easily 
corrected; and, hence the general opinion of 
them, though uncontradicted, cannot be so 
safely trusted. On philosophical subjects, 
many opinions have prevailed universalis. 



138 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch.IF.) 

which, by subsequent discoveries, have ap- 
peared to be false. And, probably, opinions 
are still held on some of them, which will be 
proved to be erroneous by future discoveries. 
Here, therefore, general notoriety, or as it may 
be termed, general opinion, merits less credit. 
But, something may be done to regulate the 
degree of assent, by considering whether the 
science of the subject in question, be still in its 
infancy, or, have made great progress towards 
perfection. These remarks will serve to show 
how the principle, on which the evidence of 
general notoriety is founded, is to be applied. 

In Proverbs, and General Maxims of Con- 
duct, it should be examined, whether there be 
no ambiguity in the language in which they 
are expressed, which may have contributed to 
their general belief, in a sense in which they 
are not true. It should also be considered, 
whether they depend for their prevalence on 
their intrinsic merit alone, or upon the credit 
and influence of some particular classes of men, 
who are interested in their support; for then, 
they are less worthy of belief. 

As to the application of proverbs to particu- 
lar cases, the highest evidence which they af- 
ford, is, that the event will happen most fre- 
quently, but not always, as they assert. But 
then, this evidence they do afford; and, he 
w r ho rejects them, though he may succeed occa- 



Report. 3 3D 

sionally, will, at length, find that he has 
deceived himself. 



On the credit due to Reports. 

Many of the particulars, which should regu- 
late our assent here, are the same with those 
contained under the head of Testimony. It 
will, therefore, be sufficient to mention them, 
without enlarging upon them. They are as 
follows : The probability or improbability of 
the fact, under the known circumstances of the 
case ; the consistency of the account in itself, 
and w ith subsequent circumstances ; the pro- 
bability of the fact's being known ; whether the 
account were likely to be contradicted, if false; 
and whether any particular interests may be 
promoted by it. Added to this, it should be 
considered, from what quarter the report ori- 
ginated, and whether it be propagated by men 
of judgment in such affairs, or only by ignorant 
and credulous people. If some time haye 
elapsed since the origin of the report, our judg- 
ment of its credibility may be assisted by 
considering the reception with which it has 
continued to meet. If, though it prevailed 
strongly at first, it afterwards died away, and 
have not revived since, it is suspicious. But 
its continuance in credit, or its reviving again 



1 40 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IV.) 

after having been dropped, are circumstances 
in its favour. 

Though reports are seldom without some 
foundation, yet they are frequently inaccurate* 
They are subject to exaggeration and misre- 
presentation. Hence, though they are entitled 
to some degree of credit, they can seldom be 
relied on with safety. On subjects, therefore, 
which are important to lis, they ought not to 
be neglected, but to excite us to ascertain, by 
further inquiry, what degree of truth there may 
be in them. 



On belief in Tradition. 

Our assent to this kind of evidence, should 
be regulated by nearly the same circumstances, 
which are mentioned under the foregoing head* 



On the credit due to Analogy. 

With regard to this extensive species of pro- 
bable evidence, very few directions seem ca- 
pable of being given. It may, however, be 
observed, that, as to those qualities which have 
no necessary connexion with each other, it is 
by experience alone, that it can be known, 
which of them do, or do not, either constantly 



Presumption, 141 

or generally) co-exist in the same subject. 
Hence, experience seems the only safe ground 
of reasoning by analogy. It may, also, be re- 
remarked, that the greater ihe number of points 
of resemblance are between ihe subject in ques- 
tion, and that from which the analogy is taken, 
and the stronger the resemblance is in each of 
these points, the safer will our conclusions be ; 
and, that where the resemblance holds in only 
one or two points, or is in itself weak, the con^ 
elusion is very uncertain. 



On the credit due to inferences from Facts 
or Premises. 

As inferences from facts are deduced by ana- 
logy, what has been said above, is applicable 
to them. 

On presumptive evidence, Blackstone (vol. 
iv. page 352.) says, that u presumptive evi- 
u dence of felony should be admitted cauti. 
4i ously; for, the law holds, that it is better 
" that ten guilty persons should escape, than 
" that one innocent should suffer." This rule 
of law manifestly supposes, that presumptive 
evidence is attended with great uncertainty; 
and, consequently, it ought, in other cases 
also, and not only in those of felony, to be ad- 
mitted with caution. For, though the conse- 



142 Special Direct, relative to Mor. Ev. (Ch. IF.) 

quences of an error in deciding on a case of 
felony be more awful than on a question of pro- 
perty, and much more awful than those whicli 
would attend an erroneous opinion, in private 
matters ; yet, as far as respects the mere error 
itself, independent of its consequences, all the 
cases are equal. And, as the attainment of 
truth ought to be our object in all our inquiries, 
we ought at all times to be cautious in deciding 
on this species of evidence. Sometimes, how- 
ever, it is necessary to found our decisions upon 
it, because no other evidence can be procured 
to determine the question. It is, therefore, re- 
quisite to consider how we may proceed in such 
cases with the greatest safety. 

Sir Matthew Hale, we are told by Blackstone, 
lays down two rules to be observed, in trials for 
felony. u First, never to convict a man for 
Ci stealing the goods of a person unknown, 
" merely because he will give no account how 
Ci he came by them, unless an actual felony 
Ci be proved of such goods. And, secondly, 
e i never to convict any person of murder or 
Cl manslaughter, till at least the body be found 
U dead, on account of two instances he men- 
u tions, where persons were executed for the 
" murder of others, who were then alive, but 
" missing." 

To these rules relating to felonies, the fol- 
lowing, of a more general nature, may be 



Presumption. 143 

added. As the same circumstances may attend 
different facts, and it is our business to deter- 
mine from the circumstances established in 
proof, which of those various facts did exist, 
we ought, in the first place, to inquire what 
facts the circumstances proved, might attend ; 
secondly, to state each of those facts distinctly ; 
and lastly, to compare each with every circum- 
stance, in order to discover with which of the 
facts all those circumstances do most probably 
agree. The formality of this procedure is ne- 
cessary, because we are always, through pre- 
judice, or by the suggestion of others, in danger 
of connecting the circumstances with some par- 
ticular fact ; and, thus another fact, with which 
they might, perhaps, be connected with greater 
probability, will be overlooked. But, if we 
proceed with this formality, we shall be less 
likely to overlook the real fact; and, if we 
thus cautiously compare each fact with the 
known circumstances, we may find, that though 
with some they may agree equally, yet, with 
one or more of the other circumstances, there 
is only one of the supposed facts, which can 
well agree ; and, thus we may discover which 
the true fact is. 

On deducing inferences from premises, it is 
scarcely consistent with the object of this tract 
to enlarge, but the reader is referred to books 
on logic ; for the rules which are necessary to 



144 Evidence of uldck (Ch. V.) 

be observed. And for the modes of proceeding 
in the doctrine of chances, and purchase of 
annuities, he is referred to such of the writers 
on mathematics, as have treated these subjects 
professedly; they being entirely mathematical 
subjects. 



C II A P. V. 

On the Kinds of Evidence of which different 
Subjects admits and on which they are actu- 
ally believed. 



/ANY Truths are believed by most men, 
on a lower species of evidence, than that by 
which they might be proved. Hence it will 
be proper to enquire, not only of what evidence 
different subjects admit, but also, on what they 
are usually believed. The subjects of human 
knowledge are so numerous, that it would be 
impracticable to mention them all ; and, were 
it practicable, it would be useless; as the 
mention of a few will be sufficient. 



Mathematical truths, though capable of de- 
monstration, are admitted by most men, only 
on general notoriety. For, they are neither 



different Subjects admit. 14* 

able to understand the demonstrations of them 
themselves, nor have they, ordinarily, for their 
truih, the evidence of those who do understand 
them ; but, finding them generally believed iii 
the world, they also believe them. Their be- 
lief, also, is confirmed by experience; for^ 
when they have occasion to apply them, they 
find that they lead to just conclusions. 



Moral maxims and proverbs, are usually 
admitted on the same evidence. For, though 
they be deduced from the observation of life, 
yet few men possess sufficient attention or dis- 
cernment to form them for themselves. Most 
men admit them, because they are generally 
believed. And though they be capable of 
confirmation from experience, yet, as they are 
not universally true, but true only for the most 
part, their confirmation must be drawn from 
the comparison of a great variety of cases, to 
which they apply. This comparison few will 
take the trouble to make, and, therefore, they 
seem to be believed by most men only on their 
general notoriety. 



Of the properties and effects of the subjects 
of natural history, as animals, vegetables, mi- 
tt 



146 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

nerals, fossils, earths, &c. These were ori- 
ginally known by personal observation ; and, 
as the subjects still exist, they are still capable 
of being known in the same way by all ; and 
are so known by some. And when the subjects 
lie within our reach, and require little pains 
or skill in examination, it is on personal ob- 
servation that their properties and effects are 
believed in general. But, as many of them 
lie ai a great distance, and are obtained with 
difficulty; and, as their examination requires 
extraordinary skill and discrimination, so their 
properties and effects can be personally ob- 
served only by few. If, therefore, they be be- 
lieved by the bulk of mankind at all, they 
must be believed on the credit of others. The 
highest degree of evidence which can ordina- 
rily be obtained for them, must be drawn from 
books published by naturalists, who have made 
personal observations on them. And the infor- 
mation possessed by those who have not read 
th^se books, is derived from a still lower source, 
as from compilations or general notoriety. 



Of the effects of certain substances on man- 
kind, we have, in many cases, the evidence of 
' ;xpe: i« nee, confirmed by the expe- 
;i u.iiers. hi some cases, our infor* 



different Subjects admit. 14? 

mat ion must be derived entirely from others. 
Often, our experience of these effects has not 
been uniform ; and others testify the same. 
For instance, the things which agree with us 
at one time, disagree with us at another ^ Here, 
we suppose, either that the substances are dis- 
similar, or that our bodies are in a different 
state. 

Certain sciences relate to some of these sub- 
jects, and certain trades or professions to others. 
The learned in those sciences, and the mem- 
bers of those professions, obtain a considerable 
part of the information which they possess, re- 
lative to those subjects which belong to their 
own line, by personal observation ; but, for a 
large share even of such information, they must 
be indebted to the observation of others. Thus, 
a physician, for instance, cannot have obtained 
his whole stock of knowledge by his own obser- 
vation, but must have derived much of it from 
books or conversation. 

What has been said, relates only to the gene- 
ral truths belonging to the subjects above-men- 
tioned. The application of those truths to 
particular cases, must proceed on the princi- 
ples of analogy. For, it is only by the resem- 
blance, which different subjects bear to each 
other in some particulars which have been al- 
ready ascertained, that we can infer, that they 
also resemble each other in all other partial* 
h2 



148 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

lars, and will be productive of the same effects. 
Tims, for example, I may have learned, that 
the metal which is called gold, is yellow, 
heavy, fixed, malleable, ductile, fusible, and 
soluble, in aqua regia, but not in aquafortis. 
But, if I would decide, whether a particular 
piece of metal, which I perceived to be yellow, 
heavy, fixed, fusible, and soluble, in aqua 
regia, but not in aquafortis, were also malle- 
able and ductile (unless I determined it by ex- 
periment) it would be only by analogy that I 
could presume that it was so, and therefore 
really gold, in these cases our reasonings rise 
no higher than probability; though it is ad- 
mitted, that that probability amounts nearly to 
moral certainty. For, it is not necessary that 
substances, which resemble each other in some 
properties, should also resemble each other in 
others, It is possible, for instance, hat a sub- 
stance may exist, which possesses all the other 
properties of gold, except its malleability and 
ductility, or which possesses even all the known 
properties of gold, without exception, and, 
together wi h them, certain other properties 
which would really change its nature, and con- 
stitute it a diffi re . thing. But, as neither ac- 
cident nor research has ever presented us with 
such a substance, it is highly improbable that 
it should exist. 



different Subjects admit. 14? 

Of facts, which respect the constitution of 
nature, and the changes of the heavenly bodies, 
the more obvious are known by personal obser- 
vation, confirmed by the uniform experience of 
all, whom we have ever heard speak of them. 
Some persons also know, that they depend on 
causes of so permanent a nature, that the con- 
stitution of the world must be altered or sus- 
pended, before they will cease. On these sub- 
jects, therefore, they have the highest degree of 
moral evidence. For the ebbing and flowing 
of the tides, they who have lived always in an 
inland country have only the observation of 
others. But then, all whom they hear speak 
on the subject affirm it, and Therefore, they 
firmly believe it. They who have lived near 
the sea-shore, have the evidence of their own 
experience, added to the observation of others. 
And again, other persons know, that it depends 
on causes as permanent as the changes of night 
and day, and have the same species and degree 
of evidence with that above mentioned. 



Present facts, such as the existence of cer- 
tain cities or buildings, of certain institutions, 
of countries, seas, or mountains, &c. admit of 
personal observation, testimony, or general no- 
toriety. But lie personal observation of these, 
h3 



150 Evidence of zchich (Ch. V.) 

as they are specific facts, belongs to a higher 
species of evidence. When the things lie at a 
convenient distance, they are actually known 
by many on this evidence. But, when they lie 
at a great distance, they are known by most 
men, on no higher evidence than testimony ; 
or, more frequently by general notoriety. Few 
men, for instance, have ever been in China, 
fewer still at Pekin. The greater part of man- 
kind have never been informed, by eye-wit- 
nesses, of their existence, and therefore, must 
believe it on general notoriety. 



Of the hand-writing of persons, we judge by 
analogy. For, from the resemblance which the 
writing in question bears to the writing of a 
certain person which we have seen before, we 
infer that it was written by him. The resem- 
blance, on which we judge, is not so much in 
the shape of each particular letter, as in a cer- 
tain general character of the writing, which can 
hardly be described. Our ability to decide 
here with safety is confirmed, or weakened, ac- 
cording to the experience which we have had 
of the correctness or incorrectness of our deci- 
sions in former cases. Nearly the same remark 
may be made of determining, that certain pic- 
tures are the work of a certain master; or, that 



different Subjects admit. 151 

a certain building was planned by a certain 
architect. Here the decision is founded on the 
resemblance which the works in question bear 
to works of the same kind, by the same hand 
which we have seen before ; and, here too, the 
resemblance consists in the general style, rather 
than in the particular parts. 



Of the effects of institutions on the charac- 
ter, manners, and happiness of mankind, or of 
peace and war, riches and poverty, &c. By 
comparing the state of one people, where these 
prevail, with that of another, where they do not, 
or, where their opposites prevail, a tolerably 
correct judgment may be formed of their effects. 
If we would collect general truths on these sub- 
jects, we can do it only by a careful study of 
history, and even by a comparison of different 
histories. The evidence attainable here, is of 
the nature of personal observation, exercised 
upon that species of testimony which is called 
historic evidence. Certain general opinions 6n 
these points are also current in the world, and 
which are believed by individuals on the au- 
thority of that general currency. These are, 
perhaps, more numerous than those which arc 
formed by personal investigation. Some of 
h4 



1 52 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

tliem may be true, but many are probably 
false. 



Of the knowledge of men's motives and in- 
tentions. The proper evidence of these is tes- 
timony. But, though men declare to us their 
motives and intentions, there are difficulties in 
forming a correct view of them, which ought 
to be considered. 

They may intend to state them either fairly 
or deceitfully. If they intend to state them 
fairly, we are in danger of misconceiving 
them on several accounts. As first, because 
their words may not exactly express their in- 
tentions. This may arise from the imperfection 
of language, from carelessness in the use of 
words, or from that absence of mind, which 
prevails in all men in some degree, but in some 
men in a much greater degree than in others. 
\i may arise also from the disposition which 
almost all men have to hyperbolical expres- 
sions, especially when under strong emotions 
of passion. Thus, were you to form your ex- 
pectation of the services which they would 
render to any friend, from the expressions of 
kindness which they uttered, while under the 
influence of affection towards him, you would 
often be disappointed. Or, were you to pro- 



different Subjects admit. 153 

portion your terrors to their expressions of ven- 
geance, when violently enraged, you would 
iind them much greater than they ought to be. 
Another, and perhaps a still greater danger of 
misconception, arises often from the disposition 
of the hearer to put a false, or an exaggerated 
interpretation on people's words. A wish, for 
instance, to attain a certain object, will fre- 
quently be interpreted into a design to attempt 
the attainment of it, though no such design be 
entertained by the speaker. Thus, the excla- 
mation uttered by Henry the Second, when 
vehemently agitated by the complaints of the 
excommunicated Prelates against Thomas a 
Becket, was interpreted into a desire to have 
hini assassinated. But the wish to attain an 
object, does not necessarily, or even at all 
times probably, imply an intention fo attempt 
its attainment. The mind, besides considering 
the desirableness of the object, considers also 
the means of effecting it. These are two dis- 
tinct considerations, and it often approves the 
one while it disapproves the other. I may 
wish for a splendid carriage, or a fine house; 
but when I consider the price which must be 
paid for them, and the expence at which they 
must be maintained, I may be very willing to do 
without them. Just so is it in regard 10 every 
other object. The object itself may appear 
very desirable. But when a man perceives 
h5 



154 Evidence of which (Ch.V.) 

that the means necessary to its attainment are 
unjustifiable, or dangerous, or too laborious 
or expensive, he may be, and often is, de- 
termined not to engage in any attempt to attain 
it. However distinct these considerations are, 
they are very apt to be confounded by those 
whose minds are influenced by terror, or po- 
litical animosity, or by those who are too 
sanguine in the expectation of the accomplish- 
ment of their wishes, and who, in consequence, 
promise themselves the co-operation of all, who 
approve the same ultimate object. Many of 
the French Emigrants, who have returned to 
their country are, no doubt, very desirous to 
see the Bourbons restored to the throne of their 
ancestors, and the ancient institutions of France 
re-established ; and perhaps, in the moments 
of confidence, may express that desire. But 
while they continue peaceably to submit to the 
government of Buonaparte, it would be ex- 
tremely unjust to impute to them an intention 
to attempt the attainment of these objects. It 
would, also, be rash to conclude, that they 
would be willing to expose themselves to all the 
dangers, which they must necessarily incur, 
by joining in an attempt at a counter-revo- 
lution. The disappointments complained of 
by those, who have paid their court to the 
great, have probably often arisen from this 
source. Being of a sanguine disposition, they 



different Subjects admit. 155 

have interpreted expressions of civility or 
kindness, as declarations of an intention to 
promote their interests, when no such intentions 
were entertained or meant to be expressed. 

These difficulties may, however, be generally 
overcome, if we be but willing to restrain our 
passions, to lay aside our party prejudices, 
and to interpret men's words fairly ; and if, 
instead of considering what their expressions 
mi<rht mean according to their full literal im- 
port, we consider what is their usual meaning 
under similar circumstances, or how far the 
expressions of men, under the influence of 
violent passions, usually exceed their deliberate 
intentions. ' 

It is, also, an important rule, in interpreting 
the statement of men's motives and intentions, 
to put such a construction upon them, as will 
make the whole of that statement consistent 
with itself, and with the common principles 
by which men are actuated. For, it is to 
be presumed, that men possess sufficient com- 
mon sense not to entertain contradictory in- 
tentions, or to use such means as are directly 
inconsistent with their objects. And it is 
further to be presumed of e^ch individual that 
he possesses the dispositions, and is actuated 
by the principles rvhich are common to man- 
kind. A dispute having long exist -d between 
A and £, inhabitants of the same town, A at 
h6 



1 56 Evidence of zvhich (Clu V.) 

length conceives that B is going to purchase a 
small spot of ground which A occupies ad- 
joining his house. In a conference held to 
adjust their dispute, A charges B with this 
intention, which B denies. But A appearing 
to discredit him, B endeavours to shew him, 
that he could make no other use of the ground, 
than to erect a manufacture upon it, which 
he could not erect without a vast expence, and 
which, being a nuisance to a near neighbour, 
the law would most probably compel him to 
take down again. B goes away in a great 
rage, and spreads a report that A, in order 
to bring him to his own terms in the settlement 
of their difference, threatened to buy the spot 
of ground over his head, and to drive him 
from his residence by erecting upon the 
ground a manufacture pernicious to its neigh- 
bourhood. Now, this interpretation was mani- 
festly perverse. For, when men mean to 
threaten, they do not magnify the difficulty 
of executing their threats, but on the contrary 
endeavour to make the execution of them ap- 
pear as easy as possible. But, if what A 
interpreted as a threat, be understood as a 
reason to prove that B had no intention to 
purchase the ground, all becomes consistent. 
For the expence of the undertaking, and the 
probability of its failure, are strong reasons to 
prove, that he did not harbour such a thought* 



different Subjects admit. I 57 

But men often s ate their motives and in- 
tentions deceitfully. For they frequently assign 
such reasons for their conduct as are likely 
to satisfy those whom they address, rather 
than the real motives of their actions, and 
state such intentions as are likely to be ap- 
proved, rather than their true objects. We 
must, therefore, inquire whether there be not 
some criterion by which we may distinguish 
the excuse from the true reason, and the 
plausible intention from the real object. When 
a man states his real motives, it will in general 
be found, that they influence his conduct, not 
only on the particular subject then in hand, 
but en all other subjects to which they are 
applicable. By comparing, then, his conduct 
in regard to other subjects with the prerent, 
we may often discover whether his alledged 
motive be genuine or not. But some caption 
is necessary in applying this rule. For he 
may be really influenced by the assigned 
motive on the present occasion, though on 
former occasions that influence was overcome 
by superior motives. It is, therefore, neces- 
sary to consider all the circumstances of the 
different cases, in order to discover vvhether, 
on the former occasions, any such superior 
motive did exist, which does not exist at 
present. If, however, no such superior mo- 
tive can be discovered, it is probable that 



158 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

his assigned motive is feigned. Thus, suppose 
a man allege his affection for his cousin as the 
motive of his present conduct, and yet I have 
known him prefer the interests of other persons 
to the interest of this cousin; if,, on comparing 
the cases, I find, that his cousin's competitor 
•was always a nearer relation of his, as a son, 
a brother, or a nephew, or was an old and 
beloved friend, I could not presume, that his 
regard to his cousin was a feigned motive. 
It might be the real motive, but yet on former 
occasions have been overcome by a superior 
attachment. But if, on any of those other 
occasions, he preferred the interests of an in- 
different person, or a stranger, I might, then, 
reasonably suspect the sincerity of his alleged 
motive. And further, by such a comparison 
of the different parts of a man's conduct, we 
may often discover, what the true motive most 
probably is. For, this comparison will ofien 
point out some secret motive existing at present, 
and on all the other occasions, which, though 
acting in different directions at different times, 
may account satisfactorily for the whole of his 
conduct. Thus, if a politician alhge his re- 
gard to the liberties of the people as his motive 
for opposing the minister of the day, and yet 
we have known him support a former minister, 
whose measures were equally injurious to ' -ieir 
liberties with those of the present minister, 



different Subjects admit. \59 

w r e may not only conclude his assigned motive 
to be feigned ; but, moreover, by considering 
that his interest will account satisfactorily for 
his conduct on both occasions, we may with 
probability conclude his interest to be the 
real motive on both. Or, if we hear a man 
assign his disapprobation of some particular 
parts of a certain person's conduct as his 
reason for refusing (o be connected with him, 
and yet know that he has equally connected 
himself with oiher persons, whose conduct 
was chargeable with the same fault in as great 
a degree, and likewise find on inquiry, that 
his interest was promoted both by forming 
the connexion, and by refusing to form it, we 
have good reason to presume that his true 
motive was his interest. There is a circum- 
stance, indeed, which may render such con- 
clusions fallacious. It is possible, that he 
may have changed his opinion, and that the 
difference of his conduct may have arisen from 
this change. It should, therefore, be con- 
sidered whether there be any reason to conclude 
that such a change of opinion has taken place : 
for this ought not to be presumed without 
probable evidence. We should inquire, there- 
fore, whether any event has taken place, which 
is likely to have produced the change, and 
whether his conduct upon the whole resembles 
that of a man, who has been sincerely con- 



160 Evidence of which (Ch. F.) 

vinced of his error. When a conviction is sin- 
cere, there is, generally, a frank acknowledge- 
ment of the error, and a tenderness towards 
those, who may continue to err in the some 
way. There is, also, a careful explanation 
of the grounds on which the conviction pro- 
ceeded, and a caution against exciting suspi- 
cions of insincerity. When a man's interests 
are promoted by the change, he is then pecu- 
liarly careful to prove his sincerity both by his 
explanations of his motives, and by the strict 
propriety of bis conduct. A due attention 
to these circumstances, and a due regard to 
the validity of the reasons assigned, and to 
the effect which they were likely to produce on 
the man's mind, will, in genera), lead to a 
correct decision. The chief danger of error in 
such questions, as indeed in all other questions 
of moral evidence, arises from the influence 
of our passions, interests, and prejudices, 
which prevent our paying due attention to 
experience or allowing sufficient weight to 
probability in forming our judgments. When 
Sallust tells us, that, after the Ambassadors 
of Jugurtha had bestow e e suras of money 

on the most powerful of the Roman Senators, 
so great a c place, that Jugurtha, 

from being the object of universal hatred, 
became the object of favour and regard, we do 
not hesitate to attribute this change to the 



different Subjects admit. 161 

influence of the bribes. As we have no interest 
here to blind our eyes, we acknowledge im- 
mediately the connexion between the cause and 
the effect. But if, in the present day, a man, 
who has been for many years railing* nt a par- 
ticular minister, should, on obtaining a lu- 
crative post under government, suddenly be- 
come one of his most strenuous advocates, we 
may, if we be partizans of the administration, 
be inclined to dispute, that his acquisition of 
the post was the real cause of his change. But 
to what is this inclination to be attributed, 
except to the influence of a party spirit ? Men 
do not judge in this way, when they are sin- 
cerely desirous of judging rightly. It may, 
perhaps, be contended, that it is possible the 
change of his conduct may have arisen from 
a change in his opinions. No doubt, it is 
possible. But it ought to be strongly im- 
pressed on our minds that probability, and not 
possibility, is to direct our judgment of matters 
of fact. And it is certainly very extraordinary, 
and consequently very improbable, that the 
change should have taken place at the precise 
moment when his interest required it, that no 
other reason for the change can be discovered 
to have existed, and yet that it should not 
have been produced by that interest. 

Where a man does not reveal to us his 
motives and intentions by his words, we can 



162 Evidence of which (Ch.V.) 

collect them only by inference from his con- 
duct. And, here an important question occurs : 
Whether the intentions and motives of men 
can be safely inferred from their actions? 
This is affirmed by some, but denied by others. 
It is obvious, however, that in the administra- 
tion of justice in this country, it is taken for 
granted, that they may be safely inferred; 
for, in most criminal cases, the intention con- 
stitutes the very hinge of the question of guilt 
or innocence; and, that intention must be de- 
cided upon by the jury from the conduct. 
But, if it cannot be inferred, how cnn they 
safely give a verdict? And, it should be 
observed, that stronger evidence is requisite 
for a legal decision, especially in criminal 
cases, than for an opinion in private life. 
This argument to prove, that the intentions 
maybe inferred from the actions is, indeed, only 
an u Argumentum ad vereeundiam;" but, 
when all the circumstances of the case are 
duly considered, it will appear to be as strong 
a one of the kind, as can be adduced. For, 
if the inferences had been as precarious as 
some men would have us suppose, it cannot be 
conceived but their insecurity would, in the 
constant course of practice in courts of judica- 
ture, have been long ago discovered ; and that 
all attempts of thus collecting the motives and 
intentions from the conduct would have been 



different Subjects admit. 163 

abandoned. This point may however, be 
proved from observation or experience, the 
great principle of moral evidence. For, ob- 
servation and experience will shew us that 
there are certain circumstances in a man's 
conduct, which will indicate his motives and 
intentions, however he may attempt to disguise 
them by words. And, doubtless, the most 
strenuous opposer of this doctrine, if placed 
in certain situations, where his passions were 
greatly agitated, would find that he himself 
could interpret a man's intentions by his con- 
duct. If, for instance, he were passing through 
a wood alone, in the dusk of the evening, with 
a large sum of money about him, which he 
had just received in the presence of several 
people, and should observe one of those people 
watching his approach, half concealed behind 
one of the trees, with a pistol in his hand, his 
fears would soon teach him, that the man 
intended to rob him. Or, if a person, whom 
he had greatly offended, should, with strong 
marks of rage in his countenance, seize up a 
weapon, or draw his sword, or pull out a pistol, 
he would have little doubt that he meant to kill 
him. in some few cases, passions are more 
faithful advisers than reason ; for, they some- 
times set aside the sophistries with which 
interest or prejudice had deluded us. There 
cm be as little doubt that a man, who, with 



164 Evidence of ichich (Ck. VJ 

weapons concealed about him, waits for his 
enemy, or industriously seeks him out, and 
kills him, was actuated by malice prepense. 
It will be said, perhaps, that these are strong 
cases. But, if these be admitted, it must 
then be acknowledged, that there are cases 
in which the motives and intentions may be 
inferred by the actions: and the only question 
then will be, under what circumstances, and 
how far the indications of the conduct can 
be trusted. If observation and experience be 
fairly consulted, it will be found , that their 
information is not confined to such cases as 
those above-mentioned. By comparing the 
conduct of men, known to be actuated by 
certain motives or intentions, with that of 
others not so actuated ; or, by reflecting on 
our own conduct, when we were under similar 
influences, we shall discover marks which may 
be safely trusted ; and to which we can scarcely 
help attending when we are not interested to 
the contrary. In the application of these 
marks, we reason by analogy. Here again, 
it may be said, that no indications, learnt 
from experience, can afford us a certain know- 
ledge of motives and intentions. But it may 
be replied as before, that human affairs do not 
admit of cert'dinty^ but of probability only; 
and that the probability here is often as great 
as the events of life usually afford. 



different Subjects admit. 1GS 

When experience teaches us, that the same 
marks in the conduct may arise from two 
different motives, there, we cannot safely infer 
from those marks, which of them exists; but, 
must determine this from other circumstances. 
Thus, in the application of the old maxim, 
€i He confesses the fault who avoids the trial," 
there is often great danger of error; for a man 
may avoid the trial from another motive, 
besides consciousness of guilt ; as because he 
is convinced that such is the temper of the 
times, or such the character of his judges, that 
he cannot obtain impartial justice. For, there 
have been times in which to be brought to 
trial, whether guilty or not, was almost a 
certain prelude to being convicted. It was 
so in the famous circuit of Judge Jefferies^ 
and during the reign of Robespiere. 



The knowledge of human nature, u e. a 
knowledge of the dispositions and characters of 
men, of their capacities, of the confidence 
which may be safely placed in them, or the ex- 
pectations which may be formed of them in 
certain circumstances, though it admits of per- 
sonal observation, and the observation of others, 
is yet usually grounded on general notoriety. 
Few men, comparatively, possess sufficient dis- 



166 Evidence of which (Ch. F.) 

crimination, or are sufficiently attentive, to at- 
tain it for themselves. The greater part have 
not even learnt it from these who have attained 
it by their own observation, but acquire what 
they possess of it, from the maxims which pass 
eurrent in the world. 



Our transactions wkh men are regulated 
much by their characters, (for which charac- 
ters we have, often, no other ground limn ge- 
neral opinion,) and much, perhaps most, by 
confidence. We purchase and consume arti- 
cles of food and medicine, of which we are not 
sufficient judges to know, that they have not 
been adulterated by ingredients of a pernicious 
nature. Yet we know, that the articles, with 
which they might be adulterated, are often so 
inferior in value as to render adulteration pro- 
fitable; that many tradesmen are not so deli- 
cate, as to refrain from adulteration, when it is 
profitable : that it is easily practised, and in 
each particular case, not likely to be detected. 
On the other hand, we trust, that though arti- 
cles be often so adulterated, as to render them 
less salutary, or even injurious, yet it is only 
in a slight degree ; that scaicely any man would 
be so w i eked, as to render them absolutely de- 
structive: that the practice could not be often 



different Subjects admit. 1G7 

repeated, without being suspected, and perhaps, 
detected ; that the discovery would be attended 
with infamy and ruin. More than all this, we 
see others buy and consume these articles, 
without suffering material injury ; nay, we our- 
selves have been accustomed so to do, from a 
period prior to that in which we were able to 
reason on the subject; and yet, have felt no 
harm. We, therefore, persist in doing it, with- 
out fearing any. Thus, in cases where our 
health, and even our lives are at stake, we act 
on a confidence, built on a sort of general ex- 
perience, without any positive evidence, arising 
from testimony, or our own skill. It may be 
said, that we do this, because it is the less of 
two evils: for, no man could provide all his 
food, and prepare it himself, or wait till he 
had ascertained that it was innocent before he 
would eat it ; if, therefore, he did not act on 
this confidence, he must starve. But, I an- 
swer, that we act thus in many cises not to 
preserve life, but merely to gratify ur palate; 
And, in acting on this principle of confidence, 
we act reasonably. For, though instances of 
people's being injured, or even poisoned, oc- 
cur; jet, in comparison with the instances in 
which they thus trust to others with saf t , 
they are as nothing. Hence, it appears, ihat 
the probability of our security in so doing, im- 
mensely exceeds the probability of injury. 



163 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

And, this is as good evidence as human life 
admits; absolute certainty being unattainable. 
On this principle, too, we trust our lives in the 
hands of physicians and apothecaries, and often 
without any direct evidence of their skill or in- 
tegrity. So also we trust our fortunes in the 
hands of attornies, and a considerable part of 
our property in the hands of our servants. 
And, from this last circumstance, a confirma- 
tion, that this principle of confidence is regu- 
lated by experience, may be drawn. For, 
those articles of our property, which we know, 
either from our own observation, or the expe- 
rience of others, that servants are likely to pur- 
loin, we secure from them; while we leave 
open to them those which we know, by expe- 
rience, they are not likely to plunder. It is, 
also, on the same principle, (though the remark 
may not be exactly in its place,) that they are 
to be vindicated from the charge of imprudence, 
who venture themselves at sea, or even on 
horseback, or in a carriage. Accidents in all 
these do occur; yet, they are not frequent 
enough to render the practice imprudent. If 
the instances in which they occurred, bore a 
large proportion to those in which they do not, 
it would be imprudent thus to expose ourselves 
to danger, without a strong necessity. 



different Subjects admit. Y$% 

Of transient facts or events which we did not 
sec, the proper evidence is testimony. If they 
be recent, personal witnesses of them may be 
produced; and then they may be established 
by viva voce testimony. But, if they be of a 
greater date, we must be content with the evi- 
dence of written testimony. In some cases, the 
testimony of a fact long past, may be confirmed 
by an observation of present circumstances. 
Thus, the deluge is confirmed by layers of sea- 
shells, which are found in high situations, at a 
distance from the sea, and deep in the earth. 
Volcanoes admit of confirmation from the lava 
and ashes. That certain large cities have 
existed and been destroyed, may be confirmed 
by the ruins which still remain. That camps 
have been pitched, and battles fought in par- 
ticular places, may be confirmed by the ap- 
pearance of the ground, and by the bones which 
are still found there. Some events admit of a 
confirmation by other writings, either public or 
private ; besides the history in which they are 
mentioned, and from which our first informa- 
tion of them was obtained. The weight of this 
confirmation varies, according to the nature 
of these writings. Public records are of the 
highest authority. Deeds, bonds, receipts, are 
of undoubted weight, especially if the hand- 
writing of the parties, who executed or wit* 
nessed them, can be ascertained* But, thea, 
i 



170 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

these confirmations are rarely obtained; and, 
therefore, such events are generally believed 
on no higher evidence than written testimony. 
They are most frequently believed, on even 
lower evidence than this. For, written testi- 
mony is properly the evidence of a person, 
who himself observed the events, which he 
relates. But, such evidence can seldom be 
had* For, most events which have been long 
past, we must be content with a testimony, 
which has passed through several hands, before 
it reached us; and, very rarely can we ascer- 
tain the channel through which it came ; for, 
we can seldom learn how the writer became 
acquainted with the events which he relates. 
And, even this degree of evidence is not pos- 
sessed by most men, who yet believe the event; 
for, they have never read the works of the ori- 
ginal writer, in which they are recorded ; but, 
have obtained their information from a mere 
compilation* 



When a recent event becomes the subject of 
examination in a court of judicature, it admits 
of the highest evidence which testimony can 
afford. For, the witnesses are then sworn to 
speak the whole truth, and nothing but the 
iruth. They give their evidence in the face of 



different Subjects admit. 171 

the Court. They are cross-examined by the 
counsel of the adverse party, who are qualified, 
by long practice, to detect deceptions, and dis- 
cover the truth. The authenticity also of every 
paper brought in evidence, may be examined* 
and the force of its proof fully established. 
When a fact of an older date becomes the sub- 
ject of a law-suit, the only evidence of which 
it can admit, are written memorials. For in- 
stance, when the title of an estate is called in 
question, deeds are capable of being produced 
in evidence. But, as the parties who executed 
them, and the witnesses to their execution have 
been long dead, the hand-writing of neither of 
them can be proved ; and therefore, the authen- 
ticity of the deed can be proved only by the 
appearance of its antiquity. Where the right 
is claimed by descent; it admits of being proved 
by parish registers^ and sometimes by sepul- 
chral monuments ; or, in some cases, by records 
in the herald's office ; or, perhaps, by family 
registers ; all of which are of great authority. 
Possession, added to either of these, is deemed 
satisfactory. 



Recent public events, such as battles, sieges P 
&c. admit of the evidence of gazettes, and of 
general notoriety. These gazettes come to the 
i2 



17$ Evidence of which (Ch.V.) 

public under the authority of Ministers of State ; 
and the credit due to them must be regulated 
by the judgment which is formed of the ability 
of the Ministers to know the fact, and their 
disposition to communicate it fairly. In re- 
spect to the former, their information is con- 
veyed officially by those who are personally ac- 
quainted with the facts, who are responsible for 
conveying the truth, and act under a convic- 
tion, that they will probably be detected, and 
punished, if they attempt to deceive. As to 
this point, therefore, there can be no reasonable 
doubt. In respect to the latter, the judgment 
should be formed by experience. If, on a fair 
investigation, it appears, that persons in their 
stations have been accustomed to give correct 
information to the public on such subjects, it 
is then entitled to credit, but not otherwise. 



Of the evidence of which History admits. 

Though many historic facts resemble those, 
which have been already mentioned, in the evi- 
dence by which they are supported ; yet the im- 
portance of history renders it worthy of a sepa- 
rate discussion, especially as its credibility has 
been disputed in almost unqualified terms. * So 

* It is to be regretted, that the objections to the credibility of 
history, are not proposed with more caution and precision, than 
they usually are. From the unqualified term* in which they are 



different Subjects admit. 173 

far as any historian relates only such facts, as he 
himself observed, the evidence is of the same 
kind with written testimony ; only, as politics 
are more likely to warp the judgment, than al- 
most any other subject, extraordinary caution 
may be necessary in giving credit to his rela- 
tions. No historian, however, relates only such 
facts as lie observed himself; for, though some 
may say of their subject, " quorum pars 
i( magna fui," they must mention many things 
which they neither did, nor saw, nor heard, 
but which they learned from others; and in- 
deed, such facts must generally, if not always, 
make up the greater part of their history. For 
these, their evidence is only testimony, that 
what they relate, is the judgment which they 
have formed from the use of the means which 
they possessed. Before we can tell, therefore, 
what degree of reliance is to be placed on their 
accounts, we must enquire what means of in- 
formation they can possess. These will differ, 
according to the nature of the facts, and the 
circumstances of the historian. If the facts be 
of a public nature, their truth is generally 

often urged, all historic evidence seems in danger of being called 
in question. Of the extent of the mischief likely to result from 
such statements, their proposers are little aware. They do not 
consider, how great a part of the evidence of revealed religion, is 
of the nature of historic evidence; and, therefore, what would 
be its fate, if that species of evidence should be regarded as un- 
worthy of credit? " Jt is obvious," says Bishop Butler, " that 
fi Christianity, and the proof of it, are'both historical. " Ana- 
logy, part ii. chap. 8. 

i3 



174 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

capable of being ascertained with ease. By 
public facts, I mean such as Ministers of State 
either wish to be publicly known, or, at least, 
have no desire to conceal. For these, the his- 
torian has generally the evidence of procla- 
mations, gazettes, or other public papers, or 
general notoriety. And, as the publicity of 
such facts exposes every account of them to 
animadversion, and to correction, if they be at 
all erroneous, a just view of them may be easily 
attained. This is especially the case, if the 
historian resides in the country of which he 
writes ; but it holds also to a considerable de- 
gree, when he does not; for so great an inter- 
course prevails between the different nations of 
Europe, especially in the time of peace, that, 
what is publicly known in one, soon becomes 
known in others. As to such public facts, 
therefore, historians are entitled to full credit, 
so far as relates to their means of information. 
The same publicity of the facts which they 
record, secures also their fidelity in relating 
them, as it exposes them to detection and 
shame, if they endeavour to deceive. 

The only difficulty, therefore, relates to facts 
of a secret nature, such as the intrigues of 
courts, and of parties, debates, and resolutions 
of Privy Councils, motives for peace or war, 
secret alliances, and secret* articles in treaties, 

* These secret articles are often, perhaps generally, revealed 
fey the circumstances which time discloses. 



different Subjects admit. 175 

corruption of public officers, or of popular 
leaders, &c. Of such facts, positive and direct 
evidence of testimony can very rarely be ob- 
tained, till a length of time has elapsed. The 
only information, therefore, which a contem- 
porary historian can obtain of them, must be by 
remote testimony, report, or inference, drawn 
from such facts as are of a more public nature. 
It sometimes happens, that some of the parties 
concerned, have revealed them in confidence 
to their friends, and they again, still in confi- 
dence, to their friends ; till at length they have 
become known to numbers. If the historian 
be of the higher ranks of life, he often becomes 
thus acquainted with these secret facts, either 
by remote testimony, or credible report, if not 
by a general notoriety within the higher circles. 
And, even an historian of inferior rank mav 
become thus acquainted with them ; for, in the 
present state of society, there is such an inter- 
course between the different ranks, that what 
is known in one, is soon known in all. When 
none of the parties have themselves betrayed 
the secret, information may have been obtained 
from secretaries or clerks, to whom much must 
necessarily be revealed to carry the plans into 
execution. And when the facts are likely to 
have great influence on the public funds, it is 
probable, tJiat persons so much interested in 
knowing them, as stock-jobbers are, and so able 
li 



* 76 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

to pay largely for information, will not fail of 
obtaining it. If, however, nothing transpires 
in either of these ways, there remain only 
inferences from more public facts. These, it 
must be admitted, do not afford such satisfac- 
tory evidence, as the more direct sources of in- 
formation; but, it may be doubted, whether 
they do not furnish a better ground for our 
judgment, than politicians are willing to allow, 
at least when they are used against themselves, 
or their partizans. An attentive study of hu- 
man nature; an accurate observation of tire 
conduct of men under certain circumstances, 
or influenced by certain views and motives ; a 
careful application of the knowledge, thus ac- 
quired, to particular cases as they occur; to- 
gether with a comparison of the different parts 
of the conduct of the men in question, to dis- 
cover their general objects ; and a due consi- 
deration of their circumstances, will enable a 
man of judgment and penetration to form a 
tolerably just opinion of many of these secret 
facts. And, if the light, which subsequent 
facts throw upon the question, be properly ap- 
plied, that judgment may be corrected or con- 
firmed. The historian may also, in forming his 
judgment, avail himself of the assistance of 
politicians of the opposite party, whose abili- 
ties and skill in politics qualify them to draw 
their inferences more correctly than other men. 



different Subjects admit. 177 

Opinions, thus formed, will, however, be more 
true in generals, than in particulars. Thus, it 
may be safely inferred, that disgust has been 
taken, when the particular occasion may be un- 
known. We may conclude, that a certain 
resolution has been adopted, when we know 
neither the reasons on which it was founded, 
nor the parties who supported or opposed it. 
Or, we may infer, that a particular man has 
been corrupted, when we are ignorant of the 
nature of the bribe, or the channel through 
which it was conveyed. They who endeavour 
to discredit all historical information founded 
upon inference, have, probably, been indis- 
posed to give it sufficient credit for its correct- 
ness in generals, on account of their disgust 
with its errors in particulars.* After all, how- 
ever, the assent which is due to those facts of 
history, which rest on such evidence, is lower 
than that, which should be given to such as are 
of a more public nature. 

In respect to public facts, a contemporary 
historian has some advantages over one who 
records events, which happened long ago. 
For, he is likely to have a clearer view of the 

* If a man wish to obtain satisfactory ground for the decision 
of this question, let him collect the opinions which have, from 
time to time, been entertained of secret facts, and compare them 
with the information which has since been obtained of their re- 
spective subjects ; as, for instance, the opinions which were en- 
tertained of Charles the Second, and his Ministers, should be . 
compared with the information furnished by Sir John Dalry.rjw . 
pie'* Memoirs. 

i5 



178 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

connexion of causes and effects, and a more 
extensive knowledge of circumstances, as far 
as they are generally known. He has, also, 
greater opportunities of gaining information 
from others who may be more fully acquainted 
with any particular circumstances than he is. 
But, in respect to secret facte, he, w 'ho writes 
the history of a period some time past, has the 
advantage. For, the private letters and papers 
which are in the cabinets of princes, and in the 
hands of private families, are often, after a time, 
made public ; and, then the secret transactions 
and motives of politicians are ascertained. — 
Thus, the papers contained in the Memoirs 
published by Sir J. Dalrymple, have thrown 
considerable light on the Histories of Charles 
the 2d. James the Sd. and William the 3d. 
Added to this, he is generally able to form a 
more correct judgment of the evidence on 
which the facts are founded, as well as of the 
nature of the facts themselves, than a man who 
writes while party prejudices still prevail.* 



The evidence of memoirs, written by persons 
who had a considerable share in the trans- 

* Many persons may be able to estimate the magnitude of this 
advantage, bv considering how different were their views of po- 
litical transactions, when they took, place; from what they have 
sioce formed on an impartial review of them, or on reading tht 
hiitory of them. 



different Subjects admit. 179 

actions which they relate, has been considered 
as superior to that of history; and, no doubt 
it is so, in many respects; but the preference 
which has been given to it, seems too unqua- 
lified. Such a writer must, of course, be better 
acquainted with facts, circumstances, and cha- 
racters, than a private historian can be. For, 
he must have better means of information of the 
proceedings of his own court, and of others, of 
the circumstances under which treaties were 
made, and of the secret articles annexed to 
them. He knows the conferences and councils 
of his own party, and the professed views of 
its members ; but, their real views he can learn 
only by inference, as well as others. The views 
and councils of his opponents can be known to 
him only by testimony or inference. And, the 
testimony, which he can obtain of them, must 
be more or less suspicious, being that of spies 
and traitors to their party, persons who have 
often an interest in deceiving him. But, what- 
ever advantages he may possess, great allow- 
ance ought to be made for the influence of 
prejudice in forming his judgments, and of par- 
tiality in relating them. For, as he had a large 
share in the transactions which he records, he 
must be considered as a man pleading his own 
cause. Hence, we should be as cautious in 
giving credit to hi* relations, as we are to per- 
sons in private life, who state to us their own 
16 



ISO Evidence of ukich (Ch. V.) 

case. And, indeed, if the conduct of poli- 
ticians be fairly considered, it will, probably, 
appear that a more than ordinary caution is re- 
quisite in believing their statements. The evi- 
dence of a mere observer, an impartial person, 
so far as he possesses the means of information, 
is decidedly more safe, than of one concerned 
in the transactions, and interested in the judg- 
ment of mankind respecting them. This de- 
tracts more from the evidence of memoirs, than 
their advocates are willing to allow. 



The history of remote periods, admits of 
the evidence of contemporary historians, of 
public records, and public account-books, and 
occasionally of public monuments. Sometimes 
it admits of the evidence of historians, who 
ivrote subsequent to the period described, and 
who had the use of materials which have long 
since perished. Often, however, it admits of 
no other evidence than tradition; and that 
tradition so corrupted, by the desire which 
every nation has to aggrandize its origin, that 
the truth can scarcely be separated from the 
falsehood. 



different Subjects admit. 181 

The evidence of Parliamentary Reports is 
also of the nature of written testimony ; for 
they are composed by persons who heard the 
debates, and purport to be the substance of 
what they heard. As to the possibility of a 
man's giving, from memory, a tolerably accu- 
rate account of the debates which he has heard, 
it is a well-known fact. And, as to the proba- 
bility of finding persons capable of doing it, no 
reasonable doubt can be entertained; because 
many men who have taken due pains to acquire 
an ability to do it, have succeeded. And, that 
the persons employed in reporting these debates 
are capable of doing it with tolerable accuracy, 
is highly probable ; since they would not other- 
wise be continued in that employment. It is, 
indeed, possible, that some questions may be 
discussed in parliament, or some arguments 
urged, which they may not be able to compre- 
hend ; and these they would be likely to mis- 
represent. But, this cannot happen often ; for 
the questions which are usually discussed there, 
and the arguments which are urged, are gene- 
rally level to the capacity of a man of ordinary 
education ; or, indeed, they would not be 
suited to their purpose. Besides, by being the 
subjects of frequent conversation, they are al- 
together within the reach of the Reporters. 
Their partiality is, therefore, the principal cir- 
cumstance, which can render their account sus- 



182 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

picious. It is said, however, that this does not 
extend to misrepresentation, but only to the 
passing over the arguments of their political 
opponents too slightly, or almost omitting 
their speeches, while they give those of their 
own party at length. And this view of the case 
is highly probable. Because, if palpable mis- 
representations were made, as they would easily 
admit of correction, so, no doubt, they would 
be corrected, on account of the interest and the 
power of those members, whose speeches were 
misrepresented, to vindicate their own charac- 
ters. Besides, if misrepresentations were ma- 
terial and frequent, as they must be known, it 
is not to be conceived that the houses of parlia- 
ment would suffer their debates to be published ; 
or that they would continue to be read with 
that attention and belief which they certainly 
obtain. It is remarkable too, that not only the 
public give credit to them, but even the prin- 
cipal speakers themselves consult the volumes 
of debates, when questions are coming on 
which have been discussed before, in order to 
see the arguments which were then urged by 
the respective speakers.* 

* This question has lately been examined by Mr. Coxe, in his 
Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, under favourable circumstances, 
for an accurate decision. After a careful comparison of the de- 
bates, published during the period of which he writes, and the 
notes which had been written by Members of Parliament, toge- 
ther with other direct evidence on the question, he decides the 
point iu favour of the authenticity of the debates. 



different Subjects adn 183 

It should be observed, however, that he who 
wishes to form a just view of the debates from 
the newspapers, ought to read a paper of eacli 
party ; for then he would see in one, what was 
omitted, from party motives, by the other. 



On what evidence can the authenticity of 
Books be established ? We very seldom attain 
direct and immediate testimony for this point : 
I. e. we rarely hear the author say, that he 
-wrote the book in question. If we are informed 
by a person who did hear him make such a 
declaration, we have then the testimony only 
at second hand. But, we have seldom even 
this evidence. Indeed, it rarely happens that 
we can trace through two, three, or more 
steps, or even trace at all, the testimony to this 
fact; and therefore, we usually believe it only 
on general notoriety, or even report. If the 
book bear on its title-page, the name of a living 
author, it may generally be believed to be his; 
because, if any credit be obtained by it, it is 
improbable that the real author would give the 
merit of his performance to another ; and, if 
any disgrace be incurred by it, the reputed 
author would, probably, disavow it publicly; 
and, perhaps, seek a legal remedy for the in- 
jury. Yet, if report is to be believed, books 



184 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

have been published, not only with fictitious 
names, but even with the names of living 
persons, who, yet never wrote them, but sold 
to the booksellers the liberty of using their 
names. This practice, however, is supposed 
to be confined to booksellers of a certain de- 
scription ; and therefore, it does not lessen the 
belief, that other booksellers do fairly give to 
the public the real names of the authors, whose 
books they publish. When a book is anony- 
mous, the only ground, in general, for im- 
puting it to a certain author, is report. If 
this report be credited by men reputed intelli- 
gent in things of this kind; if the reputed 
author be supposed capable of writing the book, 
(for which capacity there is often no other evi- 
dence than report,) if the report be contradicted 
by nobody, it may generally be safely believed. 
Sometimes, top, the style of the work, the me- 
thod of treating the subject, and the sentiments 
enforced, will afford to some persons a probable 
ground of attributing the book to a certain 
author. But this supposes those persons to be 
acquainted with other works of that author, and 
with his sentiments on that subject, or others 
nearly allied to it ; and moreover, that they 
possess considerable judgment in composition. 
Of course, this mode of ascertaining the author 
of a book, must be confined to few people. 
In such cases ; and many others of a similar 



different Subjects admit. 185 

kind, the report is some evidence on one side, 
which there is nothing on the other to counter- 
balance. Consequently, the preponderancy 
of the evidence is on the side of the report, 
and should produce some degree of assent. 

The evidence for the authenticity of ancient 
books is rather different, and seems to be of the 
following kinds. First, that, so far as we can 
learn, the book is generally believed to have 
been written by the person whose name it 
bears; secondly, that it is imputed to him 
in books, supposed to have been written at, or 
near the time, when the reputed author is said 
to have lived. It is observable, that this is 
supporting one presumption by another; for, 
it may be asked, how do you know that the 
authors, whose testimony you cite, did live at 
that time, and write the books, which you 
impute to them ? The coincidence, however, 
of several presumptions, provided they be 
independent of each other, does afford \cry 
considerable probability. Thirdly, that so far 
as we can learn, it has never been disputed to 
be the work of the reputed author. It is pre- 
sumed here, that if it had been disputed, some 
record of that circumstance would have come 
down to us. Or, fourthly, that if it ever 
were disputed, its pretensions were examined, 
and yet it still continued to be attributed to the 
same author. This affords coasiderable con- 



186 Evidence of which (Ch. V.) 

firmation, and the nearer the time of its 
examination was to its supposed publication, 
the greater is that confirmation. Fifthly, that 
the internal evidence of the book agrees with 
the correctest ideas, which we can form, of 
the reputed author, and of the time and place, 
when and where he is said to have written it ; 
at least, that no incongruity appears, either in 
style, or in any other circumstance. For, 
a consistency in all the various circumstances 
of style, opinions, manners, customs, forms 
of government, persons, geography, &c. afford 
a strong presumption, that a work is genuine. 
Because, it is highly improbable, that an 
author should have so thoroughly acquainted 
himself with all these circumstances of the 
time and place, in which he would have his 
spurious book be supposed to have been writ- 
ten, and keep them so constanly in his mind, 
as never to make any one mistake, capable of 
being detected by the learned ; and, at the 
same.time, avoid the introduction of any cir- 
cumstance of more modern times, with which 
his mind is so much more familiar. It may, 
indeed, be physically possible to do this ; but 
it is certainly highly improbable. And it 
should always be recollected, that our opinions 
of human affairs are to be regulated, not by 
physical possibilities, but by probabilities. 
Experience shews, that whatever abilities may 



different Subjects admit. 1 87 

be displayed in delusions, yet there is almost 
always some unguarded circumstance, which 
exposes them to detection. We find this in 
cases comparatively simple; and therefore, 
may more reasonably expect it in so com- 
plicated a case, as that before us. 



Of what evidence do Miracles admit ? 

A miracle is an event, which happens con- 
trary to the established course of nature. To 
an eye-witness, a miracle admits of the evi- 
dence of sense* The witness, however, must 
be supposed to be acquainted with the course 
of nature, so as to be able to judge, that the 
event in question is contrary thereto. In re- 
gard to the miracles recorded in scripture, 
this cannot be doubted. For no man of ordi- 
nary understanding, could be incapable of 
ascertaining, that the event was contrary to 
the established course of nature, when diseases 
were healed by a word, when sight was im- 
parted to the blind, hearing to the deaf, the 
powers of speech to the dumb, merely at 
command, and without the use of any other 
means ; especially when a corpse, which had 
begun to putrify, was restored to life by the 
speaking of a word. 
To other men, miracles, like other events^ 



188 Evidence of which (Ch. T.) 

admit of the evidence of testimony. As we 
cannot doubt the competency of the witnesses 
to ascertain the facts, their credibility is the 
only point to be considered ; and this must be 
determined upon the principles, on which the 
credibility of testimony, in general, depends. 
An objection, however, has been brought 
against the credibility of miracles, which 
merits particular notice. The objection in 
substance is, that a miracle being a violation of 
the laws of nature, which universal experience 
has proved to be invariable, its improbability 
cannot be surmounted by any human testimony 
whatever; because it is more probable, that 
that testimony should be false, than that a 
constant law of nature should have been vio- 
lated. The evidence, which we have for the 
existence of a law of nature, and for the 
application of that law to particular cases, has 
been mentioned before. It was then observed, 
that, as the constancy of these laws depends 
entirely on the will of God, so no argument 
from that constancy can be of any weight, 
when there is reason to conclude that it is his 
will, that they should be suspended or altered. 
This observation would, of course, be denied 
by a man who holds, that the course of nature 
is governed by a principle of necessity, inde- 
pendently of the will, or agency of God. 
But, he who holds that God governs the 



different Subjects admit. 18f 

world, will admit the observation. With him, 
therefore, the only question would be, whether 
any occasion can arise, which, it may rea- 
sonably be concluded, would induce God to 
alter or suspend any of the constant operations 
of nature. And, if it can be shewn that such 
occasions may arise, all the objections from 
the most constant course -of nature, would 
be of no real weight ; their sound would then 
be more formidable than their meaning. This 
latter question must be determined by argu- 
ments of a different kind from the constant 
experience of natural things. It should then 
be inquired, whether it can be presumed, that 
any occasion can occur, in which it may be 
important that God should reveal his will 
to men, to correct their mistakes, to reform 
their vices, or to give them any new instruction . 
The view, which will be entertained of the pro- 
bability of the existence of such an occasion, 
and of its importance, will depend on the judg- 
ment which has been formed of the moral state 
of mankind, and of the happiness or misery 
which may await men in the next world. If it 
be admitted, that such occasions may occur, 
it should then be enquired, how such a revela- 
tion can be made, so as to excite the attention 
of men, and warrant their reception of it as 
from God. Now, in what other way, dis- 
coverable by us, can this be done, than by ac- 



190 Evidence of which (Ch. F.) 

company ing it with miracles ? Hence, miracles 
may be expected to attend a divine revelation. 
Consequently, they are not events so impro- 
bable, as to surmount the evidence of testi- 
moiy, if that testimony be in itself unex- 
ceptionable. 



On a review of this chapter, it will probably 
appear surprizing, on how small evidence most 
subjects are believed. This is mentioned, not 
to excite or encourage scepticism, nor should 
it have that effect. For if experience shews, 
that the instances in which we are deceived by 
believing on this evidence, small as it may be, 
bear an inconsiderable proportion to those in 
which we decide rightly by it, it has a just 
claim on our assent. For, experience must be 
the only criterion of the safety or danger of the 
practice. This review will, also, shew the in- 
consistency of refusing to believe certain things, 
which, perhaps, interest, or a regard to party, 
may incline us to reject, because stronger evi- 
dence is not brought for them, than in the 
nature of the thing they admit; while we 
are in the constant practice of believing so 
many other things, and those often of very 
great importance, on such slight evidence. 
It should be impressed on our minds, that, 



different Subjects admit. 191 

though we ilo rightly in requiring the strongest 
evidence which the subject can afford; yet, 
it is our du v y to be satisfied with the strongest 
of which, under all its circumstances, it 
admits. 



CONCLUSION. 



A 



Few remarks shall conclude this tract. 

1. From the whole of this work it will ap- 
pear, that experience is the great test of pro- 
bability, and the grand principle on which all 
moral reasoning must proceed, either in the 
attainment of knowledge, or in the regulation 
of practice. But then, it should be observed, 
that experience furnishes only the materials of 
knowledge ; and, that great skill is necessary 
to make a proper use of them. The object of 
this tract is to facilitate the acquirement of that 
skill, by shewing how our observations are 
to be conducted in attaining a knowledge of 
things ; and, how experience is to be employed 
in determining the probability of events, and 
in regulating our credit in the testimony and 
observations of others. 

2. As experience ought to be the foundation 
of all our judgments of what is probable, we 
cannot learn to reason correctly on subjects 



192 Evidence of uhich (Ch.r.j 

which admit of moral evidence so early in life, 
as on those which admit of demonstration ; be- 
cause, a considerable time must have elapsed, 
before we are furnished with proper materials 
to form our judgments. Hence arises the neces- 
sity of submitting to the judgment of those of 
our elders, who have no interest but in our wel- 
fare. And, hence, young men, even of great 
abilities, both natural and acquired, who re- 
ject the counsel of their seniors, often make 
such serious mistakes, as lay the foundation of 
bitter, but unavailing repentance. An indis- 
position to avail ourselves of the experience 
of others is, probably, one of the principal 
causes of the miseries of human life. 

3. It should be remembered, that errors in 
judgment on practical questions, are not inno- 
cent, unless they are inevitable. For, we have 
received our talents from our Creator for the 
direction of our conduct, and are responsible 
to him for a fair use of them. But, we do not 
use them fairly, when we assume the liberty of 
forming our judgments according to our incli- 
nations, or present interests ; when w r e neglect 
or pervert those rules for distinguishing truth 
from error, which are established on the general 
experience of mankind ; or, when w r e implicitly 
adopt the opinions, or follow the advice of 
those, who are as uninformed as we are, or are 
interested to deceive us. We can never, 



Conclusion. 193 

indeed, be said to use them fairly, unless we 
improve the opportunities which we enjoy, 
to prepare our minds for a just decision of 
practical questions; and, when we proceed to 
decide them, apply fairly and steadily those 
principles of reasoning, which alone can con- 
duct us to a right conclusion. 

4. Lastly, the soundest principles of mora- 
lity are of little use, without a just application 
oi them ; and to apply them justly, it is neces- 
sary to form an accurate view of facts and 
circumstances. Such a view we cannot form, 
without a competent knowledge, and a fair ap- 
plication of the principles of moral evidence. 
But, if a man be ignorant of these principles, 
or, if knowing them, he neglect or pervert 
them, so as to give credit to mere assertions; or 
exparte evidence on one side, while he with- 
holds his assent from the strongest, evidence 
which the nature of the subject admits, on the 
other; if, like a disputant for victory, and 
not an enquirer after truth, he allow himself to 
dispute, or explain away, maxims founded 
on general observation, or notorious truths, 
merely on account of the difficulty which 
there must always be of collecting compulsive 
proof of them, the best moral principles will 
not preserve him from a conduct injurious to 
society, and the more injurious, in proportion 
to the weight of his character. 

K 



( 1M ) 

APPENDIX. 

On disputing for Victory, and not for Truth. 

VV HENEV"ER a man engages in a debate, 
without proposing to himself the establishment 
of soi^ie point, which he really believes to be 
true; or, whenever he attempts to prove that 
some truth is an error, or some error is true, he 
is disputing for victory and not for truth. 
Sometimes, men contend in order to obtain the 
reputation of able disputants. On other oc- 
casions, victory is only a means, but the sup- 
port or defence of a party* is the ultimate end 
proposed, in both cases, truth is equally dis- 
regarded, and the powers of reason equally 
perverted. The methods, also, which are used 
in both, are nearly the same. A few of the 
most common of these methods, it may be 
useful to enumerate. All of them it would 
be scarcely possible to mention : because, every 
sophism, which is capable of being employed 
on the subject in question, is occasionally 

* This is most likely to happen, when parties run high ; and 
therefore, it often happens on the commencement or a war. 
Hance, Dr. Johnson sa\s, " Among the calamities of vya*, may 
" be justly numbered "the diminution of (he love of truth, by 
" the falsehoods which interest dictates, and credulity encou- 
" rages." Idler, vol. i. page 169. 



Appendix. 195 

resorted to by these disputants. But, a brief 
description of a few may be useful, both to 
shew more clearly the nature of the practice) 
and to put the reader upon his guard against 
its delusions. 

Disputants for victory, and not for truth, 
often deny such of their opponent's positions 
as, though true, do not admit of specific proof. 
Of this kind are those, which are founded on 
observation or experience, or general notoriety. 
They dispute facts, which they do not dis- 
believe, and take the chance 'of their op- 
ponent's not being furnished with positive proof 
of them. They explain away those maxims, 
which are founded on the general experience of 
mankind, and are delivered in proverbial ex- 
pressions. They demand a species, or degree 
of proof, of which the subject does not admit. 
Thus, on practical questions, they dispute 
^ nclusions proved by strong probable argii- 
• ■>, and withhold their assent, because they 
<^c be demonstrated. On the other hand, 
they require possibilities to be admitted by 
their opponent, in opposition to strong proba- 
bilities. They demand the admission of mere 
cxparte evidence, and that, often of a very 
suspicious kind, in their favour; while they 
reject legitimate evidence on the subject against 
them. They lay hold of an occasional word, 
dropped by their opponent, either to divert 
k2 



196 Appendix. 

the discussion from the subject in question, 
or to give a false sense to an argument. They 
cite their opponent's words unfairly, or give 
them a different meaning from what he in- 
tended by them. They endeavour to evade the 
question, by substituting some other question 
instead of it. They avail themselves of a 
mistake in some of the circumstances of a 
fact, to make the whole of it appear false, 
though the substance of the statement be true. 
They endeavour to confound the principles, 
either of evidence, or of morality, on which 
the decision of the question must depend. 
In a word, they shew, that they consider 
themselves entitled to take every advantage, 
however unfair, to establish their cause. Such 
disputants must, of course, have a great ad- 
vantage over a fair and honest reasoner, whose 
only object is to discover and establish the 
truth. For he cannot allow himself to take 
any unfair advantage, or to use any methods 
which would be likely to mislead. It would 
be inconsistent with the end, which he pro- 
poses to himself, to urge any argument or 
objection, which he does not believe to be well 
founded ; or to give it greater weight than, 
in his judgment, it really deserves. He would 
rather, even supply any defect which he might 
perceive in his opponent's statement of facts 
or arguments, whereby they had less force 



Appendip. 197 

than they ought to have, that he might con- 
tribute all in his power to a right decision 
of Hie question. Which of these characters is 
the more honourable and useful, cannot be 
doubted. But it is not sufficient to say, that 
disputing for victory is not so honourable or 
useful, as fairly enquiring after truth. It may 
further be shewn, that the practice is immoral. 
The powers of reason and speech are given 
to men for the attainment and communication 
of truth; and are perverted when they are 
used to deceive. This is acknowledged in the 
case of lying ; and, there seems no reason why 
it should not be acknowledged in this case also. 
For, the essence of a lie is the intention to 
deceive. The means employed are immaterial, 
whether they be words, or signs, or arguments. 
Now, in this case, there is an intention to 
deceive. For, the disputant does intend to 
make it believed, that some error is a truth, or 
some truih an error; or, that conclusive argu- 
ments are not conclusive, or vice versa: more- 
over, he endeavours to persuade his hearers, 
that he believes them so to be. And, if he be 
successful in his endeavours, they are reallv 
deceived, no less than if they believed any 
other falsehood. 

When the defence of a party is the ultimate 
object, he who adopts this practice, does ac- 
tually propose to himself deception, as a means 
k3 



198 Appendix. 

of accomplishing his end. Here, therefore, 
the intention to deceive is manifest. Upon 
•what principles, then, this practice can be 
justified, it is difficult to conceive. For how- 
ever important the interests and reputation of 
any man's party may be in his esteem, he can- 
not be justifiable in promoting them by means 
of deception ; unless it can be proved, that the 
end will sanction the means ; or, that it is 
lawful to do evil, that good may come. But, 
when victory, or the reputation of being an 
able disputant, is the ultimate object, it may 
be said, perhaps, that the disputant has no 
real wish to impress on the mind of his op- 
ponent, or others, a belief of false arguments 
or a false conclusion; but only to display 
superior talents of reasoning for his credit 
or amusement. But, I answer, that though 
reputation or entertainment be his ultimate end, 
yet, in order to accomplish it, he does represent 
falsehood as truth, or truth as falsehood ; and 
endeavour to make them believed so to be, at 
least, for the time; otherwise, he could not 
succeed. But, no man can have a right to 
promote his reputation or his amusement, by 
such means ; any more than he can have a 
right to tell lies for a similar purpose. Our 
right to amuse ourselves, or to display our 
talents, can extend only to things which are in 
themselves innocent ; which deception cannot 



Appendix. 199 

be. To gratify ourselves in this way, then, 
must be wrong*. If the disputant were always 
careful to correct the delusions, before lie left 
the company, it may be questioned whether 
his conduct would even then be innocent. It 
would be like indulging oneself in tellina* mar- 
vcllous stories, and, after having- amused one- 
self in such a licence for a considerable time, 
informing the company, that they were false- 
hoods. Would this practice be deemed justifi- 
able? But, the truth is, that these disputants 
are rarely, if ever, careful thus to undo the mis- 
chief which they have done. On the contrary 
they generally leave the false impressions which 
they have made, in full force on -the minds of 
their hearers. 

We are told in scripture, that, f c for every 
" idle word we must give an account in the 
M day of judgment." And surely words em- 
ployed to deceive, must be idle words, in a 
very bad sense. 

Added to all this, the consequences of the 
practice of thus disputing for victory, and not 
for truth, are injurious. They are so to the 
disputant himself. For such a conduct tends 
to weaken the influence of sound arguments 
upon his judgment, and to generate scepticism. 
As the accustoming of ourselves to examine 
carefully the weight of arguments, and to 
allow them due influence on our minds, tends to 



200 Appendix. 

strengthen our judgment ; so, the using our- 
selves to start objections against arguments, in- 
stead of soberly estimating their force, must 
promote scepticism ; for, our minds are subject 
to the influence of habits, as well as our bodies. 
Experience, also, shews that persons, who ad- 
dict themselves to this practice, do often turn 
out sceptics. 

If a man propose the defence of a party by 
these means, he hereby fortifies himself in the 
wrong ; for, if his party were right, they would 
not need such a defence. It can hardly be 
supposed, that he can have the same sense of 
doing wrong, in any particular thing, which 
he has been accustomed to defend victoriously, 
as he would have, if he had been usually 
defeated in his attempts to maintain it. Cer- 
tainly, the law of reputation cannot operate 
upon him in the one case, as it would in the 
other. He also precludes himself from the ad- 
vantage which he might enjoy for the detection 
of his errors, not only on the point in question, 
but on others connected with it. For, his 
friends, were they not silenced by his sophis- 
tries, might point out to him his mistakes, and 
the erroneous principles on which they are 
founded ; both of which, as observers, they are 
more likely to discover than he. 

To the hearers, also, the practice is injurious. 
If they do not detect his fallacies, they are 



Appendix* 201 

really deceived ; and the mischievous conse- 
quences of this deception will be in proportion 
to the importance of the subject. If they per- 
ceive that, though victory is obtained , yet it is 
not on the side of truth, they are led to regard 
the art of reasoning, like the art of fencing ; 
that is, as entirely dependent on the skill of the 
disputant ; but, as having no natural tendency 
to the discovery of truth. For, they suppose, 
that, if a more skilful disputant were to take 
the opposite side of the question, he would be 
able to confute all the former arguments, and 
to establish an opposite conclusion. Thus, the 
faculty, which God bestowed upon man to 
discover truth, and to direct his conduct, is 
brought into disrepute ; and its influence on 
mankind is weakened, if not destroyed. Can 
it be justifiable, then, to render useless, or even 
to impair the use of so important a faculty, 
for the sake of amusing ourselves, or promoting 
the interests of a party ? 

Besides, as, in this practice, some false rule 
of reasoning must always be laid down, either 
formally, or by implication ; or some just rule 
be rejected or perverted, it must always tend 
to pervert men's principles of reasoning, and to 
confound those rules by which truth is to be 
distinguished from error. For instance, should 
a man maintain that probabilities ought not to 
influence our judgment, or our conduct ; but, 



202 Appendix. 

that we have a right to demand certainty, be- 
fore we act or believe, it is evident, that lie 
would be culpable. For, he would be endea- 
vouring to propagate a doctrine, which would 
make men infidels in religion, and would con- 
found the principles on which they must act in 
common life. Now, where is the great dif- 
ference, whether he maintains this doctrine for- 
mally, in words ; or, whether he assumes it 
as a principle, on which he grounds his ar- 
guments, and thus enforces it by his own 
example ? 

Jf lie adopt this practice to support a party, 
he is endeavouring to prevail on others, to sup- 
port what is wrong. For, as was observed be- 
fore, if his party were right, they could not 
need such a defence. This he cannot do inno- 
cently ; unless it can be proved that guilt and 
innocence have no relation to party matters. 

Another evil, attending this practice of dis- 
puting for victory, and not for truth, is its ten- 
dency to excite anger. A man can bear, much 
more patiently, to be shewn that he is wrong, 
if he really be so; than to have the victory 
wrested out of his hands by a sophism, or a 
perversion of the rules of evidence. Nothing, 
indeed, is more likely to irritate and disgust, 
than a conduct so unfair. Hence, also, dispu- 
tation itself, is brought into disrepute, and men 
account debating an evil, because they observe^ 



Appendix. 203 

that it generally ends in a quarrel. But, this it 
would rarely do, if this unfair way of reasoning 
were laid aside. 

What has been said, has been urged with a 
view to shew the immorality of this practice ; 
but its folly, also, may be shewn. And, as it 
is feared, that this consideration will weigh 
more with many, than its immorality, it is ne- 
cessary to add a few words on this topic. 

If the reputation of being an able disputant 
be his object, it may be questioned, whether it 
is not in general defeated. For, with men, at 
least of sound judgment, the notion of an able 
disputant includes that of a fair reasoner; but, 
the notion of a disputant for victory, resembles 
that of a person who cheats at play, and is, in 
consequence, despised. If the reputation of a 
party be his object, it is generally frustrated ; 
because, the delusion will rarely be of long 
continuance, but will most frequently be de- 
tected by reflection, and by subsequent infor- 
mation; and, when it is detected, it excites a 
presumption, that his party is in the wrong. 



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